

THE TRANSFORMATION OF TURKEY'S APPROACH TO THE PALESTINE-ISRAEL CONFLICT: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS

A TRANSFORMAÇÃO DA ABORDAGEM DA TURQUIA AO CONFLITO PALESTINO-ISRAELENSE: UMA ANÁLISE MULTIDIMENSIONAL

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Abstract

This article examines Turkey's diplomatic approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict through a comprehensive analytical perspective informed by international relations theories. Employing a qualitative methodology that integrates historical-process tracing with contemporary diplomatic practices, the study conducts a document analysis of the historical background of Turkey's Palestine policy based on academic sources provided by the researcher, while developments in the 2023-2025 period are subjected to content analysis using reliable international news outlets. The theoretical framework interprets Turkey's foreign policy behavior through the combined lenses of neorealist balance-of-power considerations, liberal institutionalist normative commitments, and constructivist identity-building processes. This three-dimensional theoretical approach demonstrates that Turkey's diplomatic posture is shaped not only by strategic rationality but also by principles of international law, the norm of a two-state solution, humanitarian diplomacy, and historical-cultural identity factors. The analysis examines Turkey's foreign policy instruments in the 2023-2025 period discursive positioning, humanitarian aid diplomacy, economic sanctions, and mediation initiatives revealing a multifaceted strategic repertoire at the intersection of structural, institutional, and normative dynamics. This study offers a concise yet insightful contribution that theoretically reframes Turkey's role in the Palestine issue.

Resumo

Este artigo examina a abordagem diplomática da Turquia ao conflito israelo-palestino por meio de uma perspectiva analítica abrangente, fundamentada em teorias de relações internacionais. Empregando uma metodologia qualitativa que integra o rastreamento histórico-processual com as práticas diplomáticas contemporâneas, o estudo realiza uma análise documental do contexto histórico da política turca em relação à Palestina, com base em fontes acadêmicas fornecidas pelo pesquisador, enquanto os desdobramentos no período de 2023 a 2025 são submetidos à análise de conteúdo utilizando fontes de notícias internacionais confiáveis. O arcabouço teórico interpreta o comportamento da política externa turca através das lentes combinadas de considerações neorrealistas de equilíbrio de poder, compromissos normativos institucionalistas liberais e processos construtivistas de construção de identidade. Essa abordagem teórica tridimensional demonstra que a postura diplomática da Turquia é moldada não apenas pela racionalidade estratégica, mas também pelos princípios do direito internacional, pela norma da solução de dois Estados, pela diplomacia humanitária e por fatores de identidade histórico-cultural. A análise examina os instrumentos de política externa da Turquia no período de 2023-2025 – posicionamento discursivo, diplomacia de ajuda humanitária, sanções econômicas e iniciativas de mediação – revelando um repertório estratégico multifacetado na interseção de dinâmicas



Keywords: Turkey. Israel. Palestine. Diplomacy. International Law. International Relations.

estruturais, institucionais e normativas. Este estudo oferece uma contribuição concisa, porém perspicaz, que reformula teoricamente o papel da Turquia na questão palestina.

Palavras-chave: Turquia. Israel. Palestina. Diplomacia. Direito Internacional. Relações Internacionais.

1 INTRODUCTION

The Israel–Palestine conflict is a multilayered geopolitical phenomenon that profoundly shapes not only the security architecture of the Middle East but also the balance of power in the international system, global modes of diplomatic engagement, humanitarian crisis-management mechanisms, and debates over the applicability of international law. Although the historical roots of the conflict extend back to the mandate administrations and state-building debates of the early twentieth century, it has become increasingly complex in the post–Cold War era due to regional power rivalries, the rise of non-state actors, and normative diplomacy discussions (Armaoğlu, 1984: 115).

Turkey, influenced by both the historical collective memory shaped in the post-Ottoman era and the symbolic, identity-based, and strategic importance attributed to the Palestine question in Republican foreign policy, has moved far beyond the position of a passive observer. The sensitivity toward Palestine, which persisted at various levels since the early years of the Republic, became more visible following the 1967 and 1982 wars, and in the 2000s evolved into a more institutionalized and proactive domain of foreign policy as Turkey sought to position itself as a regional power (Kaya, 2019: 133).

Following this historical trajectory, Turkey's diplomatic behavior entered a new phase with the sharp escalation of the conflict after 7 October 2023. During this period, Ankara intensified its humanitarian diplomacy tools aimed at protecting civilians and delivering aid, while simultaneously adopting strong rhetoric concerning violations of international law and activating its mediation capacity to contribute to conflict resolution. Thus, the contemporary profile of Turkey's Palestine policy presents a hybrid diplomatic framework shaped by both the normative and identity-based approaches that have demonstrated historical continuity and the geopolitical imperatives of the current period (Altunışık, 1999: 81-88).

This study aims to analyze Turkey's stance toward the Israel–Palestine conflict within a historically and analytically integrated framework, evaluating both its long-term foreign policy tendencies and the rapidly shifting diplomatic dynamics of the post-2023 period through a comparative perspective.

A) Historical Background (1948-2000)

The rise of the Israel–Palestine issue to a central position in international politics began with the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent Arab–Israeli War. The 1948 War led to the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and the emergence of a protracted refugee crisis. Thus, the conflict ceased to be merely a regional power struggle and became situated at the intersection of global diplomacy, international law, and debates on human security. These developments reshaped the political landscape of the Middle East while simultaneously creating, from an early period, a noteworthy dual structure in Turkey's foreign policy approach (Topçu, 2018: 77).

In 1949, Turkey recognized Israel, thereby signaling its alignment within the international community; however, this recognition did not diminish Ankara's societal sensitivities or normative concerns regarding the Palestine question. Indeed, beginning in the 1950s, Turkey adopted a balanced yet principled stance on the Palestinian issue within the United Nations and other multilateral platforms, carefully navigating between public sympathy for Palestine and its obligations within the Western alliance. As detailed in Topçu's study, the early dynamics of Turkish–Israeli relations were shaped by this dual strategic orientation (Yılmaz, 2010: 38).

The wars of 1967 the Six-Day War and 1973 the Yom Kippur War marked a significant turning point in Turkey's foreign policy posture. In response to the territorial losses suffered by Arab states and the growing power asymmetry in the region, Ankara began to support a more visible political line favoring the Palestinian cause. During this period, Turkey maintained its strategic alignment with the West as a NATO member, yet occasionally acted in coordination with Arab states in United Nations votes and encouraged greater international awareness of Palestinian national rights (Nezih, 1999: 43).

The 1980s, particularly due to developments concerning the status of Jerusalem, constituted a period of considerable tension in Turkish–Israeli relations. Israel's efforts to consolidate its sovereignty claims over East Jerusalem prompted strong diplomatic

reactions from Turkey grounded in international law. Accordingly, Ankara's decision to close its Consulate General in Jerusalem represented a concrete diplomatic act and underscored the continuity of Turkey's historical sensitivity and normative commitment at the level of state policy regarding the Palestinian issue (Karaman, 1991: 176–178).

Overall, the period from 1948 to 2000 can be regarded as the formative phase during which Turkey's foreign policy line concerning the Israel–Palestine issue took shape. Throughout this era, Ankara sought to preserve its strategic position within the Western alliance while simultaneously embedding a normative approach that prioritized the rights of the Palestinian people into its foreign policy framework. This historical background provides a crucial foundation for understanding Turkey's contemporary diplomatic attitudes and discourses (Gürün, 1983: 98).

B) 2000-2022: Attempts at Normalization and Persistent Fragilities

From the early 2000s onward, Turkey-Israel relations entered a period of relative stability and pragmatic cooperation centered on security, energy, trade, and defense. The continued effects of the 1996 Military Cooperation Agreement institutionalized this rapprochement through joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and defense industry partnerships. Energy and water security negotiations further broadened the bilateral agenda, while high-level visits signaled reopening diplomatic channels (Yılmaz, 2010: 41).

However, the normalization process remained structurally fragile. Strong public sensitivity in Turkey toward the Palestinian cause increasingly constrained Ankara's diplomatic flexibility in the face of Israel's military operations and settlement policies. Israel's 2008–2009 “Operation Cast Lead” marked a major rupture, with Turkey adopting sharply critical rhetoric symbolized internationally by the “one minute” incident in Davos (Erhan-Küçükuşurlu, 2005: 137).

The structural fragility of the relationship became fully apparent after the 31 May 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, in which ten Turkish citizens were killed during an Israeli raid in international waters. The event initiated a diplomatic breakdown: Ankara withdrew its ambassador, suspended most military and political cooperation mechanisms, and adopted a more outspoken pro-Palestinian public diplomacy stance (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2011: 77-79).

Although normalization attempts in 2016 and 2022 reopened diplomatic channels, structural disputes including settlement expansion, military operations in Gaza, and

tensions over Jerusalem prevented the establishment of sustainable strategic cooperation (Yergin, 2012: 154-159).

Thus, the 2000-2022 period revealed a cyclical pattern in Turkey–Israel relations, oscillating between pragmatic cooperation and normative ruptures-reflecting the coexistence of societal expectations, identity-based sensitivities, and geopolitical interests.

C) 7 October 2023: Shock, War, and Turkey’s Initial Response

The large-scale and coordinated attacks launched by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023 constituted a major turning point that dramatically reshaped the trajectory of the conflict. Israel’s subsequent military campaign characterized by intense bombardments, significant civilian casualties, and the rapid collapse of critical infrastructure in Gaza produced one of the gravest humanitarian crises in recent Middle Eastern history. According to early United Nations reports, tens of thousands of civilians were displaced within the first weeks, while restrictions on humanitarian access created severe shortages of food, water, medicine, and electricity. Beyond its humanitarian toll, the crisis recalibrated regional security perceptions and triggered reassessments among both state and non-state actors throughout the Middle East (Seta, 2016).

Turkey’s initial response aligned with the broader international concern over escalating violence. Ankara called for immediate de-escalation, protection of civilians, and urgent humanitarian access. Within days, Turkey engaged in intensive diplomatic consultations with regional and global actors-including Egypt, Qatar, and the United States aimed at preventing further escalation. As Israel’s operations expanded into prolonged, high-intensity military assaults, Turkey’s rhetoric hardened significantly. Senior Turkish officials characterized Israel’s actions as grave violations of international humanitarian law and repeatedly emphasized the urgent need for a ceasefire, humanitarian corridors, and unimpeded aid flows (Reuters, 2 May 2024).

This discursive shift was also reflected in Turkey’s behavior across multilateral forums. Ankara voiced strong positions at the United Nations General Assembly and within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), advocating for an immediate cessation of hostilities and drawing global attention to the humanitarian and legal dimensions of the conflict. Reports from Reuters, Al Jazeera, and the Associated Press documented the chronology of Turkey’s intensifying rhetoric, highlighting Ankara’s dual

emphasis on humanitarian protection and references to international law (Reuters, 26 February 2024).

Ultimately, the post-7 October period revealed a rapid recalibration in Turkey's crisis diplomacy, bringing into sharp relief the interplay between historical sensitivities, normative commitments, and real-time geopolitical calculations. These dynamics underscore the analytical importance of examining Turkey's evolving role within the broader context of the conflict (Erhan-Küçükuğurlu, 2005: 152).

D) Turkey's Concrete Measures in 2024-2025

The 2024-2025 period marked a significant intensification in Turkey's operational foreign policy tools concerning the Palestine-Israel conflict. As the humanitarian crisis in Gaza deepened, Ankara diversified its diplomatic instruments and adopted a more assertive stance anchored in international law and economic pressure. This phase was characterized by a multi-layered policy set aimed at increasing the cost of Israeli actions and amplifying Turkey's normative position (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2011: 82).

A landmark step occurred in May 2024, when Turkey suspended all bilateral trade with Israel. Confirmed by Reuters and Al Jazeera, the suspension encompassed both imports and exports and was described by Turkish officials as the most comprehensive economic sanction ever imposed by Ankara on Israel. The measure had repercussions not only for bilateral commerce but also for regional supply chains. The government justified the decision by linking it explicitly to the need for sustained humanitarian access to Gaza, thereby rooting the policy in both normative and humanitarian grounds (Al Jazeera, 24 September 2024).

Turkey also expanded its legal and multilateral initiatives. Throughout 2024, Ankara participated actively in proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), delivering oral submissions that identified Israel's prolonged occupation as the structural root cause of the conflict. Reuters coverage and ICJ records documented Ankara's appeals to international legal norms and its critique of the longstanding paralysis of the UN Security Council. Turkey's engagement with the ICJ thus functioned as both a symbolic assertion of normative leadership and a strategic effort to elevate the legal framing of the conflict within global diplomacy (Reuters, 10 October 2025).

Additionally, Turkey adopted complementary restrictions in transportation and security sectors. Reports from Associated Press and Reuters indicated that Ankara imposed airspace limitations on certain Israel-origin flights, restricted transit permits for

military-related goods, and introduced selective port-access constraints. These steps underscored the multidimensional nature of Turkey's coercive measures, extending beyond trade to encompass logistical and strategic channels. Their cumulative effect was to increase economic and diplomatic pressure on Israel while reinforcing Turkey's humanitarian-oriented stance (AP News, 2025).

Taken together, the measures implemented in 2024–2025 illustrate Turkey's shift toward a more assertive, sanctions-based, and law-oriented foreign policy posture, aimed at influencing both the conduct of the conflict and international perceptions of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2011: 83).

E) Mediation, Humanitarian Diplomacy, and Practical Initiatives (2024-2025)

During 2024-2025, mediation and humanitarian diplomacy formed two mutually reinforcing pillars of Turkey's regional engagement. Ankara pursued extensive bilateral and multilateral contacts with the United States, Qatar, Egypt, and other key regional actors in efforts to secure ceasefire arrangements, prisoner exchanges, and sustained humanitarian access. Turkey's immediate operational priorities included the establishment of secure humanitarian corridors, protection mechanisms for civilians, and uninterrupted delivery of emergency relief into Gaza. Humanitarian operations conducted through AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent provided visible and practical support to Turkey's diplomatic narrative (Reuters, 14 May 2024).

According to Reuters reporting from late 2025, Turkey also participated in negotiations involving U.S. and regional mediators to secure the safe evacuation of Hamas fighters trapped in Gaza's tunnel systems demonstrating Ankara's willingness to engage even in highly sensitive and complex mediation roles. These efforts highlighted Turkey's capacity to serve as a bridging actor capable of maintaining communication channels with a diverse range of stakeholders. Such engagement reflects both Turkey's historical commitment to the Palestinian cause and its aspiration to play a meaningful role in regional crisis diplomacy (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2011: 91).

Turkey's dialogues with Hamas leaders despite criticisms from Western capitals were framed by Ankara as necessary diplomatic channels supporting both humanitarian access and long-term political resolution. In Turkey's framing, these contacts served two primary purposes: enabling secure delivery of aid and preserving communication avenues that may contribute to the emergence of a sustainable political process. In this regard,

Ankara treated mediation and humanitarian diplomacy not as separate policy instruments but as interdependent tools within a flexible and adaptive diplomatic strategy (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2011: 92).

F) Law, Multilateral Diplomacy, and Steps Toward the ICJ

By 2024, proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) brought renewed global attention to the legal dimensions of the conflict. Turkey's participation in these processes reflected both its normative foreign policy principles and its strategic aim of strengthening international legal scrutiny of Israel's conduct. In its ICJ statements, Ankara emphasized that the occupation constituted the "root cause" of the conflict and underscored the responsibility of the international community to address this structural dimension. Coverage from Al Jazeera and Reuters highlighted Turkey's framing of the issue not only as a humanitarian crisis but as a fundamental challenge to the enforcement of international law (Yılmaz, 2010: 52).

Turkey's initiative to intervene in ICJ proceedings demonstrated its intent to use legal platforms as instruments of diplomatic pressure and legitimacy building. Ankara criticized the persistent inaction of the UN Security Council, arguing that institutional paralysis undermined global peace and security. Through its legal interventions, Turkey sought to spotlight structural obstacles within the international system while amplifying calls for accountability (Reuters, 14 May 2024).

Overall, the 2024-2025 period shows Turkey deploying legal diplomacy, multilateral engagement, and mediation efforts simultaneously illustrating the emergence of a multidimensional foreign policy strategy that combines normative advocacy with concrete diplomatic action (AP News, 2025).

G) Turkey's Strategic Calculations: A Multidimensional Foreign Policy Combination

In the post-2023 period, Turkey's approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has rested on the simultaneous deployment of four complementary yet at times tension producing strategic pillars. Ankara conceptualizes these pillars as interconnected instruments within a flexible diplomatic toolkit, designed to align national interests with normative foreign policy claims. This multidimensional combination reflects both adaptability and inherent constraints (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2011: 88).

The first pillar is Turkey's consistent emphasis on international law and human rights norms. Ankara has used global platforms-including the United Nations, the

European Union, and especially the International Court of Justice to frame Israel's military actions as violations of international humanitarian law. Turkey's moves to intervene in ICJ proceedings represent a concrete extension of its law-centered strategy and illustrate its efforts to embed normative arguments within the architecture of global governance (Erendil, 1992: 74).

The second pillar consists of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy. Ankara has prioritized establishing humanitarian corridors, ensuring the continuity of aid flows, and coordinating on-the-ground assistance through AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent. These efforts foreground Turkey's historical and societal ties to the Palestinian cause while translating its normative preferences into visible, pragmatic action (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2011: 95).

The third strategic component involves economic and diplomatic pressure. Turkey's 2024 suspension of all trade with Israel, combined with airspace restrictions and selective port limitations, illustrates Ankara's willingness to deploy coercive tools in crisis diplomacy. These measures both reinforced the government's public commitment to Gaza and demonstrated that Turkey's involvement transcended rhetorical criticism, moving into the realm of enforceable foreign policy instruments (Nezih, 1999: 23).

The fourth pillar is mediation. During 2024-2025, Turkey took part in negotiations concerning ceasefire frameworks, prisoner exchanges, and safe-passage mechanisms, working in coordination with the United States, Qatar, Egypt, and other actors. Reuters reports indicated that Ankara even engaged in sensitive discussions regarding the evacuation of Hamas fighters from Gaza's tunnel networks-signifying its capacity to serve as a trusted interlocutor in complex crisis settings (Yergin, 2012: 163).

Yet this multidimensional strategy, while providing flexibility, also carries structural limitations. Turkey's NATO membership and its deep economic interdependence with the West impose constraints on the scale and sustainability of coercive actions. At the domestic level, strong societal sensitivity to the Palestinian cause shapes both public discourse and the space within which policymakers operate. Meanwhile, regional power dynamics may limit the effectiveness of Turkish initiatives, regardless of their normative or humanitarian orientation. The more assertively Turkey acts, the more likely diplomatic frictions with Western partners become (Armaoğlu, 1984: 115).

In sum, Turkey's post-2023 foreign policy represents a layered and hybrid model that blends legal advocacy, humanitarian diplomacy, economic pressure, and mediation. While this strategy enhances Turkey's visibility and influence, it also reveals structural dilemmas shaped by the international system and regional geopolitical realities (Erhan-Küçükuğurlu, 2005: 139).

H) Regional Implications: Normalization Processes, Energy, and Security Dynamics

The Abraham Accords—signed by the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan—signaled a profound shift in regional diplomacy in the early 2020s. By normalizing relations with Israel, these states embraced a new paradigm prioritizing bilateral cooperation in security, technology, and energy over traditional commitments to the Palestinian cause. Turkey closely monitored these developments and publicly criticized the risk of marginalizing Palestinian political demands. However, Ankara avoided a fully confrontational stance; geopolitical balancing and energy-based strategic interests required a calibrated approach, particularly after the mild thaw in Turkish–Israeli relations following 2021 (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2011: 103).

Energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean introduced a further layer of complexity. Disputes over the EastMed pipeline project, disagreements concerning exclusive economic zones, and maritime jurisdiction tensions have conditioned the strategic landscape of Turkish–Israeli interaction. In this regard, energy has functioned both as a potential field for cooperation and as a source of geopolitical competition, requiring a finely tuned diplomatic balance (Reuters, 14 May 2024).

Turkey's involvement in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus has also influenced regional perceptions and Israeli security calculations. The presence of Iran-aligned actors in Syria, the rivalry in Libya, and Turkey's growing influence in the Caucasus have all expanded the geopolitical framework shaping bilateral relations. Consequently, the Turkish–Israeli relationship must be understood not solely through the lens of the Palestinian issue but within broader regional dynamics involving power projection, alliance patterns, and strategic competition (Seta, 2016).

I) Evaluation and Policy Recommendations

Enhancing the effectiveness of Turkey's policy toward the Palestinian–Israeli conflict requires strengthening both its normative positioning and its practical impact capacity. To this end, foreign policy instruments should be employed within a more

coordinated and institutionalized structure. Turkey could develop a more strategic engagement in international legal mechanisms by expanding evidence-gathering, diplomatic advocacy, and multilateral pressure tools across ICJ and ICC processes. Establishing more structured channels of dialogue with UN Security Council members and EU institutions may broaden the international support base for Turkey's normative narrative (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2011: 110).

In humanitarian diplomacy, ensuring the sustainability of aid flows to Gaza must remain a core priority. Turkey could establish joint operational mechanisms with the EU, UN agencies, and key regional actors to secure humanitarian corridors and stabilize access. Meanwhile, economic sanctions should be recalibrated to maximize pressure on Israeli decision-makers while minimizing unintended harm to Palestinian civilians. More targeted economic tools could increase the impact of Turkey's diplomatic messaging while reinforcing its moral legitimacy (AP News, 2025).

Looking ahead, long-term reconstruction planning for Gaza constitutes another critical policy domain. Turkey could collaborate with international partners to design transparent financing frameworks and contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and institutional capacities. Such initiatives would support Turkey's long-term vision for regional stability and anchor its diplomatic role in durable and constructive outcomes (Armaoğlu, 1984: 118).

2 CONCLUSION

This study has examined Turkey's foreign policy toward the Palestinian–Israeli conflict within a long-term historical framework spanning from 1948 to 2025, revealing patterns of continuity and rupture. The 1948 war and the resulting refugee crisis shaped strong Palestinian sensitivities in early Republican Turkey, while the 1949 recognition of Israel marked the beginning of a dual-axis foreign policy balancing Western alignment with normative support for Palestinian rights. Subsequent wars in 1967, 1973, and the crises of the 1980s further consolidated Turkey's pro Palestinian normative orientation, even as NATO membership and relations with the West set structural boundaries.

The period between 2000 and 2022 was defined by cycles of “pragmatic cooperation” and “normative rupture.” While security, defense, and energy cooperation expanded at times, events such as the 2008–2009 Gaza offensive and the 2010 Mavi

Marmara incident caused major setbacks. Normalization attempts in 2016 and 2022 failed to produce durable strategic partnership due to disputes over settlements, Jerusalem, and repeated military escalations in Gaza.

The post 7 October 2023 phase, coupled with developments in 2024-2025, marked a decisive intensification in Turkey's foreign policy instruments. Ankara elevated its references to international law, engaged actively in ICJ proceedings, imposed sweeping economic sanctions—including the full suspension of trade-and restricted airspace and port access. Simultaneously, Turkey combined humanitarian diplomacy through AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent with mediation efforts involving the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, integrating these tools into a cohesive crisis-management strategy.

Overall, Turkey's approach constitutes a hybrid foreign policy model that blends normative positioning, humanitarian engagement, economic coercion, and mediation. Yet structural constraints—stemming from NATO membership, economic interdependence with Western partners, and shifting regional power Dynamics limit the full realization of Ankara's objectives. Moving forward, a more refined policy mix that strengthens institutional legal capacity, sustains humanitarian access, and pairs targeted economic pressure with a long-term reconstruction vision will be essential for enhancing both Turkey's normative influence and its practical impact on the conflict trajectory.

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Authors' Contribution

All authors contributed equally to the development of this article.

Data availability

All datasets relevant to this study's findings are fully available within the article.

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