THE PRINCIPLE OF EMOTIONAL CONVICTION AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE CRIMINAL JUDGE IN THE JORDANIAN CRIMINAL LEGISLATION

Abstract

This study aims to clarify the role of the criminal judge, according to the Jordanian Criminal Procedures Law, in evaluating the evidence before the criminal judge for proof in criminal actions, and the extent of his powers in assessing the evidence, and whether his powers differ in terms of evaluating the evidence from his acceptance and the controls for evaluating the evidence. As well as the extent to which the trial court and the court of cassation supervise the evaluation of the evidence by addressing the position of the Jordanian judiciary regarding the evaluation of the evidence. To achieve the desired goals of this study, the researcher followed the descriptive and analytical approach to the texts of the Jordanian Criminal Procedures Law, reinforced by judicial decisions. One of the most important findings of the study is that the extension of criminal judge's authority to assess his conviction has its limits because the legislator did not leave it unrestricted, but rather the legislator restricted it with limits and controls and provided some exceptions to it against which the criminal judge does not have any freedom in assessing the value of the evidence. The study recommended the need for the Jordanian legislator to intervene to make the necessary amendments with the conviction of the criminal judge, such as determining the value of non-judicial recognition, which is appropriate to the relevant legal texts.