EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Abstract

Objective: This article examines epistemic responsibility as a normative condition for the legitimacy of scientific knowledge within contemporary philosophy of science. Method: It provides a conceptual analysis and a critical review of the recent philosophical literature, reconstructing epistemic responsibility in two key dimensions—individual and collective—and connecting this framework to the debates on inductive risk and values in science. Results: The analysis demonstrates that epistemic responsibility encompasses individual obligations (such as intellectual integrity and transparency) and collective mechanisms (like peer review and replication). It is intrinsically linked to managing inductive risk, where choices about evidence standards involve value judgments. Furthermore, it serves as a crucial foundation for public trust in science by requiring transparent communication of uncertainty. Conclusion: Epistemic responsibility functions as a key mechanism for sustaining the reproducibility and legitimacy of scientific knowledge, particularly under conditions of social complexity and growing interdisciplinary collaboration. It is not merely an individual virtue but a structural, normative feature of scientific practice.