OS MECANISMOS DE INDUÇÃO AO CUMPRIMENTO DO DIREITO INTERNACIONAL À LUZ DA TEORIA LIBERAL DAS RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18623/rvd.v23.n4.4954Keywords:
Direito Internacional, Mecanismos de Indução ao Cumprimento do Direito Internacional, Relações Internacionais, Teorias das Relações Internacionais, LiberalismoAbstract
Na literatura, há uma carência de pesquisa acadêmica, teórica e empírica, sobre o cumprimento estatal das decisões dos regimes jurídicos internacionais. Especificamente, são poucos os trabalhos, a partir das teorias das relações internacionais, não obstante tratar-se de relevante tema de investigação. Entretanto, os mecanismos de indução ao cumprimento do direito internacional somente podem ser compreendidos em toda a sua plenitude mediante ferramentas metodológicas interdisciplinares, que combinem trabalhos empíricos com a revisão da literatura das teorias das relações internacionais, apesar das dificuldades de se estudar vários campos de pesquisa ao mesmo tempo. Diante disso, buscou-se analisar o fenômeno do cumprimento do direito internacional, a partir dos argumentos centrais do paradigma liberal das relações internacionais. Constatou-se que, para o liberalismo, não é possível entender de maneira separada as políticas que ocorrem dentro e fora de um Estado democrático, assim, instituições, grupos e práticas sociais nacionais e transnacionais influenciam-se reciprocamente e produzem consideráveis desdobramentos para a cooperação internacional, com destaque para o cumprimento do direito internacional.
References
ABBOTT, Kenneth W. International relations theory, international law, and the regime governing atrocities in international conflicts. Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, v. 36, p. 127 - 158. 2004.
ABBOTT, Kenneth W. Toward a richer institutionalism for international law and policy. Journal of International Law and International Relations, v. 1, n.1 -2, p. 09 - 34. 2005.
ABBOTT, Kenneth W.; SNIDAL, Duncan. Hard and soft law in international governance. International Organization, v. 54, p. 421 - 456. 2000.
BURLEY, Anne-Marie Slaughter. International law and international relations theory: a dual agenda. American Journal of International Law, v. 87, n. 2, p. 205 - 239. 1993.
CHILTON, Adam S.; BREWSTER, Rachel. Supplying compliance: why and when the US complies with WTO rulings. Yale Journal of International Law, v. 39, p. 201 - 246. 2014.
DUNOFF, Jeffrey L.; TRACHTMAN, Joel P. Economic analysis of international law. Yale Journal of International Law, v. 24, n. 1, p. 01 - 60. 1999.
GUZMAN, Andrew T. A compliance-based theory of international law. California Law Review, v. 90, p. 1823 - 1887. 2002.
GUZMAN, Andrew T. How international law works: a ra¬tional choice theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 260 p.
HAAS, Peter M. Why comply, or some hypotheses in search of an analyst. Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, v. 29, p. 21 - 48. 1997.
HAFNER-BURTON, Emilie M.; VICTOR, David G.; LUPU, Yonatan. Political science research on international law: the state of the field. The American Journal of International Law, v. 106, p. 47 - 97. 2012.
HALLING, Matt. A law of no gods, no masters: developing and defending a participatory legal system. Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, v. 32, n. 1, p. 237 - 270. 2009.
HASTREITER, Michele Alessandra; WINTER, Luís Alexandre Carta. Análise econômica do direito internacional. Revista de Direito Internacional, v. 2, n. 2, p. 262 - 282. 2015.
HATHAWAY, Oona A. Between power and principle: a political theory of international law. Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, p. 469 - 536, jan. 2005.
JEPPERSON, Ronald L.; WENDT, Alexander; KATZENSTEIN, Peter J. Norms, identity, and culture in national security. In: KATZENSTEIN, Peter J. (Coord.) The culture of national security. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. p. 33 - 75.
KATZENSTEIN, Peter J.; KEOHANE, Robert O.; KRASNER, Stephen D. International organization and the study of world politics. International Organization, v. 52, n. 4, p. 645 - 685. 1998.
KELLY, Claire R. The value vacuum: self-enforcing regimes and the dilution of the normative. Michigan Journal of International Law, v. 22, p. 673 - 734. 2001.
KINGSBURY, Benedict. The concept of compliance as a function of competing conceptions of international law. Michigan Journal of International Law, v. 19, p. 345 - 372. 1998.
NORMAN, George; TRACHTMAN, Joel. Measuring the shadow of the future: an introduction to the game theory of customary international law. University of Illinois Law Review, v. 2008, n. 1, p. 127 - 154. 2008.
POSNER, Richard. Fronteiras da teoria do direito. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2011.
PUTNAM, Robert D. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization, v. 42, n. 03, p. 427 - 460. 1988.
RAUSTIALA, Kal; SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. International law, international relations and compliance. In: CARLNAES, Walter; RISSE, Thomas; SIMMONS, Beth (Orgs.). The handbook of international relations. Princeton: Kim Lane Scheppele; Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2002. p. 538 - 558.
RIBEIRO, Gustavo Ferreira; CAIADO, Jose Guilherme Moreno. Por que uma análise econômica do direito internacional público? desafios e perspectivas do método no Brasil. Revista de Direito Internacional, v. 2, n. 2, p. 245 - 261. 2015.
SIMMONS, Beth A. Compliance with international agreements. Annual Reviews of Political Science, v. 1, p. 75 - 93. 1998.
SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie; TULUMELLO, Andrew S.; WOOD, Stepan. International law and international relations theory: a new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship. American Journal of International Law, v. 92, n. 3, p. 367 - 397. 1998.
TRACHTMAN, Joel P. The future of international law: global government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 167 p.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
I (we) submit this article which is original and unpublished, of my (our) own authorship, to the evaluation of the Veredas do Direito Journal, and agree that the related copyrights will become exclusive property of the Journal, being prohibited any partial or total copy in any other part or other printed or online communication vehicle dissociated from the Veredas do Direito Journal, without the necessary and prior authorization that should be requested in writing to Editor in Chief. I (we) also declare that there is no conflict of interest between the articles theme, the author (s) and enterprises, institutions or individuals.
I (we) recognize that the Veredas do Direito Journal is licensed under a CREATIVE COMMONS LICENSE.
Licença Creative Commons Attribution 3.0





