LIMITING EXECUTIVE ABUSE OF POWER THROUGH EXECUTIVE DUALITY AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACTORS

Abstract

The aim of this research is to show that executive duality and participation of constitutional actors in executive decision making can be a structural instrument for limiting the abuse of executive power and preventing its deviation from constitutional goals. The study is founded on the assumption that simply imposing legally formal limits on executive power is not enough if those formal limits are not supported by a rearrangement of executive power and a system of legal checks and counterweights between the institutions of the new constitutional order. Suggesting a comparative analytical method, the models of power distribution in the dual executive systems in France, Egypt and Iraq are examined. It emphasizes the development of the role of the Head of State and of Government, the scope of their powers, the extent to which the partition enhances concentration of power and/or balances authority. The study also illuminates the involvement of the legislative branch and other constitutional actors in critical executive decisions, such as those involving states of emergency, treaty termination and declarations of war, where the dangers of unilateral executive decision-making are most visible. A special focus is on the way in which current constitutions have reinterpreted the concept of separation of powers, from an unchanging tripartite conception to one involving cooperation and balance. This way, different state bodies can have the chance to have an impact on each other and supervise the activities of the other, while maintaining the independence of their functions. The research continues the analysis of the role of president from a symbolic to a substantive perspective, and the position of the Prime Minister and of the Council of Ministers as the executive bodies that directly report to the parliament. It also focuses on the prominence of constitutional conventions and the partisan political setting for supporting one model over another or resolving conflicts between the two. Furthermore, the study proves that legislation influence on fundamental executive acts (like war and state of emergency) could not only be a formal limitation of government powers, however, it is a safeguard for rights and freedoms in a democratic system against a possible excessive extension of executive powers. The study ends with the conclusion that the success or failure of executive duality and the involvement of constitutional actors is finally dependent on the presence of a constitutional and political climate that can activate and enforce constitutional provisions.