DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS AS A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TOOL: MALAYSIA’S REGULATORY AND ETHICAL PREPAREDNESS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18623/rvd.v23.n4.4718Keywords:
Corporate Governance, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, DPA, Adequate Procedures, ABMSAbstract
This article analyses corporate readiness in Malaysia to implement Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), as practised in the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and Singapore. It highlights the essential elements of DPA, including judicial oversight, public-interest imperatives, and corporate compliance frameworks, thereby fostering ethical accountability. The readiness of Malaysia’s top five publicly listed companies across diverse sectors is measured against compliance with the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 (MACC Act), Adequate Procedures (AP), and ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems (ABMS). The deliberate focus on large corporations reflects their heightened exposure to liability risks and the expectation that they maintain more stringent compliance standards. The findings indicate that substantial anti-corruption efforts have been undertaken, particularly through ABMS certification; however, ethical vulnerabilities persist in specific sectors, notably logistics and transportation. Overall, the study suggests that Malaysia possesses the institutional and corporate capacity to adopt DPAs, provided that such mechanisms are tailored to the country’s legal, economic, and cultural context and are supported by effective judicial oversight and comprehensive compliance infrastructures. This research contributes to policy and corporate discourse by offering a framework for strengthening ethical governance and accountability by integrating comparative DPA models with corporate compliance assessments.
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