

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON THE TRANSFER OF POWER DURING THE MAMLUK ERA IN IRAQ (1750–1831)

INFLUÊNCIAS REGIONAIS E INTERNACIONAIS NA TRANSFERÊNCIA DE PODER DURANTE A ERA MAMELUCA NO IRAQUE (1750–1831)

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
Abstract

The transfer of power and the role of regional and international interventions in Iraq during the Mamluk period (1750–1831). In particular, this project analyses how local authority has combined with Ottoman legitimacy and international interventions. The study shows that the Mamluk political system was characterized by the exercise of effective power through military control and alliances with local elites tribal groups rather than functioning as part of the Ottoman state administrative apparatus which was legitimised by the issuance of imperial decrees by the latter. The results further reveal that the Persian and European interventions, in particular those originating from Britain and France, were a determining factor for bolstering certain rulers. Thus, every power transfer emerged as a layered negotiation involving basic recognition at the centre and differential expression of complicity. The fragile equilibrium resulted in chronic political instability, a weakening of military and administrative institutions, and a form of deferred legitimacy based on regional and local power equilibria rather than on imperial authorization. These dynamics ultimately led to the collapse of Mamluk rule and the reassertion of direct Ottoman authority in 1831. Thus, the interpretation suggests that this integrated the internal structures of Mamluk Iraq. Regional and international influences are linked to the causes of instability and the deterioration of the ruling elite's relative autonomy.

Keywords: Mamluk Iraq. Transfer of Power. Regional Interventions. European Influence. Political Legitimacy. Political Stability. Ottoman System.

Resumo

A transferência de poder e o papel das intervenções regionais e internacionais no Iraque durante o período mameluco (1750–1831). Em particular, este projeto analisa como a autoridade local se combinou com a legitimidade otomana e as intervenções internacionais. O estudo mostra que o sistema político mameluco se caracterizou pelo exercício de poder efetivo por meio do controle militar e de alianças com elites locais e grupos tribais, em vez de funcionar como parte do aparato administrativo do Estado otomano, que era legitimado pela emissão de decretos imperiais por parte deste último. Os resultados revelam ainda que as intervenções persas e europeias, em particular as originárias da Grã-Bretanha e da França, foram um fator determinante para o fortalecimento de certos governantes. Assim, cada transferência de poder surgiu como uma negociação em camadas, envolvendo o reconhecimento básico no centro e a expressão diferenciada de complicitude. O equilíbrio frágil resultou em instabilidade política crônica, um enfraquecimento das instituições militares e administrativas e uma forma de legitimidade diferida baseada em equilíbrios de poder regionais e locais, em vez de na autorização imperial. Essas dinâmicas acabaram por levar ao colapso do domínio mameluco e à reafirmação da autoridade otomana direta em 1831. Assim, a interpretação sugere que isso integrou as estruturas internas do Iraque mameluco. As influências regionais e internacionais estão ligadas às causas da instabilidade e à deterioração da autonomia relativa da elite governante.



Palavras-chave: Iraque Mameluco. Transferência de Poder. Intervenções Regionais. Influência Europeia. Legitimidade Política. Estabilidade Política. Sistema Otomano.

1 INTRODUCTION

The Mamluk Era in Iraq (1750–1831) is the most complex and yet challenging period of the Ottoman administration that took place in Iraq. This period had its own political and administrative characteristics. It is different from the usual model of the Ottoman power. During this era, Iraq served as a semi-independent political entity, shaped by the influence of domestic and military elites who, as the imperial center's grip weakened, succeeded in creating a new governing formula based on actual control and internal alliances that were later solidified by the issuance of imperial edicts.

Alterations in governance during the Mamluk period cannot only be referred to internal factors. Their linkages regional and international orchestrations, particularly amid intensifying rivalry between European powers and their neighbouring states for influence prospects in the wider Middle East. This contest greatly influenced local conflicts, often tipping the balance in favour of one or other contenders for power through various degrees of political, military and diplomatic support. Therefore, power transfer was dependent not only on internal realities but also on external alignments and pressures. Accordingly, the political transitions in Mamluk Iraq were due to local agency, forced migration, international pressure and ultimately tied into legitimacy and regime stability and analysis of these transitions must consider this.

Similarly, analysing the ongoing trends suggest that political instability is often a feature during transitions of power. The close examination of these processes would reveal a strong connection to the external competition with regards to Iraq being a strategic crossroads of trade routes and communication networks as well as entry into the Gulf and India. This competition allowed outside actors to impact succession outcomes by influencing and backing candidates indirectly or weakening others through political pressure and diplomatic isolation. So, the legitimacy of rulers no longer depended only

on actual Ottoman recognition or their military strength. It also depended on their position in a wider regional and international alliance.

Considering the transition of power through the lens of external meddling allows for better comprehension of the structural factors that weakened the Mamluk polity and harmed its capability to retain political unity. Reliance on external balances of power gradually eroded the Mamluk elite's relative autonomy and turned Iraq into an arena of indirect competition between powerful players. The final result was the fall of Mamluk domination and the reinstatement of Ottoman sovereignty in 1831. In this way, the political transformation offers an interpretation not simply in terms of administrative alteration, but rather in terms of disequilibrium attributable to external impact on internal fragmentation.

Through a historical-analytical approach, this study aims to see the impact of the regional and international intervention on the transfer of power in Iraq during the Mamluk era (1750-1831). The technique includes a meticulous examination of primary sources documents, more particularly Ottoman imperial edicts, local administrative records, and letters between provincial governors and the imperial center, along with actions, other European sources reporting siege, use of diplomatic acts and military moments recording to French, British and all of the international involvement in Iraqi matters.

Also, the study analyses the internal political and social context of Afghanistan through relations among military elites, tribal actors and local power structures, along with alliance patterns and negotiated settlements through which governance took place. This approach provides a better understanding of how intra-elite forces helped or hindered the impact of external interventions in leadership transitions. More specifically, I focus on how regional and international balances of power influenced political legitimacy in Mamluk Iraq, and how foreign backing or pressure affected both the path of political succession and the stability of the regime.

In addition, the research utilizes a comparative framework for examining diverse leadership transition cases, analysing the engagement of foreign actors at each stage. This makes it possible to detect larger patterns in how external intervention relates to local politics and its outcome. Using both local and international perspectives – linking domestic power struggles with foreign influences – the aim of this project is to explain

the bases of stability as well as instability and hence the structural conditions that resulted in the downfall of Mamluk rule and the restoration of direct Ottoman rule in 1831.

2 RESEARCH PROBLEM

Mamluk Rule possibly is trying to talk about some focusing by scholars on who has tried to understand the process the Mamluk power transfer in Iraq from the period 1750-1831. That is, how the power was taken over from the Ottomans by the Mamluks.

Most studies focus on the internal dynamics of conflicts among local and military elites, or the administrative and legal processes of governor appointments. Yet, these studies do not focus on regional and international powers' roles on such transformations. These powers include France, Britain and Iran. These actors, however, played a direct and indirect role of strengthening certain rulers and weakening others and thereby contributed to the repeated oscillations in the locus of power.

Insufficient attention has been given to how the external interventions interacted with local conditions, such as alliances between military and tribal elites, competition for resources and the social acceptability of the newly appointed governors as a consequence of these interventions. This is necessary because of the connection between outside influence and what counts as political legitimacy in Mamluk Iraq. The absence of any Ottoman permit or concession is complicated to understand the political system of that time, as legitimacy was no longer drawn mainly from the Ottomans but became more dependent on external support (or pressure). Therefore, it is essential to study this relationship in order to explain recurrent political instability.

As a result, the goal of this study is the interpretation of the impact of regional and international interventions on the transfer of power. This is done by tracking how these pressures shaped leadership changes, institutional stability, and relationships among local actors. Ultimately, it aims to explain the structural factors behind the fall of Mamluk rule and the resumption of direct Ottoman rule in 1831. The study seeks to demonstrate that to adequately grasp power in Mamluk Iraq, it was necessary to link the local dimension with external pressures and balances – and to assess how such interventions shaped governance and the building of political legitimacy.

3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

Utilizing an analytical-historical approach that includes primary and secondary resources, this paper study the impact of regional and international interferences on the transfer of power and stability of government in Mamluk Iraq. This aims at examining the internal political and social environment for local and military elites, their alliances, conflict negotiation and pattern of authority, together with an assessment of the external actors' influence on these internal political and social processes. This way they can see how local, regional, and international factors shaped governance in Baghdad and elsewhere throughout Iraq during the years 1750–1831.

The study uses two main types of sources for the analysis:

1. First, the main sources that will be used in the thesis will be the Ottoman imperial decrees (ferman), formal letter exchanges between the imperial center and governors of Baghdad, local administrative records, and a range of military records that document operations and external interventions.

They also include modern European materials like military memoirs and diplomatic reports that explain how France, Britain, and its neighbours became engaged in the affairs of Mamluk Iraq.

2. A modern historian and expert on Mamluk rule in Iraq, and local conflicts, a historian who has studied foreign interventions in the Near East. Plus books about Ottoman policy and European rivalry for influence in the region. Utilizing these materials allows for a comparative analytical reading between local, regional and global readings.

By combining this approach with different types of sources, it allows for an analysis of the process of power transfer in Mamluk Iraq. Through an analysis of Iraqi political developments since the inception of the war in 2003, the study intends to dissect this exercise of investigating the 2021 Iraqi election results due to alleged fraud. It also applies new theoretical concepts and opportunities for analysis.

4 SECTION ONE: THE NATURE OF THE MAMLUK POLITICAL SYSTEM IN IRAQ AND THE LIMITS OF ITS AUTONOMY (1750–1831)(2)

4.1 First: the transfer of power as a complex political phenomenon

Authority transfer in Mamluk Iraq (1750–1831) may be examined as a complex political phenomenon, whose implications go far beyond the confines of central Ottoman administration, which relied on a fixed set of directives issued by the center for the appointment of governors. The change of authority in Mamluk Iraq was not a mere formal administrative change but emerged from the interplay between the effective power of local military elites and the legal power of Ottoman imperial decrees. (3).

Starting in the mid-eighteenth century, the province of Baghdad exhibited a gradual decline in the capacity of the imperial center to impose governors upon the province from elsewhere. The emergence of locally oriented Mamluk personages, who monopolized the instruments of military and administrative power, decisively shaped the political balance within the province. In consequence transfer was a process that commenced from specific collectivity forces the locational alliances and the imperial declaration or other necessary measures came later to be taken. In many cases, such declarations serve less a direct central-imposition function, but rather a retrospective endorsement of something that already existed.

French traveler Carsten Niebuhr mentions that the government of Baghdad during the Mamluk time was under a pasha of the first rank with three horse-tail standards. In other words, the pasha is second in rank to the sultan only, which means he is of the highest symbolic rank. Such rank was given by the sultan to a governor of a big province like Baghdad or Egypt. In contrast, officials of lesser administrative or military positions, such as the governor of Basra or the governor of Shahrazad, received a two- or one-standard rank. This hierarchy suggests a systematic structure of power within the Ottoman; furthermore, it indicates a crucial relocation of bona fide power from the empire' center to that of Baghdad. (5).

In this context, the imperial decree itself no longer served to lend authority; rather, the decree became a means for legitimation of a political reality already brought about by local forces. As a result, the Mamluk demands legitimacy from society before relenting,

which created a “deferred legitimacy” in Mamluk Iraq. Under this model, it was political strength in terms of local power, alliance and military strength that mattered, and the imperial order, merely gave legal sanction to the status quo. (6).

4.2 Second: the multiplicity of patterns in the transfer of power

During the Mamluk era (1750–1831), Iraq had a political system without a well-defined principle of hereditary succession, and with an instability of the mechanisms of political transition. The power transfer mechanism was flexible but vulnerable and divisive in its nature.

Simply having a family background was not enough to take control of the province, nor was belonging to a powerful family enough to ensure continuity or further dominance over the ruling elite.

Likewise, administrative experience or managerial competence did not form decisive criteria for governance. There was a widespread acknowledgment that the means of the patna and law could not secure control over the province, but rather to be able to skillfully forge ties with the military elite of the Mamluks who controlled the army and defined the real-supporters of commanders.

Moreover, the backing of local notables and tribal leaders was critical to the success of any candidate for power. The community social and political allegiance acted as a kind of protective wall for the ruler against internal and external challenges. As a result of this configuration, one may use the term ‘coercive consensus’ or temporary settlements. These settlements were succeeded by prevailing political conditions in order to avert disorder and armed conflict. However, such arrangements did not reflect stable institutional legitimacy.

Thus, the effective determinants of governorship became political maneuverability and the ability to manage alliances and secure military and social support rather than hereditary succession and administrative qualifications. The concept of coercive consensus, a distinctive category of political transition, refers to a form of unwritten agreement negotiated amongst the relevant competing actors – be they Mamluk factions or tribal and local elite groups. (7).

The intent behind these arrangements was not to create long-lasting institutional legitimacy, but to avoid a collapse into chaos and violent conflict that threatened the local and regional orders. The resulting consensus was not a political choice in the proper sense but a response to local pressures and immediate threats arising from the province's precarious balance of power.

Although this pattern allowed the newly installed governors to stabilize their political system and rule the province without opposition for the time being, the system was unstable. The sustainability of the regime was limited and could collapse under pressure of a changing power balance like a governor's death, changing loyalties of military and tribal forces, and interference by regional and international players in local matters. (8).

The essence of coercive consensus is that the internal political structure is fragile and the system functions based on local realities rather than formal legal authority or central commands. The evidence suggests that Mamluk Iraq was never stable in the way that this network had envisaged. Hence, this pattern is very significant to understand power relations in this period in history.

4.3 Third: the ottoman decree between legal legitimacy and symbolic function

During the Mamluk period, the Ottoman imperial decree maintained its significance but did not have an essential constitutive function anymore, so it came to function mainly as a ratification instrument instead of one of creation. In many cases, the imperial center was forced to acknowledge the authority of a locally imposed governor to prevent the unrest from growing or the province from nominally seceding. Consequently, the decree evolved into a symbolic element that subserviently provided legal cover for an already established rule rather than being a decisive mechanism in the selection of rulers(9).

The newly-acquired symbolic function demonstrates that the relationship between Ottoman center and province is asymmetrical. According to Montgomery, while the imperial capital may appear to preserve sovereignty, Baghdad retains the power in reality. The Ottomans as a central authority benefited from a situation where powerful governors

emerged who wielded significant autonomy as long as they ensured a baseline of nominal loyalty and contributing to the payment of tax (10).

By exploring power transfers in Mamluk Iraq, it becomes apparent that such events are symptomatic of the political system itself, which, for all its advantages, has no real capacity to produce stability over the long term but only in an ephemeral sense. Instability of successions occurring repeatedly does not show the incapacity of individuals but the fragility of the political structure itself. The unclear rules of succession and the plurality of sources of legitimacy along with multiple power centers turned each transfer of authority to a moment of systemic testing. The political transition mechanism is seen as a reflection of Mamluk style of governance and limitations which impede the sustainability of stability (271 words).

5 SECTION TWO: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE TRANSFER OF POWER IN BAGHDAD

5.1 First: the imposition of a de facto order as the primary path to authority

The most typical form of political succession during the Mamluk period in Iraq was the imposition of a de facto order. A new governor usually laid claim to authority by controlling local military forces and relied on the loyalty of Mamluk troops before obtaining official recognition from the Ottoman state. In this respect, the transfer of power was not a separate decision issued from the capital of the empire, but rather an indication of the imbalances in power that existed in the province itself. The assassination, dismissal, or neutralizing of a governor often created a vacuum that different actors sought to occupy (11).

The pattern shows that actual power came before legal legitimacy, and decision-making was based in Baghdad and not in the imperial capital. Mamluk governance relied more on its organized force and military loyalty than its more traditional institutional structures.

There was another pattern of succession which developed within the Mamluk elite with relative consensus, often with tacit support from local notables and influential tribal leaders. The development of this pattern tended to arise when rival factions sought to not

cause disorder or resolution militarily occurred because the balance of power was too even. However, this agreement didn't mean institutional maturity, but rather it was a conditional settlement that took place out of necessity. Whatever Monroe doctrine or pivot to Asia is, the geopolitical rivalry within the Asian region remains Susceptible to shocks. Aspects like power configuration can destabilize the political order of Japan (6).

Historians have had various interpretations of these mechanisms of succession. According to Rasul al-Kirkukli, Dawud Pasha's appointment was in accord with the will of the people, endowing it with a sort of social and moral legitimacy (13); by contrast Stephen Hemsley Longrigg sees it as an imperial decision influenced by internecine struggles in the Ottoman bureaucracy. Though differing in their interpretations of legitimacy and political change, both views agree that power is rooted in the imperial edict, and that edict is the legal basis for power (14).

The evolving Ottoman administrative and military system shows how over time the state stopped intervening directly and shifted to indirect rule through notables, due to the weakening of state regulations in far-off provinces. Rebellions in the empire became more frequent and rebellious areas exhibited a trend of militarization which suggests that by the 1800s Ottomans were issuing repeated decrees but at the periphery their effectiveness was declining. Similarly, corruption in the military apparatus and distortions in the salary system impaired the state's capacity for its directives. As a result, the Central administration could not effectively control outer provinces through formal orders (15).

5.2 Second: the impact of regional and international interventions on the transfer of power

The transfer of power in Mamluk Iraq was not just a local affair but one that was significantly impacted by outside and regional forces. Neighboring powers and European states had vested interests of their own in the Mamluks. The Iranian state, for example, exerted constant pressure on Iraq, whether by directly deploying military troops or through the use of local groups. Involvement of regional rulers strengthened some while weakening others. Overall, regional alliances were vital for consolidation and undermining of power. (23)

European countries, chiefly United Kingdom and France, played indirect but significant role in influencing Baghdad city through their economic and diplomatic ties with their governors to arrange politically stable set-up for their economic objectives (17). These interventions added a new factor to political succession. This new factor is the need to obtain the permission or at least not to get in the way of regional and international players (18).

The appointment of Sulayman Pasha the Great, for instance, is the result of an interplay between internal disorder, pressure exerted by local populations on the Ottoman state, and external factors, including British support and financial aid. The transfer of power here was not simply a local affair; rather, it was an outcome of multi-layered processes: the local, the Ottoman, and the international (19).

5.3 Third: the impact of external interventions on the stability of governance and the legitimacy of authority

The convergence of indigenous dynamics and external pressures resulted in a precarious scheme of postponed legitimacy whereby the governor's authority emanated neither exclusively from the center nor from the balancing act between local powers, but rather the ability to win regional actors and gain external acknowledgement from foreign players with vested interests in Iraq. Due to this, political stability was already weak, as one internal or external alliance could change the entire political equation, and deserving to cause a test of the whole system at every power transfer.

All such interactions are a further illustration that the Mamluk authority in Baghdad operated in an open structure subjected to shifting internal and regional and international balances. While this gave each governor a limited degree of autonomy, it also made them vulnerable to reassessment or dismissal. Due to this situation's structural weakness and repeated conflict, Mamluk state ultimately collapsed and direct Ottoman control was restored in 1831 (20).

The analysis highlights how outside interventions in Baghdad were not only secondary features, but a core part of the power transfer relations. Authority was not closed or stable, but rather, it was situated within a dense web of local, regional and international relations.

6 SECTION THREE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS FOR SYSTEM STABILITY AND THE COLLAPSE OF MAMLUK RULE

6.1 First: the weakness of political stability as a result of local and external interactions

In Iraq, Mamluk political system was in constant engagement with local conflicts as well as external interventions thus resulting in continuous political instability. The effective authority of each governor depended on a complex balance of power between rival Mamluk elites, local troops, powerful notables, and tribal groups; while the appointment of governors was also affected by the positions of regional and international powers that monitored, backed, or opposed them.

This context meant every hand-over of power became a litmus test for the system, relying on actual exercise of authority to secure power when mere legal legitimacy was inadequate. Rather, a successful governor could manage internal alliances and negotiate external pressures well to be a successful governor. The idea of “deferred legitimacy” emanated from this reality, in which authority was built up from the reference point of the local power before being recognized by the center. (21)

Consequently, “temporary stability” became a distinguishing feature of the system. Effective governors were able to assert control for a limited time but quickly lost it with any change of balance for instance the death of a governor, changes in the support of local notables and changes in the interests of other actors. A transition of power became a structural feature of the system. It revealed the fragility of the political order and the instability of the ruling elite and not merely the failure of particular rulers (22).

6.2 Second: the impact of external interventions on military and administrative institutions

The impact of regional and international interference went far beyond the appointment of governors to the institutions of governance, military and civilian administration. The weakening of control of the imperial authority over inward provinces

paved the way for the Mamluks to seize the opportunity of the ineffectiveness of the regular army to build their parallel armies and manage resources and security independently.

In addition, military corruption and distortions in the salary system reduced the state's ability to implement. Due to this, Ottoman edicts that were meant to serve as instruments of central control, were in essence legal frameworks that became largely symbolic and lacked the ability to ensure effective control over provincial territories (23).

Meanwhile, the European powers, such as United Kingdom and France, added another dimension to this precarious balance. The financial and political backing of a specific governor by them would increase the authority of that governor. Similarly, their backing against him would diminish the power of that specific governor. Consequently, external pressure became a coding mechanism that determined which local factions would succeed in power assuming (24).

As a result, local power, external power and the symbolic legitimacy of the Ottoman state shaped the actual transfer of power in a complicated manner. The said dynamic, in conjunction with one responsible for the chaotic entry into statehood, weakened institutional continuity significantly and undermined the ability of military and administrative structures to withstand internal and external threats (25).

6.3 Third: the collapse of Mamluk rule and the restoration of direct ottoman control (1831)

After many years, both internal and external reasons added up to lead to the collapse of the Mamluk system in Iraq and the re-establishment of direct Ottoman rule in 1831. It became increasingly difficult to maintain a semi-autonomous model based on local power and cooperation with the Mamluk elite and leading notables. Time and again experience has shown that no military powerful governor, however efficient their administration may be, will be able to achieve stability in the long run after the continual outside intervention, whether regional or international, supporting one candidate or another or controlling the provincial agenda.

The utter collapse of that also brings to light that the external interventions were not mere interventions or incidents. Rather, it was alongside the reconfiguration of

authority. It was a key element. The attitudes adopted by regional and international powers became crucial in determining whether any governor succeeded or failed. The strength of succession mechanisms is also fragile because they depend on effective power rather than institutional frameworks. As a result, each authority transfer had a negotiated character involving local players and external players in a constantly evolving web of relationship.

This shows how the internal and external problems of Mamluk Iraq was solved. The authority of the time was not due to individual or administrative will, but emerged from a constant dynamic interplay of internal conditions, the Ottoman center, and regional and international interventions. This comprehension enables an analysis of the political legitimacy, fragile nature of institutions, and the lack of sustained stability in Mamluk Iraq.

7 CONCLUSION

Through the analysis of the effects of regional and international interventions on the transfer of power during the Mamluks in Iraq (1750–1831), the study illustrates how the transfers of power were not mere political events nor administrative arrangements under the will of the centralized Ottoman state. In fact, they resulted from a fragile internal structure coming under ever greater external pressure. The weakening of imperial power and the rise of the local Mamluk elite produced a particular model of governance characterized by effective autonomy, whereby authority was first established through control over what we can call local instruments of power military and administrative before obtaining its legitimacy through Ottoman imperial decrees. This means that the political power is gradually, though informally, moving from the imperial capital to Baghdad.

The research also shows that external meddling of neighboring regional powers and rising European states was not an afterthought or a secondary one. In fact, they formed a structural part of the governing equation. Such interventions impacted internal rivalries through the support for some actors, and undermining of others, making the transfer of power in Mamluk Iraq part of a wider network of regional and international relations. As a result, rulers' legitimacy came to depend on their ability to handle

pressures from the inside and the outside, rather than only having Ottoman authorization for their rule. As a result of this dynamics, what can be called “composite legitimacy” emerged, comprising formal legal support and practical endorsement.

In addition, the questionable existence of institutional mechanisms for succession and the presence of competing power centres within the province were further reasons for chronic instability. Each transfer of power posed a crucial test for political arrangements as a whole due to the lack of stable procedures of succession and reliance on contingent alliances and coercive settlements. This type of environment generates a transient sort of stability, which may be referred to as fragile. In it, strong individuals were able to impose their authority for set time periods. However, this equilibrium is lost as soon as the positions of local or external forces change. Thus, fighting broke out again.

The research further reveals that outside impacts were not limited to the choice of elites but also affected the very infrastructure of military and administrative regimes. The Mamluk elite relied on regional military forces to maintain their control because of the weakening central authority and the ineffective regular army. While this gave them greater independence, it also severed their ties to the Ottoman center.

Furthermore, external pressures and competition from abroad hindered both administrative and military reform, thus making state institutions less capable of responding to internal and external challenges. In turn, this hampered their ability to achieve sustained stability.

The collapse of Mamluk rule in 1831, therefore, should not be seen as a sudden or incidental event but as the result of deeper structural imbalances. Internal and external interaction contributed to lost adaptive capability and continuity, while increasing dependence on regional and international balances undermined the Mamluk elite’s capacity of relative autonomy. As conditions became right for direct Ottoman intervention, the Mamluk system was unable to resist or regenerate itself and was thus replaced with a renewed version of a centralised state system.

As such, the Mamluk experience in Iraq is a clear case study in the trajectory of semi-autonomous regimes which are built upon unstable equilibria and are unregulated by institutional frameworks with the capacity to transfer power. An adequate comprehension of Iraq during this period necessitates a careful analysis of the dialectical relationship of internal and external forces, a contention that the study strongly confirms.

The emergence of authority was not the result of solely local dynamics nor isolated external imposition. It was a product of their continuous interaction.

Ultimately, the results create space for further research into patterns of governance in other Ottoman provinces and for framing analyses of external interventions and their influence on political authority. These two essays highlight how the international balances pertained to the reconfiguration of political entities in the Islamic world during the modern period, thus enabling a better understanding of the political changes that took place in the region.

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APPENDIX

Endnotes

1. Rasul Hawi al-Kirkukli, *Dawhat al-Wuzara fi Tarikh Waqa’i Baghdad al-Zawra*, translated by Musa Kazim Nurs, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1960, p. 106; Baqir Amin al-Wardi, *Events of Baghdad Over Twelve Centuries*, 1st ed., Al-Nahda Library, Baghdad, 1989, p. 222; Alaa Musa Nurs, *Mamluk Rule in Iraq*, Ministry of Information Publications, Iraq, 1975, p. 30; Abbas al-Azzawi, *Encyclopedia of Iraq’s History Between Two Occupations*, 1st ed., Arab Encyclopedia House, Beirut, 2004, vol. 5, p. 324; Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, *Iraq: Past and Present*, 3rd ed., Al-Irfan Press, Sidon, 1958, p. 29. Some historians, however, indicate that its beginning dates back to 1749/1162 AH, or even a year earlier, as noted by Abbas al-Azzawi, *Iraq Between Two Occupations*, vol. 6, p. 17; Imad Abd al-Salam Raouf, *Social Life in Iraq during the Mamluk Period (1749–1831)*, Master’s Thesis, Department of History, Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, 1976, p. 4; Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, previous source, p. 136; Baqir Amin al-Wardi, *Baghdad: Its Caliphs, Governors, Kings, and Presidents*, Dar al-Tarbiyah Publications, Baghdad, 1984, p. 223. It is noted that there is variation among sources regarding the starting date of Mamluk rule in Baghdad, reflecting differences among historians between dating the emergence of actual influence and dating the formal consolidation of authority. Accordingly, this study adopts the year 1750 as the beginning of Mamluk rule in Baghdad, as it marks the official appointment of Sulayman Pasha, while acknowledging an earlier preparatory phase of expanding influence.
2. Ali al-Wardi, *Social Glimpses from the Modern History of Iraq*, Al-Irshad Press, Baghdad, vol. 1, p. 150.
3. Carsten Niebuhr, *Niebuhr’s Journey to Iraq in the Eighteenth Century*, translated by Mahmoud Hussein al-Amin, Dar al-Jumhuriya for Publishing and Printing, Baghdad, 1965, p. 129.

4. James Raymond Wellsted, *A Journey to Baghdad during the Governorship of Dawud Pasha*, translated by Salim al-Tikriti, Arab Renaissance Library, Baghdad, 1984, p. 58.
5. Uthman ibn Sanad, *Matali' al-Su'ud bi-Tib Akhbar al-Wali Dawud*, abridged by Amin Hasan al-Halwani al-Madani, edited by Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, Al-Salafiyya Press, Cairo, 1931, p. 307; Rasul Hawi al-Kirkukli, previous source, p. 275; Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq History*, translated by Ja'far al-Khayyat, 6th ed., Baghdad, 1985, p. 284.
6. Ra'fat al-Shaykh, *Modern Arab History*, Ain for Human and Social Studies and Research, 1994, pp. 40–41.
7. Abd al-Aziz Sulayman Nawar, *Modern History of Iraq from the End of Dawud Pasha to the End of Midhat Pasha's Rule*, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, Cairo, 1968, p. 22.
8. Abd al-Aziz Sulayman, same source, p. 23.
9. Abd al-Aziz Sulayman, same source, p. 23.
10. Sulayman Faiq, *History of Baghdad*, translated by Musa Kazim, Al-Ma'arif Press, Baghdad, 1962, p. 62.
11. Abbas al-Azzawi, previous source, vol. 6, p. 271.
12. Rasul al-Kirkukli, previous source, p. 275.
13. Stephen Longrigg, previous source, p. 284.
14. Odile Moreau, *The Ottoman Empire in the Age of Reforms*, translated by Carmen Jaber, 1st ed., Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Beirut, 2018, pp. 20–21.
15. Lutski, *Modern History of the Arab Countries*, 9th ed., Dar al-Farabi, Beirut, 2007, p. 79.
16. Ra'fat al-Shaykh, previous source, p. 42.
17. Ra'fat al-Shaykh, same source, p. 78.
18. Alaa Musa Nurs, previous source, p. 117.
19. Ra'fat al-Shaykh, previous source, pp. 81–82.
20. Rasul al-Kirkukli, previous source, p. 170; Stephen Longrigg, previous source, pp. 234–235.
21. Uthman ibn Sanad, previous source, p. 307; Rasul Hawi al-Kirkukli, previous source, p. 275; Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, previous source, p. 284.
22. Abd al-Aziz Sulayman Nawar, previous source, p. 22.

23. Abd al-Aziz Nawar, previous source, p. 23.
24. Arif Mardhi al-Fatah, *A Concise History of Basra, al-Ahsa, Najd, and Hijaz*, Arab Encyclopedia House, vol. 2, Beirut, 2009, p. 33.
25. Stephen Longrigg, previous source, pp. 227–228.