

JEAN-LUC NANCY'S CONCEPT OF THE OTHER: OR WHEN THE SELF IS THE SAME AS THE OTHER

O CONCEITO DE “OUTRO” DE JEAN-LUC NANCY: OU QUANDO O EU É O MESMO QUE O OUTRO

Article received on: 11/18/2025

Article accepted on: 2/13/2026

Nada Abdulraheem Makttoof Al-Mayyahi*

*Department of Philosophy, University of Baghdad, College of Arts, Baghdad, Iraq
nada.a@coart.uobaghdad.edu.iq

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest

Abstract

This research aims to shed light on Jean-Luc Nancy's philosophical contribution to the concept of the other. Nancy's approach to the other adopts a new form of philosophy away from the approaches of other philosophers, as the concept of the other has become a new hermeneutical station of self-awareness and not an altruistic or external view of it, as has been known since Descartes to this day. The other has become according to the pattern(being-with) another who examines the self and reveals its identity and relationship with others. The other - as Nancy sees it-is not just a mirror reflection of ourselves, but a radical otherness that challenges and enriches our understanding of the world. Meeting with the other opens up new possibilities of meaning, innovative ways of being in the world. The other is the context through which the meaning of existence is formed or on the basis of which the existing other is dealt with. This approach has opened the door for philosophical discussion towards further contributions regarding the concept of the other.

Keywords: The Other. Being. Jean Luc Nancy. Self.


Resumo

Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo esclarecer a contribuição filosófica de Jean-Luc Nancy para o conceito do outro. A abordagem de Nancy ao outro adota uma nova forma de filosofia, distanciando-se das abordagens de outros filósofos, uma vez que o conceito do outro tornou-se um novo ponto de referência hermenêutico da autoconsciência e não uma visão altruísta ou externa dela, como se conhece desde Descartes até os dias de hoje. O outro tornou-se, de acordo com o padrão (ser-com), aquele que examina o eu e revela sua identidade e relação com os outros. O outro — na visão de Nancy — não é apenas um reflexo espelhado de nós mesmos, mas uma alteridade radical que desafia e enriquece nossa compreensão do mundo. O encontro com o outro abre novas possibilidades de significado, formas inovadoras de estar no mundo. O outro é o contexto através do qual o sentido da existência se forma ou com base no qual o outro existente é abordado. Essa abordagem abriu as portas para a discussão filosófica em direção a novas contribuições sobre o conceito do outro.

Palavras-chave: O Outro. O Ser. Jean-Luc Nancy. O Eu.

1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of the Other occupies a central place in Nancy's thought, serving as the fundamental intellectual axis around which his entire philosophy revolves. For Nancy, the concept of the Other is linked not only to the shared existence of beings within the horizon of communal living or existence in the world, but also to significant philosophical



dimensions encompassing various other types of relationships—religious, political, aesthetic, psychological, literary, and others. The Other does not appear within the realm of the transcendent as a separate existence whose particularities and uniqueness one must be mindful of; rather, it is one of the fundamental meanings of shared existence that constitutes the axis of Being-with, according to a model established by Heidegger a century ago. It is fair to assert that Nancy's concept of the Other, with its profound influence, was derived from Heidegger's concept of Being-with. Although Nancy adapted this concept to suit his philosophical needs, its underlying philosophical foundation remained rooted in the concept of authentic Being, with the added understanding that authentic Being is, in essence, Being-Together. This research attempts to present the fundamental contributions of Jean-Luc Nancy's approach to the concept of the Other and the philosophical horizons that emerged following this approach.

2 JEAN-LUC NANCY'S CONCEPT OF THE OTHER: OR WHEN THE SELF IS THE SAME AS THE OTHER

The talk about the concept of the other was not born of the feminist moment, but preceded it by several centuries . Philosophers, in their different languages and schools, have examined the concept of the other and demonstrated its importance in relation to subjective, social or even political patterns . From the German circle, we can talk about some additions or, say, the basic building blocks of the concept of the other by some philosophers. For example, Kant believes that " the other is what reveals the limits of my knowledge and my subordination to the General Laws of reason." And also believes that " the other is what calls me to respect and accept as an end in itself, not just a means." . Hegel (1770-1831) says that "the other is the mirror in which I see myself. Without awareness of the other, an individual cannot reach self-awareness. That self-awareness is completed only through confrontation with the other. The other is the mirror through which I see myself and become fulfilled as an individual. This struggle between oneself and the other is the engine of consciousness and civilized development. Hegel discussed the concept of the" other "in the context of the controversy between the" self"and the" other " and the formation of self-identity. , The self is determined by its relationship to the other. "The other is what fulfills my latent potential through mutual recognition." "The

other is what constitutes the dialectic of consciousness and mutual recognition between self and subject." "The other is self-actualizing through mutual recognition and dialectical dialogue." "Self-awareness is achieved only through recognition of the other."- This reflects Hegel's vision of the importance of the relationship with the other in shaping our consciousness of ourselves.

Apart from Hegel and his ideas, Schopenhauer sees the other from a different angle, because it is the other who experiences the painful truth of existence and takes away my selfish will." "The other is what exposes the selfish nature and the will to control in man." "The other is what reflects to me my selfish nature and my need for empathy."

As for Nietzsche, who is unique in his philosophy and his view of things, he has a special view of the other, depending on what he sees in the corridors of philosophy before him or even in the political and social dimensions of his time. Based on the concept of Superman and the will of power, the other is the horizon through which a person can transcend the boundaries that were drawn for him, that is, he comes to other possibilities that exist other than those that are known and drawn to him according to religious, political and social perceptions. "The other is what drives me to overcome and overcome myself in order to achieve the will of power."

Proceeding from the concept of language and its implications, Wittgenstein asserts that "the other is what determines the boundaries of my language and therefore the boundaries of my world." Gadamer, the author of the truth, the method, the horizons of Taoism, interpretation and discourse, is well aware of the role that the other plays in dialogue or even in capturing the cultural horizon of the other and then going to what he calls the cross-pollination of horizons that confirm the centrality of the other in building the appropriate Taoist horizon and then creating a solid hermeneutic system that helps to read texts in a different format. "The other is what requires me to understand his cultural horizon and dissolve my own horizon in his horizon." The author of the theory of communicative action –Habermas - does not lose sight of the scene of evidence about the centrality of the other and its importance in establishing the basic links of the public space, which originally requires the presence of the other and respect for his otherness. "The other is what requires me to recognize him, respect his rights and realize his just demands." . As for the rest of the Frankfurt School, or, say, the philosopher of recognition, Honneth, he is fully aware that the boundaries of the self begin from the perception of the

other and its importance in drawing up the space of recognition and participation . Without the other and his binding presence, there is no system of cooperation and exchange of recognition within the community and society alike . The other is the main element in the statement of the credibility of the concept of recognition, because recognition is inherent in one recognized and vice versa, the other . "The other is what defines the limits¹ of the self and gives it the recognition and appreciation necessary for its realization ." .

Although Descartes was self-centered and emphasized self-awareness in examining and perceiving the world, this did not prevent him from saying that there is a close relationship between that ego that is aware of its existence and the other, that perspective to him, both perceived and appointed .: "I'm thinking, so I exist. But who am I in my relationship with the other" In front of the Enlightenment philosopher Rousseau, he paved the way for talking about the importance of the other in all his books, which then led to the centrality of the concept of the other not only in the literature of the Enlightenment, but extended to the present day . Based on his vision of the social contract, which is based on individuals and groups, which are necessarily individuals and others, the other, as he sees it, generates a sense of empathy and social responsibility for me." As for Voltaire, who inspired the Enlightenment, the virtue of tolerance, as he sees it, begins from participation and otherness, and when you forgive, there must be another forgiveness and vice versa. The feeling of otherness and otherness has always been present to him, he says : "tolerance is the virtue that makes us accept the other even if it is different from us."

And when it comes to Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980): and his vision of the other, it looks a lot different . He studied the concept of " the other " as part of philosophical existentialism. He focused on how the other affects our vision of ourselves and our freedom. Despite all the assertions mentioned by philosophers before him about the importance of the other and its centrality in self-awareness, building the basic bonds of society and community and the sustainability of the horizon of coexistence, Sartre sees the other as hell . This shocking statement has opened the door wide for discussion between a supporter of this idea and a fierce opponent of it . Sartre's view of the other proceeds from the premise that every time the other attends in accordance with my conscious and perceptual pattern, he robs me of the freedom of my single ego or the self

that is examining or dominating the consciousness of the world . Instead of the self being the one who sees, perceives and realizes, and the gift of things must be done, its status and centrality for me, as a human being with a relationship and ties with nature, the other comes as soon as his visible presence or SEER takes away all that existential security from me and refers me to his perspective, Observer, Examiner, object of knowledge and perception . Instead of me being the self-aware and scrutinizing of what is around me, the other, once present, refers me to his perspective, an object of knowledge . It is this freedom, captured in Sartre's words, that makes the other an object of aversion and alienation, instead of the solitary existential serenity for me as a person who sees, realizes and enjoys what he sees and feels in this world, the self becomes an object . Sartre confirms this in his book *Being and nothingness*, specifically in the chapter in which he talks about the gaze or gaze . My freedom, once boundless in my own world, is now being restricted by the other . Sartre says: "the other is what determines my existence and what I am in the world." "The other is what makes me realize the limits of my freedom and self-deification." "The other is my hell. My relationship with the other is a relationship of constant conflict, in which I always strive to dominate or dominate him." "The other is hell. The other is the one that actually makes me feel like a subject, that is, something other than free." "The other is hell. When I look at the other, I feel as if I am locked in my body and have lost my freedom." .

3 THE OTHER IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JEAN-LUC NANCY

The other is not something we can understand or possess. The other always exists already, in its irreducible otherness. The encounter with the other is a meeting with the Infinite, with what transcends and disrupts our self-enclosed world." Since the other does not come according to the existential pattern of possession or possession, even according to perception or perception, but the other is an act of constant verification of otherness, which allows us to grasp it in any case only according to the existential feeling of duality . The latter, according to this understanding, is what reveals to us our existential duality, or rather, what irreversibly disrupts the Cartesian Cogito. Not only that, but the concept of the other implies that it is not a reflection of ourselves, 'since "the other is not just a mirror reflection of ourselves, but a radical otherness that challenges and enriches our

understanding of the world. Meeting with the other opens up new possibilities of meaning, new ways of being in the world." This further states that " the other is not a static entity, but a dynamic and flexible presence that is constantly evolving. The other is not a fixed category, but a process of becoming, a movement of difference and change" . The other I am talking to is perceived by me as an absolute otherness, isolated from me, my personality and my presence, but according to Nancy's understanding, this other is that recurring, generative presence that scrutinizes my existence every time I see the other's otherness or try to examine my single existence . The other is the permanent process, the repeated difference, the renewed change that is indescribable and immutable . This new understanding of the other makes it an existential station that scrutinizes everything around it . We are no longer transcendent beings who can give meaning to all other beings, including the other or others, but the understanding of authentic existence and co - existence is based entirely on the presence of the other multiple and reproducing at the same time . And this other does not cease to make us understand existence, including our existence, but rather it disrupts the adherence to each individual identity or the retreat into a bloated or closed self . That is, the other makes us repeat our self-question every time we try to answer a question from the other "To meet the other is to face the limits of our self, the limits of our existence . The other disrupts our sense of self and pushes us to question our identity and relationship with the world."

Meeting with the other is a moral necessity. It calls us to recognize and respect the difference of the other, to recognize his dignity and the right to be different. The latter is not a threat to our identity, but a call to responsibility . One of the advantages of the other, according to Nancy, is that it opens the horizon of recognition, that recognition, which is a prerequisite for the logic of coexistence, not only this, but also that difference requires the condition of respect for the other's otherness and difference, which confirms that the other is not only a disturbing element of our self-identity or for our self. Rather, it is the other that makes our identity the focus of attention in the Heideggerian sense . That is, it is the other who asserts that my identity can take on its true effective character only by the existence of another who separates me from others, in other words – only by the existence of someone who divides my self into me and others . This understanding of the other according to the pattern of identity acquisition and its re-meaning is something that is new in the horizon of philosophical, social and political thinking . After the identity depended

on the aspect of privacy and uniqueness , to preserve everything that would entrench the subjective character of identity, according to this understanding, it became the other who reproduces identities, but not in their old form or closed character, but according to the pattern of coexistence or being-with which the individual and collective dimensions are preserved at the same time .

For Nancy, the self is not complete in itself except according to the exposure of the other and represents it on the surface of common existence .the self does not live in a Horizon isolated from everything around it, but is in a continuous pattern of being-with. The self is completed only through the relationship with the other. The self is not an isolated entity or a fixed essence, but is formed and determined in the context of the relationship with the other. This means that it is the other who helps to establish oneself and its identity.Hence, it is revealed that the principle of identities, which has taken up a large part of the philosophical, social and political debate, is receding according to this form of meaning of identity . The other does not have a fixed identity or a separable otherness and therefore a nature of its own that separates it from me or from my self, but the other in the feminist sense is a sustained, unconscious exposure of participation that cannot take on the character of constancy or non-closure . The other is an open entity, constantly changing and transforming. This openness is what makes the relationship with the other always moving and living, not confined to a specific framework.But this otherworldly separation is the greatest advantage through which the self determines its horizon of origin or the form of its existence . The difference is the basis on which these different selves are treated . But not on the basis of a fixed or specific heteronormative identity, but on the basis of a heteronormative separation that has a similar meaning of giving and taking . The other is not just a reflection of oneself or its completion. It is rather different and distinct from them. This difference is the basis of the relationship, the self is realized only by recognizing and acknowledging this difference. Each self is rather a transcendent self because it has realized itself through the other or through his own, and it is this consciousness that provides the self with an appropriate form of realization of its own uniqueness in the totality of human existence .

So, immediately there is a repetition of the touches of meaning, which the meaning requires. This immeasurable and completely heterogeneous repetition opens up an irreducible strangeness to each of these othertouches. And the other origin is

incomparable or not assimilated, not simply because it is "other" but because it is an origin and a touch of meaning. Or rather, the other's otherness is his original adjacency to the "proper" origin. You are a complete stranger because the world begins its turn with you .

Nancy believes that the expected otherness in the other carries a special mutated character that makes him a special other for each other's self . And the first Origin in the other is his jealousy, which makes him a station for self-discovery . No being can be an original being in itself, but only in another being at the same time . The other is the origin of his existence. And, on the contrary, the origin of the original is its existence – other, but existence – changed every being in order and in the transit [à travers] of every existing one. Thus, the originality of the original is not a property that would distinguish an object from all other objects, since this object must be something other than itself in order for its origin to be in its own role .

Again, this is how there is no other. "Creation" specifically means that there is no other and that this (there is) " is not another. Being is not the same, but the origin is the exact and separate correspondence between us, as between us and the rest of the world, as between all beings .It is the distance between selves or—, say, between beings that makes the examination of existential separation possible . There is a clear interconnection between beings that allows each being to be his own and be only others at the same time.

There is a constant desire in us as beings who are looking for their origin to become aware of others according to the optimal form of existence . In fact, we are beings who are always aware of their otherness . That is, turning to others is the main concern of every being who wants to examine his authentic existence . There is no breakthrough that comes after self-awareness towards the outside or towards others, but the concept of otherness and others and its representations are present in the self and surrounding it from the very beginning .The other is nothing more than an interconnected part of this crazy desire, but the others, in fact, are our original interests. However, it is true that the possibility of this insane desire exists in the disposition of the very original interests: the distraction of the original disturbs the original [affole] in the "i-i" as much as makes me curious about it. , Makes my "I" "me" (or "human" or someone anyway). (It follows from this that there is no ethics independent of Ontology.Only an ontology can be ethical in a consistent way.) .

It is worth noting that according to this approach of thinking about the other, the other is the context through which the meaning of existence is formed or on the basis of which the existing other is dealt with. The other is a self-revealing context and not a party to the relationship with me as a heteronormative being. There is no origin in the philosophical, social and even political sense if there is no other. The other is the context that believes in the subjectivity of its existence and its private and public presence.

One / the other is not "by", nor "for", nor "in", nor "against", but is "with". This "with" is at the same time more and less of a "relationship" or "association", especially if this relationship or association presupposes the a priori existence of the conditions on which it depends;" with" is the exact contemporary of its terminology; it is, in fact, their contemporary. "With" is rather a sharing of time and space; it is at the same time and within the same time, as it is, in itself, too, and scattered in itself. It is the immediate reversal of the principle of identity: being exists at the same time and in the same place only under the condition of the spacing of an indefinite number of singularities. He is not being with the being; he will never repeat himself, but he is close to himself, outside himself, in contact with himself, the pure self, in the paradox of that closeness where remoteness and strangeness are revealed. We are every other time, and every time with others. "With" indicates no more the sharing of a common position than the juxtaposition of purely external manifestations (for example, a mat with a tree with a dog with a passerby).

Nancy emphasizes here that the self is here and there every time according to its spatial dimension, but not on the condition of separation or uniqueness, but according to the mode of participation. And it is this participation that makes the other always present in all the past, present and future, and the other is always there on the horizon of the future or towards the point of continuous encounter with him in the pattern of the following event. It is the uniqueness that makes the act of existence effective and continuous. The self is essentially the uniqueness of a society and is intertwined. Hence, it turns out that other selves cannot be defined or within a closed pattern of identities, but rather they are each time an appropriate form of existence, which gives the self its essential dimensions and common meaning at the same time. Because the others are rather multiple and not one self, but they are of the nature of multiplicity and heterogeneity, which provides a form of renewed existential encounter with it.

If we cannot reach the other in the situation described, and instead seek to seize the original - something we always do - this same curiosity will turn into Estela's anger destructive. We no longer look for the uniqueness of the original in the other; rather, we are looking for the unique and exclusive original, in order to adopt it or reject it. The other becomes another according to the pattern of desire or hatred. Making the other divine or making him evil is that part of curiosity that is no longer interested in decadence and co-emergence, but rather has become the desire for the situation itself. This desire is the desire to fix the original, or to give the original to oneself, once and for all, in one place and for everyone, that is, always outside the world .

Nancy warns against messing with the concept of the other according to the adoption of two methods that are often resorted to in human dealing, which is the pattern of desire or hatred . Because the self, according to the following of one of the donors, neglects the sublime aspects and meanings in the other, because the adoption of one of the donors misses the search for the original origin in the other, because it is he who gives the whole participatory existential process its desired meaning, or the required basis is overlooked, which is impossible to grasp after this failure .

We can say – in line with Nancy – that being in the world is nothing but being – with - the - other and that the sought-after or acquired mode of being is indeed being-the other, which contemplates me and my self . Nancy strongly criticized the diacritical approach or the Cartesian kojino, which closed the door to the examination of the other or the search for its meaning according to the pattern of being – with . Because Descartes completely emphasized the ego, forgetting or turning a blind eye to the other, without which the ego would not have acquired its centrality or would not have taken on its proper existential meaning . Rather, the self is another separate or another perspective on it from another party, each self is another alternately or by contrast . This Cartesian understanding is a metaphysical illusion par excellence, as Nancy sees it, because to consider oneself static and stable is to reject the direct existential nature that we experience daily . Our self is not stable, immutable, substantial, individual and unified, but is in a sustainable stage of formation and change according to the pattern of the other that we encounter in the world . The self is not something closed to itself, but it is in constant interaction and cohesion with the other and others, and this is what makes the other a self-examination station for itself, not only . The other is no longer a disturbing source of our existence or

a threat to our identities or an indulgence to the elite of our uniqueness, the other has become the appropriate context and the appropriate meaning through which the self takes its subjectivity and meaning . A being can only be represented in its environment within its otherness or based on its otherness with others, for real research is not carried out on individuality or individuality, but on the basis of participation, variation and otherness . From here, it is clear that the self is a subject of constant testing and experience of significance, meaning and participation, and not something static that carries social, political and other characteristics and qualities . The self is renewable, changing and mutating according to the interaction with the other and others .

Moreover, it is for this reason that the word "We" does not exist universally: on the one hand, the word "WE" is said Every time about a composition, a group or a network, no matter how small or large; and on the other hand," we "say" we "for" everyone", for the coexistence of the entire universe From things, animals and dumb people who do not have "we". "We "does not say" the one "and does not say the plural of" ones"and" others"; rather," we "says" one " in a singular and plural way, one by one and oneby D .

That is, the search for the meaning of (WE) is not carried out according to the methods and approaches previously followed or hammered out in the literature of Philosophy, Sociology and politics, but (we) have become an incomprehensible meaning or a semantic challenge station for us today . We do not mean the whole, the introverted group by its name, the existential closed circle, party, nationality, ethnicity, language, but rather that (we) are originally one in the pattern of representation of each one or say on behalf of each one, or they express one by one, subordination or one by one and not the sum of individuals or individuals . This division of the concept of the plural, which has long been expressed in a plural way, is something worth standing up for who sees the possibility of saying the plural, but in a way of expressing the singular one according to the plural participle pattern, or say the plural one, or being a single plural one.

4 NANCY AND LEVINAS: TOWARDS THE OTHER AND THE SELF

Surely the other's idea of Nancy has found its first roots or its main starting point in the thought of Levinas. It is known that Levinas is another philosopher par excellence. The other, as mentioned earlier, is the station of self-knowledge. The other side is the face of God or the other side. The other is the contemplated existence of the self, and without the other, no self can reveal itself in the required form. The other cannot be assimilated according to a specific conception or an established idea, but it is a complete otherness that urges us every time to approach it with something from a purely existential encounter.

Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) formulated a theory about the "other" as the basis of morality. He believed that facing the other's face is the fundamental source of any moral obligation. "The other is the face that imposes a moral responsibility on me. Commitment to the other is the essence of morality." "The other face is the only place where we can meet with God." "The face of the other is what imposes a moral responsibility on me. I am responsible for the other and I am not responsible only for myself." "The other is what imposes on me an inevitable moral responsibility." "The other is what imposes on me a moral responsibility for his existence."

For Levinas, humans are an individual being and irreducible to the whole or to the same thing. Every unique being we encounter remains irreducibly otherworldly. And most importantly, this irreducible otherness requires a moral response. And the essence of Levinas' thought is that we respond to the other; we respond to a face (le visage), that is, to a single face. In a 1981 AHA interview with Richard Kearney, he told Levinas that dealing with the face is the basic form of responsibility. The face is the one that asks me not to let him die alone. This face, as Levinas writes, speaks (le visage parle). The concept of "speaking" carries a special allusion in the work of Levinas because it raises the distinction between "saying" (le dire) and "LMSY L" (le dit). A saying is an event that conveys something to which I have to answer. Levinas distinguishes this from the original content, that is, the phrase. In a 1981 interview, "telling is as much moral honesty as it is presentation". One can expect that the event-like presentation of the utterance is devoid of the linguistic content of any particular phrase, and as such it allows a plurality of sounds, each of which contains a request for a response. The "saying" entails an excess

that goes beyond the semantic or linguistic content of the saying. The plus lies in the fact of the title of the saying; a speech that evokes the need for a response and recognition. For Levinas, saying means talking to and for the other, and leads to moral closeness .

For Vinas, this responsibility to address the other is the basic structure of subjectivity. In his 1968 essay "on substitution", he wrote: "to be" self" means to be in charge without doing anything". I am responsible for the same responsibility. We must replace ourselves with others and atone for their excesses. However, our response to the other face cannot be completely satisfied. The calling is endless. This is a foundational shortcoming that must be understood in a positive sense. The moral thought of Vinas offers, in this regard, a resource to stop the dehumanization and violence of our time. For Finas the responsibility to the other, the responsiveness to the other's face, is a largely non-reciprocal relationship. This state of non-reciprocity begins to reveal the counterintuitive and seemingly impossible nature of his thought .

With Levinas, the other face poses an impossible demand. We replace the other in the expiation of self-erasure. Is such a morality based on exclusivity and others impossible However, perhaps, after Kant and after the Universal Declaration, impossible morality - not abstract and ideal, but based on uniqueness and otherworldliness-is precisely what we need in our time, which, in some ways, with "ethnic cleansing" and genocide, is an impossible time. Is an impossible ethic needed in impossible times

Perhaps such attempts respond to individualism because they give voice to the suffering of the other. They to some extent take responsibility for the other and give the other a voice to which we must respond. By presenting this responsibility to the other, writers, journalists and intellectuals may be engaging in what Levinas called the "real relationship". The fact that the representation of loss and suffering can restore voice and humanity to those who have suffered and diedWA, which is reminiscent of Levinas's saying that the other "asks me not to let him die alone ".

Both Nancy, with the concept of uniqueness and renewed exposure, and Vinas, with the reformulation of the self that replaces the other, raise the problematic of the concept based on the fact that the self is an independent, isolated, or separate phenomenon. For Vinas, for example, responsibility for the other occurs in the passion of obsession and passivity, a passion that transcends consciousness and self-identity. And so he says that

obsession " strips the ego of its self-conceit". To be oneself means to be responsible for the other, to surrender to this responsibility, to be a hostage to this responsibility .

It is for this reason that contemporary Western thought has recorded such a concern about otherness, an uneasiness that Hegel actually introduced, and has been aggravated ever since. But it is because of it that a kind of hypostasis of the "other" is produced, the weak point of which is that it always ends up returning to oneself: the self needs the other. She has to get to know him, and so on. Thus, the self confirms its symmetry. .

5 NANCY AND HEIDEGGER: OR BEING-WITH A WAY TO EXAMINE THE OTHER

To talk about Heidegger and the other, this requires a special form of philosophical approach because Heidegger is one of the few, who emphasized early on the contradiction of Cartesian Cogito, which emphasized the centrality of the ego and the self, stressing that the self is never alone in the world alone, but it is in a constant entanglement of communication and connotation with other beings . There are many times when Heidegger emphasized in his books the role of the other in the statement of the pattern of being-with . And this Heideggerian term, par excellence, is enough to give him the lead in the statement of what it is to be the being of an object-with, another in this world . Heidegger says " the other is what determines my authentic and real existence in the world ." And that " the other is what helps me to reach an authentic understanding of my existence in the world." . Not only that, but " design is basically being –with- others. The being of those who belong to the same world with each other, belongs to the being of Dasein . Therefore, the "other" is not just another being, but a being who shares the same world in which I live ."That is, the mode of revealing the existential relationship is through the other, through being . This affirms that "the other is not just another being, but the mirror through which he became 'I "' .Hence, the understanding that we can get in this world is based primarily on others . It is they who provide us with the existential tool to examine the position and effectiveness of the self . "Our understanding of the world and of ourselves is fundamentally based on our relationships with others ."There is certainly a network of relations and meanings in which the object rotates according to the

pattern of being - with which it obtains all forms of meaning, "the thing is always more than just a thing, because it is connected to the network of human relations and meanings .""Being-with is the being-with component of being in the world. Dasein, asbeing-with, is essentially "being with the other" . That this other that I see, feel, reside with in this world, cannot be at my disposal or according to my pattern of possession or under my intellectual control or I can exercise a pattern of conceptual appropriation on it, but it remains another design, different, distinct, separate from me , and most importantly, it coexists with me in this Therefore, Heidegger emphasizes, "the other Dasein is not just an object or being at hand that I can observe and study, but an object that coexists with me in the common world ."Even according to the style of art and its works, art itself makes the world open in the form of the required existential exposure, which makes the other manifest in a completely otherworldly way . Art opens up the horizons of the otherworldly within and through works of art .

"A work of art, in opening it to the world, makes the other as obvious as the other," says Heidegger ."Even in the field of freedom, according to the Heideggerian purpose, it is no longer to work to fulfill all the subjective ambition to do something outside or to strive to assert the uniqueness of the self according to its individual decisions in the world, but rather freedom has become a space or an opening for the other to come, manifest and reveal . That is, the pursuit of freedom and its implementation is with the other, and not involuntarily, separately or by moving away from him. So Heidegger says that from the lecture on the essence of truth: "freedom is to be free in order for the other to exist in the essence ."

According to the influence of Cartesian Cogito on philosophical understanding, which has been formulated since Descartes' reflections until the day of Heidegger, we can answer the supposedly pressing question : Who Am I This question comes to us every time we manifest ourselves in front of this person who expresses us on the horizon of the living world . Descartes taught us to make a cognitive contemplative journey through which we can seek the qualities, States and representations of this person being. Start by looking at me : I am not a person who finds the(NA) that expresses Me By owning things, I am my childhood that still accompanies me, my ego that is hiding behind an obscene ego, or even I am the cognition that exercises a pattern of reference and analysis. At this moment, we are practicing a kind of Impressionism towards ourselves in the form of an

appeal to what we can be ourselves. But all these signs entail something fundamental for Descartes: a pattern of separation from the world. We are separate from each other in terms of difference and separation. We are outside of ourselves and in constant separation from the things of this world. That is, we are practicing a kind of existential separatism in the depths of this world. After all this hard work, my cents are on the answer-Cartesian -: I am myself or I am only my self.

Heidegger rejects this mechanism as an appeal to Cartesian understanding in order to come up with an answer to the question posed, because it does not lead to any accurate understanding of being. Heidegger's Dasein does not practice a pattern of differentiation between what is internal and External at all. That is, I am not an internal being with some degree of separation from external things. For Heidegger, the daze cannot be referred to as something. Nor can we say that it is psychological perception. Heidegger says, "others do not meet us within the framework of a perception that pre-distinguishes the existing private self at first sight from other accidental selves, it is also within an elementary gaze into ourselves, where for the first time the distinction about which it is located is established. They meet us from the point of view of the world, within which the preoccupied Daz'in resides - a visionary in view of what he is. Even when the daz'in explicitly addresses himself as: I am-here, the positional designation of a person should be understood from the existential-spatial of the daz'in. In the interpretation of the latter, we have already shown that this I - here does not mean a point specific to the thing that is I, but it understands itself as a being-in the starting point of which the world that is under-hand, which has a dozen resides from where it is preoccupied".

Being is not a specific entity or entity, but rather what gives the entity its entity or what gives the being its strength. This is through which beings understand that when we ask about being, we are not asking about anything specific, what or entity, or about the totality of things, but rather we are asking why all these beings are classified as beings or entities? We must be careful not to confuse the concept of being and its question with any being, the universe, or even ourselves. Is it necessary to ask the being about its being, but is it possible to ask a mug, a chair, the sun, or galaxies about being? The question must be posed to the being who can question himself about his being, that is, it means to him his own cause.

There is no uniqueness that distinguishes the human being from other beings except in the foresight of his possible being. Otherwise, he is doomed to this mode of co-breeding life with the whole . I don't know who I am except by looking at everyone, and I don't distinguish myself and point out my privacy only when I observe my presence with everyone at the same time . I am one of them, I am not isolated from them . What shapes them shapes me as I follow in their footsteps in their understanding of the world, their approach to language, their following of the law and in their understanding of reality . I am among them in the midst of my privacy as a dazine, but I cannot get rid of the Leech of common understanding and the surrounding system that envelops us all . Who are the others They are me and others, and what is true of them collectively, shapes me individually . The others are me and the rest of me in a chronic historical social-relational system in which everyone has to be the same .

The other does not mean what is apart from me and what is separated from me in this world, but the other is anyone and everyone, including me . The other is not separated from me in the surface of this world as something that is EXTERNAL to me, like other things, and what he has with me directly is only by action and speech, but the other is the detector, the engine, the demonstrator of dazaini and the doer of the original existence in this world . There is no I without another and no other without me, I am the other and the other I am in a pattern of the living world that everyone must be included in the total and this understanding is what Heidegger singled out and developed away from the views of Husserl and other physicists who dealt with the concept of being in the world or studied the concept of the other in a physical way . It is absolutely impossible to be a being-there without being a being –the - meaning, an Being - the - implication and an Being-on-an-extension, and this includes not only the one who says or the personified Dasein does not meet the potentials of his being, but includes everyone who goes there in the horizon of the vastness of the area of credulity there for all human existence . It does not help me alone and is dedicated to me, but it includes everyone with me and everyone with me . The other does not experience with a pattern of meaning and the corresponding vision in the world as we approach the mountain, the sun and the bowl, but the other walks with me in the footsteps of being there to find him with us, with us and with us, there is no separation between me as a dazain and the other dozens of females except in the pattern of participation in going there continuously and component of the world of existence .

My world is not damaged by me and is not formed by my oneness, individuality, understanding and assimilation of other things and entities in the world . Rather, the very name of the world implies the existence of all beings with me, because I cannot separate myself from the living world and describe it, but it is with me that it accompanies me in every way and forms the meaning of my original existence .

Being is not an object at all; it is that characterizes objects as objects and not no objects, and it is what makes the difference, so to speak, between something and nothing. There is another similar phrase that may also be useful: being is the difference that the presence of something makes instead of nothing. Even if we cannot find a reason for the totality of objects, we can investigate the meaning of being, because it makes a difference in the being of objects instead of nothing. We can pay attention to this difference and describe it .

However, he believes that we should question the metaphysics of presence, since this imitation has serious consequences. It dulls us to the depth of experience and restricts us to poor ways of thinking and actions. In particular, if we define being by presence, we can become obsessed with making objects present themselves to us perfectly and in a definitive way - with objects being represented accurately and effectively. We are trying, by means of philosophy, science or technology, to achieve a complete vision of things and thus complete control over them. According to Heidegger, this ideal does not correspond to the nature of understanding; understanding is always a limited and historically framed interpretation. Heidegger asserts that there is a truth, and considers that some explanations (including his own) are better than others - but there is no definitive explanation. Heidegger is an uncompromising enemy of non-historical absolute concepts of truth .

Why are there objects and not nothing Or more precisely, it is the openness, in thought, to the possibility of meaning, or to the possibility of a world: the salvation of thought or its renunciation to open time and space, the extraction or expression of the world. It is this opening (what Kant addressed with his concept of transcendental planning) where it is possible to observe the fact of existence as such. To experience beings in their presence means to experience the fact that they were given or offered to our representation. In that fleeting experience, we observe the very fact of progress. Or the relationship by which we are able to realize that a thing is this or that thing. (Although

the relationship is not an object of perception, we notice nothing more than the fact that objects have been given to our perception - as a pure openness, the relationship gives itself in its withdrawal) .

Heidegger argued that the human Dasein is unique among beings precisely because this relationship came into question for him; it is the Being whose being is at stake, and with it its relationship to everything (including other human beings). When the Dasein is surprised by the fact of existence (and this surprise can take the form of the experience of the stranger or vertigo), he discovers the fact of his abandonment or exposure, and thus discovers that he is the Dasein (the Dasein is the site of his exposure). He experiences his exposure in a kind of original self – affection-original, because he reaches his presence in this experience (his presence is defined there) and discovers himself as existing: he finds himself as if he had been subjected to the opening of a relationship with what he is, committed to this relationship (or rejecting it) .

At this moment, the dazein is in its own world with a pattern of flow, exposure and attachment, which we can call the Maqam (or residential), but this type of maqam is not based on any thinking or cognitive action because it is not one of the characteristics of the dazein universe in the world to be based on observations or perceptions, but it is a pattern of patterns of The form of stay there. As it is usually said in Arabic (there is something-there is a danger coming-there is something suspicious - this-there-does not indicate a place to denote it and is not related to any specific aspect, but it reveals a large signaling space within which each ray is fused to indicate time or place. It is a kind of reference to presence or what Heidegger called residence . It is a pre-mentioned reference . The question of being-in-the-world is a deeper question than a question of knowledge, because knowledge is related to epistemology, but being is related to ontology, and as stated by Heidegger, ontology precedes epistemology . Being-means being in a world, and it is the world that determines your being, and being cannot be outside the world because being is referred to by the world, that we are included in some world, a space without issues and concerns, and that everything we mean outside this context comes later. That is, every understanding of belief, perception or knowledge comes later, because it is one of the things to do in some world and without the universe in some world it is impossible to talk about these things. Being is ahead of everything .

It is important to emphasize here that the *dasein* does not have freedom as one of its characteristics: the *dasein* comes to itself in its freedom, in the original. He does not discover a pre-existing essence or potential; rather, his being is determined in this experience. The subject of freedom appears in his freedom, and in this sense freedom (as the initial inversion) precedes itself as the freedom of the self..

Nancy constantly suggests that these last two limits to the existence of the *Dasein* should actually be thought of Together: any experience of "birth" or "liberation" is inseparable from the knowledge of annihilation. Heidegger explained this point in his book *Being and time* by describing freedom as the passage to the free assumption of being towards death, which became possible thanks to the salvation of the *Dasein* of his reality and being. Finally, the experience of annihilation in Heidegger's text cannot be separated from any finite experience, and Nancy tends to follow Heidegger in this regard in his references to death. However, Nancy's writings were not characterized by the festive and tragic lamentations of the Being, time and Heidegger's writings of the early thirties or by the tone of mourning that characterized some of Heidegger's later works..

Being - towards-death is a possibility that is peculiar to the *Daz'in* because it expresses an original idea in his existence unlike all other beings in the world . It is an idea that accompanies us from the beginning to the end, not an idea or an event of completion, cessation and demise . Heidegger believes that what is hidden in the *daze* and implied by its false or inauthentic existence is the being – towards – death and not the event of death itself, because this event cannot be approached according to a sentimental approach, because it is a non-lived State as an event . The design is about the foresight of possibilities and these possibilities are united according to the pattern of freedom of decision, the decision that we make about the possibility of some of the possibilities of our existence in this world . Being a doctor, an engineer or a farmer, the determination of this possibility is determined only by the possibility of the improbability that *Daz'in* have when thinking about death . Hence, being – towards-death is an authentic ontological appeal that penetrates the veil of our authentic existence in order to gather all possibilities until it is impossible, impossible, and then beyond .

Hence, Heidegger uses the term (mortals), and this term requires a lot of supplies for its placement in order to understand the idea of being – towards –death . This idea is specific to the design only, hence the idea of the idea, not the idea of the event. *Dasein*

does not think of the event of death as an event, nor is this what Heidegger refers to, but rather it is based on the sustainability and presence of the idea of annihilation, that is, this being is van in its reality by simply evoking the idea that it is a being - towards - death.

The idea of Annihilation is an idea of mine alone, that is, it is connected with what I call-my loneliness-what is mine alone and no one but me. There may be other abilities and potentials that would be performed by someone else according to the ability of his being - except death, he can die alone without the participation of others and without his behalf or intervention. This subtle peculiarity of the courtyard that penetrates the dazain entity every time a tone or anxiety activates it is an original page of dazain's existence in this world. Death can only be faced by me, and no one can bear the button of being - towards - death.

The certainty of death forms the basis for the daze in the world. With this understanding, death does not remain an external event or something we observe in some future, but it is an existence -towards - transformation and fluttering around us in all that. The idea of annihilation at this moment is in itself a possibility, but it is the possibility of the non-possibility, and thus the Dasein remains yellowish to its existence at a moment of meaningfulness of existence in general.

Being-towards-death requires us to make the best decision. The decision that the Dasein has to make constitutes an authentic form of our existence at the moment when we have to make the decision. Sometimes we have a moment when we are in the midst of some action, a moment of penetration into a feeling completely different from the joy, anger, joy and strife that we experience daily. It is the moment of turning towards the horizon of anxiety, which whistles at us all meaning of things. Things in their time stand to be as meaningful as they were. And the design becomes watching the page and quality holistically and goes towards the mean and original. It is the moment of facing the certain fate that each Dasein goes through individually.

Y.Nancy also emphasizes a point concerning the experience of mortality that is hardly more than implied in Heidegger's text but strongly put forward by Bataille and Blanchot. This is the proposition that the death of the other invites the self beyond itself, thereby surrendering it to its freedom. Freedom is necessarily shared, and the experience of the death of the other is something like a condition for this participation. Like love (in itself inseparable from the experience of mortality), it invites the self beyond itself,

exposing it to otherness. Perhaps we should not choose a word or concept for it, but rather recognize in the thought of the Collective a theoretical surplus (or, more precisely, a surplus in relation to the theoretical) that would force us to adopt another practice of speech and the collective. But at least we have to try to say so, because "language alone indicates, at the maximum, the sovereign moment when it is no longer present". Which means here that only the speech of the collective, which exhausts itself, can indicate to society the sovereignty of its sharing... The ethics and politics of speech and writing are clearly involved here .

Heidegger sees that there is something between us and things, between us and time, between us and everything to which we refer and relate . We go through a lot of pain from birth to death . This one or the other is a fundamental basis for knowing that constant openness separates us from everything. Without that, we can't say who we are and what we are . However, this relationship is not imagined in a single, categorical, definite way : that is, it is not imagined that there is a close and distant subject, you and I, this and that, etc., while the essence of this relationship is embodied in the fact that it is a single block that connects all things as a single unit, but in a detailed way, and this is what distinguishes Heidegger's approach, which means that There is a separation between us and things, and there is even a multiplication of the two . If it were not for this connection, it would not be possible for us to refer to the story and identify things in our special World . Therefore, the basis of this Heideggerian understanding is the mode of real existence through which we can say that there is something other than us. Valdezain is between being and something, and we are between Earth and heaven, between approaching and moving away, between love and hatred . The nature of the relationship is based on the concept of relationship . That relationship between us and things and essences .

And so everything, then, passes between us. And this "Bean", as its name implies, has neither consistency nor continuity of its own. It does not lead from one to the other. It forms neither connective tissue, nor cement, nor a bridge. Perhaps it is not even fair to talk about a "link" with his subject; he is neither connected nor separated; he does not achieve both; and even better, what is at the heart of the connection, which is the tangle of threads whose ends remain separate even in the center of the knot. "Walpin" is the expansion and dimension that the singular opens as the divergence of meaning. What does

not maintain a distance from the "Between" is nothing but a conversation that collapses on itself and is devoid of meaning .

And from one singular to another, there is juxtaposition but not a continuity. There is proximity, but only insofar as extreme proximity emphasizes the divergence that it opens. All the being is in contact with all the being, but the law of touch is separation; moreover, it is the heterogeneity of the surfaces that touch each other. Communication is beyond fullness and emptiness, beyond connection and separation. If "contact "means starting to understand each other, then this" coming "does not penetrate anything; there is no intermediate and intermediate" environment". The meaning is not the environment in which we are immersed. There is no such thing as *Alma-Ben* [between the place]. It is a matter of one or the other, one and the other, one with the other, but by no means one in the other, which will be something other than this or that (another essence, another nature, diffuse or another). *Planting Commons*). And from one to the other is the simultaneous repetition of the origins of the world, which are each time one or the other .

Origin is the confirmation; repetition is the confirmation condition. "That's it," I say. It is not a "fact" and has nothing to do with any kind of assessment. It is the uniqueness that resorts to affirming the being, it is the touch of meaning. It is not another being; it is the singular being in which the being is found, or its being, which is being in the transcendental sense of the verb (inaudible meaning, inaudible – the very meaning of being). It is this touch of meaning that plays a role in its uniqueness and distinctiveness, and plays a role in the multiplicity of "all the time" for you for a touch of meaning, "my" as well as all the others, each of which is "mine" in turn, according to the singular turn of its affirmation .

So, immediately there is a repetition of the touches of meaning, which the meaning requires. This immeasurable and completely heterogeneous repetition opens up an irreducible strangeness of each of these touches to the other. The other origin is not comparable or assimilable, not simply because it is "other" but because it is an origin and a touch of meaning. Or rather, the other's otherness is his original adjacency to the "proper" origin. You are a complete stranger because the world begins its turn with you .

In the course of talking about the foundations of discourse, we always do a pattern of deliberate withdrawal from ourselves when we want to address the whole or try to raise something about others . And because public discourse itself involves both otherness and

otherness, it mainly includes the self that also says that it is within the patches of speech and not something outside of it, but it is the active pattern of subjectivity that makes our (people's) say, for example, something that refers to everything other than the self that says a pattern of verbal disagreement or a disclaimer of existential responsibility . We say "people are strange". This phrase is one of our most enduring and primitive existential testimonies. In fact, it says a lot. The word "people" refers to every other person, referred to as specific group of the population, genealogies, races [clans] from which the speaker himself comes out. (However, he departs in a very special way, because the label is so generic - and this is exactly the point - that it inevitably turns on the speaker. And since I say that "people are strange," I include myself in a certain way in this strangeness.)

The word "people" does not say exactly the same thing as the word "one", even if it is some kind of it. With the word "one", it is not always certain whether the speaker includes himself in the anonymity of the "one" or not. For example, I could say "someone told me" ["onM 'a dit"] or "it is said that" ["on dit que"] or "that's how it's done" ["c'est comme ça Qu 'on fait"] or "one is born and dies" ["on naît, on meurt"]. These uses are not equivalent, moreover, it is not certain that a "person" always speaks of himself (of himself and about himself). Heidegger understood that the word "one" would be said only as an answer to the question "who?" "It poses the theme of the dazine, but it does not pose the other inevitable question that must be asked to discover who gives this response and who, in responding in this way, removes himself or has a tendency to remove himself. .

And so the "people" are imprecise and at the same time individual silhouettes, faint outlines of sounds, patterns of behavior, sketches of effects, and not anonymous chatter in the "public domain". But what is the effect, if not every time draw Behavior, if not every time a pattern Sound, if not every time a faint outline What is uniqueness, if not every time it is always touched, always lightly touched: revealing oneself next to him, always next to him. . ("Beside himself" ["acôté de ses pompes"], as the saying goes .

"I resort to Exception or distinction when I say 'people', but I also give this distinction to everyone, although in a completely ambiguous way, "says Nancy Anna. And this, undoubtedly, is the reason why people often make the verdict that "people are strange". "Or "people are unbearable." It is not only, or even primarily, a question of the tendency (however obvious it may be) to set one's own behavior as the norm. And it is necessary to reveal a more primitive level of this particular judgment, " where what is

perceived is nothing but the uniqueness itself. From faces to voices, gestures, postures, clothes, behavior, whatever the "typical" traits, everyone distinguishes themselves by some kind of sudden and impulsive shedding in which the strangeness of uniqueness is centered. Without such carelessness, quite simply, there would be no "someone", there would be no more attention or hospitality, desire or disgust, no matter who or what the goal is".

The word "someone" is understood here in the way a person may say "it's okay" about a photo, expressing with this word "okay" to cover a gap, making what is inappropriate enough, and it can only be connected with the perception that the "momentary" of the moment is precisely its own gap. The image - in my mind a banal everyday image - simultaneously reveals exclusivity, vulgarity and our curiosity towards each other. The principle of indistinguishability becomes decisive here. Not only are all people different, they are all different from each other too. They are no different from the original or generic model. Typical features (ethnic, cultural, social, generational, etc.), whose own patterns form another level of uniqueness, do not cancel out individual differences; instead, they bring them comfort. As for the single differences, they are not just "individual", but non-individual. It was not at all that I met Pierre or Marie per se, but that I met them in such and such a "form", in such and such a "state", in such and such a "mood". And so on and so forth.

Hence it is often said today that we have lost meaning, we miss it, as a result, we need and are waiting for it. The "person" who speaks in this way forgets that the publication of this speech itself has meaning. Regret for the absence of meaning in itself has meaning. But this regret has meaning not only in this negative situation; the denial of the existence of meaning is confirmed by the fact that one knows what meaning is, whether it exists, keeps the mastery of meaning and its truth in place (which is the claim of human discourses proposing to "rediscover" meaning). Whether it is so or not, the contemporary discourse on meaning goes much further and in a completely different direction: it highlights the fact that "meaning", used in such an absolute way, has become a pale name - for being - one - with - another -. We don't have "meaning" anymore, because we ourselves have meaning - completely, without reservation, without limits, with no meaning other than "we".

This does not mean that we are the content of meaning, nor its realization or result, as if we were saying that human beings are the meaning (end, essence, value) of being, nature or history. The meaning of this meaning - that is, the connotation with which the state of affairs corresponds and is compared - is exactly what we say that we have lost meaning. But by saying (We are meaning) we mean that we are the element through which semantics can be produced and generalized. The meaning is special communication and constant circulation . The "meaning of being" is not a property that should qualify, fill or end the wanton giving of pure and simple "being". Rather, it is a fact that there is no "abundant giving" of being, and that there is no scarce Prevention there that is given when one says that "there is a nail ...". That the gift of being that we understand when we say "to be" (no matter how it is and no matter how confused it is), together with the (same) given that is presented with this truth-is intrinsic with the Giving of being, that we understand each other (no matter how confused) when we say it, it's a gift that can be summarized as As follows: being is given to us as meaning. Being has no meaning. The being it self, the phenomenon ' of being, is the meaning that circulates, and we are what that circulation is . .

There is no meaning if the meaning is not shared, not because there will be a final or initial implication that all beings have in common, but because the meaning is the same as sharing the being. The meaning begins where the presence is not a pure presence, but where the presence [itself] separates in order to be the same as such. The phrase (as such) implies divergence, massiveness and division of the being. Only the concept of "the presence" contains the necessity of this division. A pure, non-shared presence-a presence to nothing, out of nothing, for nothing - is neither present nor absent. It is a simple collapse of an object that could not be - an internal explosion without a trace

6 CONCLUSION

The concept of the other plays a pivotal role in Nancy's philosophical construction, as it is the basis from which all his philosophy and its various methods and approaches proceed . There is no doubt that this philosophical characteristic of the concept of the other came after different patterns of conceptual engagement with great philosophers who have given their input into the concept of the other, specifically, but not limited to Vinas,

Derrida and Heidegger . It is the concept of being –with, which is a milestone that Heidegger singled out in the history of contemporary philosophy, that prompted Nancy to reformulate his theory according to this form of ontological specialization of self and other . There is no pure existence of the human self or a single Cogito, as Descartes wanted, but there is always a self-awareness of its otherness, and a person is aware of his otherness. As for Vinas, the other philosopher par excellence, Nancy took some intellectual implications from him, and this did not prevent Nancy from criticizing Vinas regarding many aspects of the other's philosophical and religious understanding . We cannot fail to mention that the deconstructionist approach adopted by Nancy Klein was derived from his old friend Derrida, as the philosophical debate between them raged between tension and attraction, between support and opposition, between comment and refutation . This sprawling system formed the juicer of a great effort that introduced us to the concept of the other in a new philosophical formula . The religious, political, ethical, aesthetic and other dimensions were present in the statement of the presence of the other and his importance, as Nancy sees it .

The form of conceptual examination of what the concept of the other IS falls under the name of the conjunctival separation . That is, this separation that we see every time wetry for thefirst time to realize ourselves is at the same time the presence of the other and the other in all his otherness and otherness, it is the vast space that comprehends everything that is connected with my being –with in this world . We are not scattered and unrelated pieces in this world , and we cannot examine the world and perceive it in isolation from the other, but rather, self-attentiveness and Self-Realization were achieved only with the help and thanks to the constant presence of the other and others . From here we can say that Nancy's concept of the other makes us revolve in the sphere of being - together, being - in partnership, individual – whole – or group - unique, because all these concepts express that the self cannot realize itself in isolation from the other .

REFERENCES

- DESCARTES, René. *Meditations on first philosophy*. Cairo: National Center for Translation.
- GADAMER, Hans-Georg. *Truth and method*. Beirut: Dar Oya, 2007.

- HABERMAS, Jürgen. *The theory of communicative action*. Beirut: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.
- HEGEL, Wilhelm Friedrich. *Phenomenology of the soul*. Beirut: Arab Translation Organization.
- HEGEL, Wilhelm Friedrich. *Philosophy of truth*. Lebanon: Dar Tanweer.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin. *Basic concepts of metaphysics*. Beirut: New Book House, 2019.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin. *Basic principles of phenomenology*.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin. *Basic writings*. Cairo: National Translation Center, 2010.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin. *Being and time*. Beirut: Dar Al-Kitab Al-Jedid, 2012.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin. *The thing*.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin. *What is called thinking?*. New York: Harper & Row Publishing, 1968.
- HOLLAND, Eugene. *Nancy and plural thinking: expositions of world, ontology, politics and sense*. New York: State University of New York Press, 2012.
- HONNETH, Axel. *The struggle for recognition*. Beirut: Oriental Library, 2015.
- KANT, Immanuel. *The critique of pure reason*. Lebanon: National Development Center.
- KANT, Immanuel. *The foundation of moral metaphysics*.
- LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *The other and others*.
- LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *The other is the face*.
- LEVINAS, Emmanuel. *Totality and infinity*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.
- NANCY, Jean-Luc. *Being singular plural*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
- NANCY, Jean-Luc. *The disavowed community*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2016.
- NANCY, Jean-Luc. *The inoperative community*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.
- NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. *Thus spoke Zarathustra*. Baghdad: Al-Jamal Publications.

POLT, Richard. *Heidegger: an introduction*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1999.

ROUSSEAU, Jean-Jacques. *The social contract*. Cairo: Hindawi Foundation for Education and Culture.

SARTRE, Jean-Paul. *Being and nothingness*. Beirut: Dar Al-Adab, 1966.

SARTRE, Jean-Paul. *No exit*. Beirut: Al-Hayat Library House Publications, 1995.

SCHOPENHAUER, Arthur. *The world as will and representation*. Cairo: National Center for Translation, 2006.

VOLTAIRE. *A letter on tolerance*. Petra Publishing and Distribution House, 2009.

WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. Cairo: Afaq Publishing and Distribution, 2021.

Authors' Contribution

All authors contributed equally to the development of this article.

Data availability

All datasets relevant to this study's findings are fully available within the article.

How to cite this article (APA)

Al-Mayyahi, N. A. M. (2026). JEAN-LUC NANCY'S CONCEPT OF THE OTHER: OR WHEN THE SELF IS THE SAME AS THE OTHER. *Veredas Do Direito*, 23(5), e235667. <https://doi.org/10.18623/rvd.v23.5667>