MACHINE LOGIC, LEGAL CONSCIENCE: THE DILEMMA OF POSITIVISM IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18623/rvd.v22.n2.3104

Keywords:

Digital Disruption, Artificial Intelligence, Legal Positivism, Law Automation, Philosophical Approach

Abstract

The rapid evolution of the digital realm has engendered profound, systemic transformations across society. Innovations in digital technology-most notably in artificial intelligence-herald the onset of a disruptive era, in which complex activities become simplified and fully automated. When harnessed positively, disruption can replace outdated systems with more robust, efficient frameworks. Artificial intelligence has begun to reshape legal practice, yet its integration demands prudent, ethically grounded reflection. Legal positivism-characterized by a naïve realist commitment to objectivity and certainty-currently dominates legal thought both globally and in Indonesia, basing its raison d'être on relational interactions among legal subjects. This dominance, however, obscures the inherently subjective dimensions of law, which is conceived, created, and applied by humans. The adoption of AI-driven legal processes risks reducing legal inquiry to a purely objective, value-neutral exercise. This paper therefore explores the urgency and future prospects of applying artificial intelligence within a positivist legal paradigm, and investigates the convergence of law and technology in confronting digital disruption. Employing a philosophical approach, the study critically assesses the implications of this convergence for the evolution of legal systems.

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Published

2025-09-25

How to Cite

Wibawa, K. C. S., Natalis, A., & Sipayung, Y. R. (2025). MACHINE LOGIC, LEGAL CONSCIENCE: THE DILEMMA OF POSITIVISM IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Veredas Do Direito, 22(2), e3104. https://doi.org/10.18623/rvd.v22.n2.3104

Issue

Vol. 22 No. 2 (2025): Veredas do Direito, v. 22, n. 2 2025

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