

GOVERNANCE DEADLOCK IN COASTAL TOURISM: DISENTANGLING JURISDICTIONAL OVERLAPS BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY AUTHORITY IN INDONESIA

*IMPASSE DE GOVERNANÇA NO TURISMO COSTEIRO: DESEMBARAÇANDO AS
SOBREPOSIÇÕES JURISDICIONAIS ENTRE O GOVERNO LOCAL E A
AUTORIDADE MILITAR NA INDONÉSIA*

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Abstract

Institutional deadlock that undermines both economic development and environmental sustainability are among the unique challenges that coastal tourism governance in post-authoritarian Indonesia encounters when democratic decentralization intersects with persistent military territorial authority. This study investigates the governance deadlock in the coastal tourism sector of Cilacap Regency. The elimination of collaborative management arrangements due to military land certification (Hak Pakai Hankam) since 2013 and the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) prohibitions on inter-governmental revenue-sharing in 2019 has resulted in a collapse of local government tourism revenue from 2.7 billion rupiah annually to zero, while also accelerating ecosystem degradation. We conducted 27 key informant interviews, two focus group discussions, quantitative revenue analysis, and environmental assessments across military-controlled coastal sites from April to October 2024, utilizing an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design. The results indicate that institutional incompatibility deadlock is a unique governance failure mode. This mode is characterized by the creation of mutually reinforcing constraints that prevent coordination, despite the recognition of superior collaborative alternatives by stakeholders. These constraints are a result of rigid path dependencies (military land rights) and goal dependencies (financial accountability regulations). Even when cooperation generates mutual benefits, transaction cost barriers—information asymmetries, multi-principal negotiation complexity, and the absence of enforcement mechanisms—maintain non-cooperative equilibria. The research theoretically advances Evolutionary Governance Theory by defining self-reinforcing dependency mechanisms and empirically illustrating how

Resumo

O impasse institucional que mina tanto o desenvolvimento econômico quanto a sustentabilidade ambiental está entre os desafios singulares que a governança do turismo costeiro na Indonésia pós-autoritária enfrenta quando a descentralização democrática se cruza com a persistente autoridade territorial militar. Este estudo investiga o impasse de governança no setor de turismo costeiro da Regência de Cilacap. A eliminação de acordos de gestão colaborativa devido à certificação de terras militares (Hak Pakai Hankam) desde 2013 e as proibições do Tribunal de Contas da União (BPK) sobre o compartilhamento de receitas intergovernamentais em 2019 resultaram em um colapso da receita turística do governo local, de 2,7 bilhões de rupias anuais para zero, além de acelerar a degradação do ecossistema. Realizamos 27 entrevistas com informantes-chave, duas discussões em grupo focal, análise quantitativa de receitas e avaliações ambientais em locais costeiros controlados pelos militares, de abril a outubro de 2024, utilizando uma metodologia mista sequencial explicativa. Os resultados indicam que o impasse por incompatibilidade institucional é um modo de falha de governança singular. Este modo é caracterizado pela criação de restrições que se reforçam mutuamente e impedem a coordenação, apesar do reconhecimento de alternativas colaborativas superiores pelas partes interessadas. Essas restrições resultam de dependências rígidas de trajetória (direitos territoriais militares) e dependências de objetivos (regulamentos de responsabilidade financeira). Mesmo quando a cooperação gera benefícios mútuos, as barreiras de custo de transação — assimetrias de informação, complexidade da negociação com múltiplos participantes e ausência de mecanismos de aplicação — mantêm equilíbrios não

civil-military jurisdictional deadlock directly impede the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals 13 and 14 by eliminating environmental oversight institutions and revenue streams that fund sustainability investments. This has implications for coastal governance in contexts where authoritarian-era military prerogatives persist within democratic institutional frameworks.

Keywords: Coastal Governance. Institutional Deadlock. Civil-Military Relations. Sustainable Development Goals. Evolutionary Governance Theory.

cooperativos. A pesquisa avança teoricamente a Teoria da Governança Evolutiva ao definir mecanismos de dependência que se reforçam mutuamente e ilustrar empiricamente como o impasse jurisdicional civil-militar impede diretamente a consecução dos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável 13 e 14, eliminando instituições de supervisão ambiental e fluxos de receita que financiam investimentos em sustentabilidade. Isso tem implicações para a governança costeira em contextos onde as prerrogativas militares da era autoritária persistem dentro de estruturas institucionais democráticas.

Palavras-chave: Governança Costeira. Impasse Institucional. Relações Cívico-Militares. Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável. Teoria da Governança Evolutiva.

1 INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's coastal tourist industry is facing a paradoxical governance dilemma as goals for economic development clash with jurisdictional ambiguity and institutional fragmentation. The situation in Cilacap Regency, Central Java, illustrates this significant tension, as strategic coastal regions have been assigned to military control since 2013 via land use certificates intended for defense (Hak Pakai untuk Hankam), thereby engendering a governance void that has incapacitated the local government's ability to oversee tourism development (Ardli *et al.*, 2022; Fajriyah, 2024). After the transfer of coastal management authority to the Indonesian Army (TNI AD) and the termination of collaborative agreements in 2019—prompted by the Indonesian Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) findings that forbade revenue-sharing among government entities—Cilacap's local government has witnessed a total collapse of tourism revenue from coastal regions, declining from 2.7 billion rupiah annually to zero (Harsanto & Wahyuningrat, 2024). This institutional impasse not only hinders local economic advancement but also threatens Indonesia's dedication to fulfilling Sustainable Development Goals 13 and 14, which necessitate cohesive strategies for climate action and marine ecosystem conservation (Neumann *et al.*, 2017; Vinata *et al.*, 2024). The Cilacap case exemplifies a significant empirical location for analyzing how jurisdictional disputes between civilian and military authorities can severely hinder sustainable coastal governance, prompting

pressing inquiries regarding institutional design in post-authoritarian settings where military prerogatives endure within civilian spheres.

According to Pittman and Armitage (2016) and Singh *et al.* (2021), although there has been a surge in scholarly attention to coastal governance in recent decades, the majority of the literature is still centered on traditional multi-stakeholder configurations involving local governments, private sector actors, and community organizations. There has been little analysis of military authorities as the main governance actors in civilian tourism contexts. Evolutionary Governance Theory (EGT) has demonstrated its utility in elucidating how path dependencies and institutional inflexibilities impede adaptive governance in coastal areas; however, its applications have predominantly focused on regulatory legacies and bureaucratic inertia, rather than civil-military jurisdictional disputes (Van Assche *et al.*, 2019). Research on policy coherence for SDG implementation has identified challenges in both horizontal and vertical coordination, yet it has not sufficiently theorized scenarios where fundamental incompatibilities arise between divergent institutional mandates, such as military defense and civilian economic development (Neumann *et al.*, 2017; Scheyvens & Cheer, 2022). Recent research on Indonesian coastal tourism has highlighted challenges in community-based management and the pressures of overtourism, yet it has not addressed the structural governance contradictions arising from military institutions exerting *de facto* control over economically significant coastal resources (Jaya *et al.*, 2024; Yamin *et al.*, 2023). The gap is significant because military engagement in resource management exemplifies a unique type of institutional path dependency stemming from historical authoritarian governance frameworks that endure despite democratic transitions, resulting in what Van Assche *et al.* (2019) describe as "de facto institutional vacuums," where an increase in regulations paradoxically leads to governance failures.

The governance impasse in Cilacap's coastal tourism industry is examined in this study to fill in these gaps and show how jurisdictional disputes between the military and local government impede efforts to promote environmental sustainability and economic growth. Utilizing a mixed-methods approach that integrates comprehensive interviews with key stakeholders from the local tourism office (Disparpora), spatial planning agency (Bappeda), TNI AD representatives, and third-party operators, in conjunction with document analysis of legal frameworks and financial records, we delineate the institutional mechanisms that engender and perpetuate this governance paralysis. This

analysis investigates three interconnected dynamics: first, the legal classification of coastal land for defense purposes establishes inflexible path dependencies that obstruct alternative governance structures; second, audit regulations designed to guarantee financial accountability inadvertently induce institutional gridlock by forbidding inter-agency cooperation; and third, the lack of institutionalized third-party mechanisms (such as regional public enterprises or BUMDs) sustains a non-cooperative equilibrium, despite stakeholders' mutual acknowledgment that collaboration would yield better outcomes for all involved. By recording both the measurable economic losses (loss of local tourism revenue) and the qualitative aspects of institutional dysfunction (communication breakdown, increase of informal arrangements by military cooperatives), we furnish empirical support for theoretical insights concerning governance failures in situations of overlapping and friction institutional mandates.

The Cilacap deadlock illustrates a unique governance failure arising from the intersection of institutional path dependencies from authoritarian military prerogatives and democratic accountability mechanisms that neglect civil-military jurisdictional complexities. Utilizing Evolutionary Governance Theory, we assert that the concurrent influence of inflexible path dependency (military land rights instituted in 2013) and equally inflexible goal dependency (BPK's ban on inter-institutional revenue sharing) has resulted in what game theory defines as a suboptimal Nash equilibrium—a scenario in which both local government and military entities acknowledge that cooperation would be advantageous, yet institutional limitations render defection (non-cooperation) the rational individual strategy (Harsanto & Wahyuningrat, 2024). This results in not just coordination failure but also what we refer to as "institutional incompatibility deadlock," wherein legal and organizational frameworks create friction imperatives that cannot be reconciled through standard policy coherence methods. Our evidence indicates that this impasse is not permanent: the rise of third-party arrangements (CV operators managing tourism sites under contract) illustrates the ability of actors to innovate institutionally, though in legally ambiguous forms that do not replenish local government revenue. We hypothesize that the formal institutionalization of third-party mechanisms—specifically regional public enterprises (BUMDs) capable of legally contracting with military authorities while directing benefits to local government—constitutes a viable solution to the governance impasse, fulfilling both military land use needs and local economic

development objectives, thus facilitating advancement toward sustainable coastal tourism in accordance with Indonesia's SDG commitments.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Coastal zones pose unique governance issues because of their shifting borders, intricate relationships between marine and terrestrial systems, and friction demands from numerous stakeholders acting at various temporal and spatial scales. Scholars have increasingly conceptualized coastal governance through the lens of complex adaptive systems, recognizing that traditional hierarchical management approaches prove inadequate when ecological dynamics intersect with fragmented institutional authorities (Pittman & Armitage, 2016; Singh *et al.*, 2021). Empirical research in various contexts—from the regulatory proliferation in the post-communist Danube Delta (Teampău, 2019) to the dyking controversies in Manila Bay, Philippines (Siriwardane-de Zoysa, 2019)—illustrates that coastal regions are especially susceptible to what Van Assche *et al.* (2019) refer to as the "coastal condition": a governance framework characterized by observational challenges (difficulty in perceiving land-based effects on marine ecosystems and vice versa), unidirectional dependencies (where coastal systems rely on governance decisions made externally), and failures in multi-level coordination, resulting in pervasive governance deficiencies. The challenges escalate when economic development demands, especially tourism growth, create pressures that current institutional frameworks cannot sufficiently address, leading to what Daniell *et al.* (2019) refer to as "governance emergence"—the rise of informal arrangements that may either aid adaptation or exacerbate institutional fragmentation. The coastal governance literature indicates that jurisdictional ambiguity and stakeholder deadlock are inherent characteristics of coastal systems, necessitating analytical frameworks that elucidate the emergence and persistence of institutional rigidities despite their evident inefficiencies.

Evolutionary Governance Theory (EGT) offers a robust analytical framework for comprehending the transformation or stagnation of governance systems via co-evolutionary interactions among actors, institutions, and discourses (Van Assche *et al.*, 2019; Beunen *et al.*, 2015). The theory's primary insight is that governance is perpetually evolving; however, this evolution is restricted by "dependencies" that EGT defines as rigidities that hinder adaptive capacity: path dependencies based on historical institutional

arrangements and goal dependencies arising from commitments to new objectives that paradoxically limit flexibility (Birchall, 2019). Comparative applications of EGT elucidate the functioning of these dependencies across various contexts—Schlüter *et al.* (2019) illustrate the evolution of coral reef governance in Indonesia's Gili Trawangan from swift economic growth via informal arrangements to gradual formalization, whereas Teampau (2019) demonstrates how post-communist path dependencies in Romania's Danube Delta engendered discursive friction between conservationist and development-oriented stakeholders that formal integration mechanisms failed to resolve. EGT asserts that dependencies may arise externally to the governance system: decisions made by higher-level authorities, significant environmental alterations, or extensive social changes might create constraints that local actors are unable to independently surmount (Van Assche *et al.*, 2019). The theory elucidates why governance actors may acknowledge superior arrangements yet remain confined to suboptimal configurations—not due to informational deficiencies or strategic irrationality, but because institutional path dependencies and goal dependencies impose structural constraints on the feasible strategy space, as recognized by game theorists. This theoretical perspective is particularly useful for studying scenarios where legal frameworks, organizational mandates, and accountability mechanisms concurrently restrict many participants, rendering cooperation systematically challenging.

The convergence of military power and civilian resource management constitutes a poorly conceptualized aspect of governance literature, especially in post-authoritarian settings when democratic transitions preserve military institutional prerogatives in certain areas. Although considerable research investigates civil-military relations in security sector governance (Knight, 1992; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006), there is significantly less focus on how military dominance over economically valued natural resources poses governance issues for civilian development goals. The Indonesian situation exemplifies a wider trend in Southeast Asia, where military entities maintain territorial dominance and economic stakes formed during authoritarian regimes, resulting in what Harsanto and Wahyuningrat (2024) characterize as enduring coordination failures in rural development scenarios where military landholdings overlap with civilian authority. The Indonesian military (TNI) has traditionally engaged in substantial off-budget economic activities, encompassing control over land and natural resources, stemming from its territorial management responsibilities during the New Order regime (1966-1998)—a trend that

democratic reforms have only partially mitigated (Alisjahbana & Busch, 2017). In coastal tourism, military control is evident through two mechanisms: direct operational management by military cooperatives (Koperasi Kodim/Korem) and contractual agreements with seemingly independent third parties that still necessitate military approval and funnel revenues through opaque channels. This configuration generates a property rights ambiguity problem, as recognized by institutional economists, where *de jure* civilian authority (local government responsibility for tourism development) friction with *de facto* military control (actual management authority derived from land use certificates), resulting in transaction costs that obstruct efficient resource allocation and collaborative arrangements. The literature indicates that military participation in civilian resource management is not only a coordination issue but also a basic institutional mismatch stemming from differing organizational mandates, accountability frameworks, and income models.

The Sustainable Development Goals framework underscores the necessity of policy coherence—both horizontal coordination among sectors and vertical alignment across governance levels—as vital for tackling intricate sustainability challenges; however, realizing this coherence is consistently challenging in practice (Neumann *et al.*, 2017; Nilsson *et al.*, 2016). SDG 14 (Life Below Water) and SDG 13 (Climate Action) necessitate integrated coastal zone management that harmonizes economic development with ecosystem conservation and climate adaptation, a requirement that presupposes institutional capacity for cross-sectoral coordination, which is often deficient in many governance frameworks (Scheyvens & Cheer, 2022; Rasoolimanesh *et al.*, 2023). Neumann *et al.* (2017) contend that SDG 14 should be viewed through a "strong sustainability" perspective, which regards natural capital as non-substitutable. This suggests that economic development cannot validly occur if it fundamentally undermines coastal ecosystems; however, this principle is largely unimplemented in most coastal governance frameworks. Empirical investigations of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) implementation within tourism contexts expose enduring discrepancies between strategic commitments and operational realities: Scheyvens and Cheer (2022) illustrate that the rhetoric surrounding partnerships in sustainable tourism seldom results in meaningful power-sharing or resource redistribution, whereas Rasoolimanesh *et al.* (2023) ascertain that the majority of sustainable tourism indicators inadequately reflect systemic governance aspects such as the quality of institutional coordination or

distributional equity. The literature on Indonesian coastal tourism explicitly highlights discrepancies between national Sustainable Development Goal commitments and local implementation capabilities, with recent research indicating that community-based ecotourism initiatives frequently lack the requisite institutional support and regulatory clarity for sustainability (Jaya *et al.*, 2024; Suacana *et al.*, 2023). The findings indicate that failures in policy coherence within coastal contexts frequently stem from not only coordination issues but also profound institutional incompatibilities—circumstances in which various actors function under fundamentally friction mandates, accountability frameworks, and temporal perspectives that standard coordination methods cannot address.

Collective action challenges are inherent in coastal resource management, where multiple stakeholders' rational individual behavior results in collectively suboptimal outcomes. To align individual incentives with collective welfare, institutional mechanisms are necessary (Schlüter *et al.*, 2019; Partelow & Nelson, 2018). Game-theoretic evaluations of natural resource governance delineate particular conditions that facilitate or hinder cooperation: recurrent interactions, transparency of information, credible commitment mechanisms, and enforcement capabilities all affect the ability of actors to transcend the prisoner's dilemma or tragedy of the commons dynamics (Kreps *et al.*, 1982; Knight, 1992). Partelow and Nelson (2018) illustrate the evolution of governance for sustainable tourism in Indonesia's Gili Islands through network-based collective action, where repeated interactions among various stakeholders progressively fostered trust and enabled the development of informal coordination mechanisms in the absence of formal institutional frameworks. This evolutionary process is fundamentally reliant on the capacity of actors to communicate, observe one another's behavior, and iteratively modify strategies—conditions that are compromised when jurisdictional friction generate information asymmetries and legal ambiguities that hinder transparent interaction. The literature on institutional design underscores that resolving collective action dilemmas frequently necessitates the establishment of novel organizational structures that reconcile divergent institutional logics: boundary organizations functioning at the intersections of various sectors, hybrid governance frameworks integrating public and private components, or third-party intermediaries capable of engaging with multiple principals while advancing collective goals (Durant *et al.*, 2017; Kooiman & Bavinck, 2013). In the context of coastal tourism governance, this implies

that overcoming impasses between military and civilian authorities may necessitate not only enhanced coordination protocols but also fundamental institutional innovation—such as the establishment of regional public enterprises (BUMDs) that can legally engage with military landholders while directing benefits to local governments, thus creating a viable cooperation pathway that current institutional frameworks obstruct. The literature indicates that institutional design solutions must address both the strategic incentive framework (rendering collaboration personally rational) and the legal-organizational limitations (rendering cooperation institutionally feasible).

Aspirational national development agendas that often lead to friction directives for local governments, long-standing military economic interests, and democratic decentralization reforms since 1998 have all influenced the distinctive institutional framework in which Indonesia's coastal tourism industry operates (Yamin *et al.*, 2023; Harsanto & Wahyuningrat, 2024). Regional autonomy legislation granted local governments the power to oversee coastal zones and promote tourism, generating expectations for local economic development; however, this decentralization occurred without sufficiently addressing military landholding claims or establishing clear protocols for civilian-military coordination in resource management (Alisjahbana & Busch, 2017). Recent studies underscore the increasing strain on Indonesian coastal ecosystems resulting from swift tourism expansion, with analyses uncovering overtourism phenomena in Bali (Yamin *et al.*, 2023; Januar, 2024) and environmental deterioration in Java's coastal regions, particularly pronounced siltation in Cilacap's Segara Anakan lagoon system (Ardli *et al.*, 2022; Fajriyah, 2024). Attempts to create sustainable coastal tourism models have achieved limited success: Suacana *et al.* (2023) note that ecotourism initiatives in Bali lack adequate institutional support, while Jaya *et al.* (2024) suggest that the integration of local wisdom requires governance frameworks that are frequently lacking in numerous areas. The Indonesian Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) has adopted a more active stance in forbidding revenue-sharing agreements between government organizations, viewing these activities as inconsistent with principles of financial responsibility. Nonetheless, these audit requirements, designed to avert corruption, unintentionally obstruct collaborative governance frameworks that could achieve valid public goals (Harsanto & Wahyuningrat, 2024). This regulatory framework creates a "second-best" dilemma, as described by institutional economists, in which the removal of one distortion (corruption risk from revenue-sharing) without addressing related

institutional constraints (military land control, absence of alternative collaboration mechanisms) leads to outcomes that are inferior to the original flawed arrangement. The literature on Indonesian coastal governance reveals a system characterized by multiple overlapping dysfunctions: decentralization without clear authority delineation, accountability mechanisms that hinder coordination, development pressures threatening sustainability, and democratic institutions that awkwardly coexist with authoritarian-era military prerogatives—culminating in what this study identifies as governance deadlock.

3 METHOD

The governance impasse in the coastal tourism industry of Cilacap Regency serves as the main analytical unit in this study, which focuses on the institutional disintegration that resulted from the 2013 military land certification and the 2019 termination of cooperative management agreements. The analytical focus includes three interconnected levels: micro-level interactions among individual actors from local government agencies (Disparpora, Bappeda), TNI AD units (Kodim, Korem), and third-party operators (CV entities, military cooperatives); meso-level institutional arrangements comprising formal legal frameworks (land use certificates, audit regulations), financial mechanisms (revenue sharing agreements, PNBP remittances), and organizational structures (BPK oversight, military cooperative operations); and macro-level policy contexts linking local governance dynamics to national decentralization frameworks and Indonesia's SDG commitments (Neumann *et al.*, 2017; Van Assche *et al.*, 2019). This design addresses the governance impasse as a constrained case situated within wider institutional frameworks, facilitating analytical transitions between in-depth analysis of particular coordination failures and theoretical understanding of how jurisdictional disputes generate and perpetuate governance stagnation (Yin, 2018). The temporal scope encompasses the duration from 2013, when military land use certificates were issued, to 2024, when field research was conducted. This enables a systematic comparison between the pre-deadlock collaborative period (2013-2019) and the post-deadlock fragmented period (2019-present), thereby elucidating causal mechanisms connecting institutional changes to governance outcomes.

The explanatory sequential mixed-methods methodology used in this study combines qualitative research on institutional dynamics and stakeholder views with

quantitative evaluation of economic outcomes (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). The sequential framework unfolds in two stages: an initial quantitative stage that records measurable results of the governance impasse—including trends in tourism revenue, visitor statistics, infrastructure investment patterns, and environmental metrics across coastal locations—subsequently followed by a qualitative stage that elucidates the emergence of these outcomes through an in-depth analysis of institutional mechanisms, actor strategies, and decision-making processes (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). The chosen design was selected due to the governance deadlock phenomenon displaying both objectively measurable aspects (revenue decline, infrastructure degradation) and interpretive aspects (stakeholder perceptions, informal agreements, discursive friction) that neither exclusively quantitative nor exclusively qualitative methods could sufficiently encompass (Pittman & Armitage, 2016). The quantitative phase delineates the empirical extent and gravity of governance failure, offering tangible proof of economic losses and developmental stagnation that informs the ensuing qualitative investigation. The qualitative phase elucidates the causal mechanisms by which institutional rigidities, regulatory constraints, and strategic interactions yield the observed outcomes, utilizing theoretical frameworks from Evolutionary Governance Theory and institutional economics to analyze the findings (Van Assche *et al.*, 2019). Integration transpires at various junctures: Quantitative findings guide qualitative data collection by pinpointing essential moments that necessitate further exploration, while qualitative insights provide context to quantitative trends by uncovering fundamental mechanisms. The integration of these findings facilitates theoretically-informed explanations that are unattainable by either dataset independently.

The selection of participants Utilized purposive sampling to guarantee representation across all stakeholder categories pertinent to coastal tourism governance in Cilacap, resulting in a final sample of 27 key informants distributed among five categories: local government officials (n=8) from Disparpora and Bappeda at various hierarchical levels; TNI AD representatives (n=4) from Kodim and Korem units with direct oversight of coastal areas; third-party operators (n=5) managing tourism sites under contract with military authorities, including CV directors and leaders of military cooperatives (Koperasi Kodim/Korem); community representatives (n=6) from coastal villages, including chairs of village tourism associations (Pokdarwis) and local entrepreneurs; and domain experts (n=4) consisting of academic researchers from

regional universities and environmental NGO personnel with ongoing involvement in Cilacap coastal issues. The selection criteria prioritized direct engagement in or expert knowledge of coastal tourism governance structures, specifically focusing on identifying informants who had experienced both the pre-2019 collaborative phase and the post-2019 impasse, thereby facilitating comparative analysis of institutional change. Snowball sampling complemented the initial purposive selection as informants identified additional actors whose insights were essential for comprehending specific governance aspects, such as BPK regional staff whose audit decisions led to the collaborative breakdown; however, these officials ultimately declined participation, citing institutional protocols. For the quantitative component, we acquired secondary data from official sources, including Disparpora's yearly tourism statistics (2014-2023), regional budget documents (APBD) outlining tourism sector allocations, and environmental monitoring reports from regional environmental authorities. Documentary sources included legal instruments (land use certificates, ministerial regulations, regional regulations), intergovernmental correspondence concerning collaborative arrangements, media coverage of governance disputes, and organizational documents from military cooperatives and third-party operators, facilitating triangulation of interview data and allowing for the reconstruction of institutional timelines.

Data was collected in three interconnected phases over a seven-month period (March-September 2025), starting with quantitative data gathering and documentary evaluation, moving on to semi-structured interviews, and ending with focus groups that allowed stakeholders to communicate. The preliminary phase entailed a systematic examination of legal documents, governmental reports, and media coverage to construct a chronological account of institutional modifications and pinpoint critical decision-making junctures necessitating in-depth analysis, in conjunction with the aggregation of quantitative metrics from official sources, augmented by field assessments of environmental variables (coastal erosion extent, mangrove coverage) at three pivotal sites: the Teluk Penyus-Benteng Pendem complex, Widarapayung beach, and designated locations within Segara Anakan. Semi-structured interviews, conducted in Bahasa Indonesia and averaging 75 minutes in duration, utilized topic guides centered on five thematic domains: institutional history and transformation, current management arrangements and revenue flows, stakeholder perceptions of governance effectiveness, barriers to collaborative problem-solving, and potential solutions, including proposed

BUMD arrangements (Harsanto & Wahyuningrat, 2024). Interview protocols were iteratively modified as emerging themes necessitated further exploration; for example, initial interviews identified military cooperative operations as a notable informal arrangement absent from official documentation, leading to adjustments in the protocols to systematically investigate this aspect in later interviews. All interviews were audio-recorded with informed consent, transcribed verbatim, and augmented by comprehensive field notes that documented contextual observations and non-verbal communication. Two focus group discussions (FGD) were held with 12 and 15 participants, respectively, intentionally assembling mixed stakeholder groups to examine interaction dynamics and ascertain potential consensus on collaborative solutions. The FGD protocols utilized scenario-based exercises, prompting participants to assess alternative institutional arrangements (status quo, BUMD model, other third-party mechanisms) based on explicit criteria (revenue generation, environmental sustainability, legal compliance, distributional equity). During data collection, we utilized member checking by presenting initial interpretations to key informants for validation and clarification, while also maintaining reflexive journals to document researcher positionality and potential biases—especially significant due to the lead researcher's prior associations with local government officials from previous collaborative endeavors.

The data analysis employed a convergent methodology, merging distinct quantitative and qualitative analytical processes prior to synthesizing results via theoretical triangulation (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). Quantitative analysis utilized descriptive statistics to record temporal trends in tourism revenue, visitor counts, and infrastructure investment, calculating percentage changes and annual growth rates to quantify the economic impact of governance deadlock. A comparative analysis contrasted pre-deadlock (2014-2018) and post-deadlock (2019-2023) periods, employing independent samples t-tests to evaluate the statistical significance of the observed differences. Data on environmental parameters were investigated through spatial comparisons among locations with varying management structures (direct military control, third-party operators, abandoned sites), facilitating the evaluation of governance regime impacts on ecosystem conditions. Qualitative analysis was conducted through iterative coding utilizing MAXQDA software, beginning with deductive coding informed by theoretical constructs from Evolutionary Governance Theory (path dependencies, goal dependencies, governance emergence) and institutional analysis (property rights,

transaction costs, collective action dilemmas), subsequently integrating inductive codes that arose from data patterns inadequately addressed by existing frameworks (Gioia *et al.*, 2013). Initial coding produced 127 descriptive codes, which were subsequently organized into 23 first-order categories reflecting informant perspectives and experiences. These were then synthesized into 8 second-order themes that encapsulate analytical dimensions: jurisdictional ambiguity, regulatory contradictions, informal adaptation mechanisms, stakeholder strategic calculations, environmental degradation pathways, revenue flow configurations, institutional innovation proposals, and obstacles to collaborative problem-solving. Theoretical triangulation amalgamated these empirical themes with EGT concepts, elucidating particular manifestations of path dependencies (military land certificates, BPK regulations) and goal dependencies (defense mandates versus development imperatives) that accounted for the observed governance inflexibilities (Van Assche *et al.*, 2019). The game-theoretic analysis assessed stakeholder incentive frameworks, depicting the governance impasse as a non-cooperative equilibrium in which both local government and military entities acknowledged potential mutual benefits from collaboration but encountered institutional limitations that rendered cooperation impractical under current regulations—an arrangement aligned with prisoner's dilemma dynamics necessitating institutional design reforms to facilitate collaboration (Partelow & Nelson, 2018). The final integration combined quantitative evidence of governance failure severity with qualitative explanations of causal mechanisms, resulting in a multi-level analysis that links micro-level actor strategies, meso-level institutional configurations, and macro-level policy contexts to elucidate the emergence and persistence of the deadlock, despite its apparent irrationality.


4 RESULT

Local government suffered severe financial repercussions as a result of the governance impasse in Cilacap's coastal tourism industry. Annual tourism revenue from coastal regions fell from 2.7 billion rupiah in 2018 to zero by 2020 and remained at zero through 2024. The significant revenue decline stemmed from the total withdrawal of local government management authority after BPK audit findings in 2019, which forbade revenue-sharing agreements between government entities, thereby dismantling the

cooperative structure that allowed Disparpora to gather entrance fees, parking charges, and facility rental income from coastal tourism sites under TNI AD control. Figure 1 illustrates the temporal trajectory comprising three distinct phases: a growth phase (2014-2018) marked by annual revenue increases averaging 18.3% and visitor growth of 12.7%; a sudden collapse phase (2019-2020) associated with governance fragmentation; and a stagnation phase (2021-2023) during which visitor numbers partially rebounded to 1.4 million annually, yet failed to generate local government revenue due to military cooperative and third-party operator arrangements that circumvented official channels. Interview data validate these quantitative trends, with the Disparpora director asserting: "We previously managed these areas and significantly contributed to PAD [local own-source revenue], occasionally reaching 2.7 billion rupiah." The current value is zero. Not due to a lack of visitors, but because we can no longer administer it lawfully" (Interview, May 2024). The economic repercussions transcended mere revenue loss, affecting infrastructure degradation, as APBD budget regulations forbade spending on assets not owned by the local government—illustrated by a collapsed bridge at Widarapayung that remained unrepaired for two years, despite being built with regional funds, due to the land beneath it possessing military certification.

Figure 1.


Coastal Tourism Revenue and Visitor Trends (2014-2023)



Stakeholder interviews and documentary analysis allowed for the reconstruction of the institutional change that resulted in governance impasse, exposing four pivotal moments that successively limited opportunities for cooperation. The pivotal moment transpired in 2013 when important coastal regions were assigned Hak Pakai (land usage certificate) designations for Hankam (defense and security) objectives, establishing a route dependency that legally subjected civilian economic activities to military directives. A Bappeda official elucidated the restrictive nature: "The land is designated for defense purposes, not for tourism or commercial endeavors." The Hak Pakai for Hankam contains no commercial terminology whatsoever" (Interview, June 2025). The second juncture occurred between 2014 and 2018, when pragmatic revenue-sharing agreements facilitated the coexistence of military land control and local government tourism management. Negotiated percentages, typically 70% for the military and 30% for local government, permitted both entities to benefit despite jurisdictional ambiguity. The third pivotal moment occurred in 2019 when BPK audit findings explicitly forbade inter-governmental revenue sharing, deeming such arrangements as breaches of financial accountability principles—a regulatory measure aimed at curbing corruption that inadvertently dismantled the collaborative framework supporting coastal tourism governance. The fourth phase has emerged from 2019 to the present, characterized by the proliferation of informal adaptation mechanisms: third-party CV operators engaged with military authorities to oversee specific sites (Widarapayung, Jetis), while military cooperatives (Koperasi Kodim, Koperasi Korem) directly managed other locations (Teluk Penyau, Cemara Sewu, Serambil Sodong). This has resulted in a fragmented management landscape, wherein systematic revenue flows to local government and transparent PNPB remittances to the central government have not consistently materialized.

Figure 2.

Critical Junctures in Institutional Transformation



Thematic analysis of interview transcripts and legal papers identified three predominant themes that perpetuated governance gridlock through jurisdictional issues and regulatory contradictions. The initial pattern, jurisdictional incompatibility, arose from inherent contradictions between military land certification for defense objectives and local government directives for economic development and public service delivery. This friction was most pronounced in spatial planning processes, where Bappeda officials articulated their inability to allocate coastal zone polygons for tourism development, as such actions would contravene both military Hankam designations and environmental regulations that restrict economic activities within 100 meters of the shoreline. A top Bappeda planner expressed this paralysis: "We fear committing errors in polygon designation." The 100-meter coastline protection zone is legally prohibited from economic activity; nonetheless, the military possesses Hankam privileges. Where should tourism development be positioned within the spatial plan? (Interview, June 2025). The second pattern, regulatory cascade effects, functioned through sequences in which a single regulatory intervention produced downstream constraints that exacerbated rather than alleviated coordination issues—illustrated by BPK's prohibition on revenue-sharing,

which, while curbing one potential misuse (corruption via inter-governmental transfers), concurrently diminished financial incentives for military authorities to uphold infrastructure, engendered legal ambiguity that informal operators capitalized on, and stripped local governments of the capacity to invest in environmental protection or enhancements in tourism quality. The third pattern, enforcement asymmetries, delineated scenarios in which disparate governance actors encountered markedly divergent repercussions for regulatory non-compliance: local government officials faced audit sanctions and personal liability for unauthorized expenditures on military land, whereas military cooperative operations breaching Hak Pakai commercial restrictions experienced negligible oversight and produced no PNPB remittances to the central government, resulting in what informants described as a "protection deficit," wherein regulations restricted civilian authorities but inadequately constrained military economic activities. These findings cumulatively suggest that the governance impasse endured not due to stakeholders' ignorance of optimal arrangements, but because the legislative framework consistently disadvantaged civilian coordinating initiatives while allowing military economic independence.

Systematic differences in the perceptions of various stakeholder categories on the origins, effects, and potential remedies of governance deadlocks were found through focus groups and individual interviews. Local government officials consistently identified military land control and BPK regulations as significant obstacles, highlighting lost revenue and the inability to meet public service obligations, with typical remarks articulating the predicament as "we wish to manage but are legally constrained" (Disparpora official, May 2025). In contrast, TNI AD informants at the Kodim level indicated a readiness to cooperate with local government; however, they highlighted their absence of an operational budget for tourism management, articulating an uncomfortable predicament: "our primary responsibility is defense and security, we lack funds for tourism operations," despite possessing land that attracts visitors (Kodim representative, July 2025). Third-party operators (CV directors) expressed a unique viewpoint focused on entrepreneurial prospects amid legal uncertainty, recognizing that their operational legitimacy relied on sustaining relationships with military landholders and local government: "We originated from Pemkab [local government], and we are prepared to relinquish management to them, provided the legal framework is unequivocal" (CV operator, May 2025). Representatives from coastal communities articulated their

dissatisfaction with their isolation from decision-making processes, while enduring environmental repercussions, stating, "whoever manages it, we just want to participate and earn a living, but often we're not involved" (Pokdarwis chair, June 2025). Advocates for cultural heritage from organizations such as Tjilatjaphistory expressed apprehensions on the degradation of historical sites (Benteng Pendem) due to disjointed management, perceiving the governance impasse as a threat to Cilacap's cultural identity. The analytical significance of these perspective divergences lies in their demonstration that stakeholders had incomplete and non-congruent information regarding the constraints encountered by other actors—local government officials were unaware of military budgetary limitations, military representatives underestimated the legal liability concerns of local governments, and third-party operators lacked insight into the reasons behind the failure of prior collaborative arrangements.

Operational arrangement analysis uncovered intricate informal institutional innovations that actors used to cope with governance impasse. This resulted in a shadow governance structure that partially addressed regulatory gaps while creating new coordination issues. Three distinct management modalities emerged across Cilacap's coastal tourism sites: direct military cooperative management (operating at Teluk Penyu, Cemara Sewu, Serambil Sodong), third-party CV operator arrangements with varying degrees of formality (Widarapayung, Jetis), and effectively abandoned sites lacking active management from both military and civilian authorities. Military cooperatives (Koperasi Kodim for Teluk Penyu-Cemara Sewu, Koperasi Korem for Serambil Sodong) managed tourism sites as commercial enterprises that generated income for military unit welfare funds, employing local community members. However, they allegedly did not remit PNBP to the central government—a situation described by a local government informant as "they collect revenues but we don't know where it goes, certainly not to PNBP" (Disparpora staff, May 2025). CV operator arrangements entailed official commercial companies engaging in contracts with military authorities to oversee designated sites, with contracts delineating PNBP requirements and operating parameters, while actual compliance exhibited considerable variation. Notably, essential personnel frequently occupied multiple overlapping positions—the CV managing Jetis was overseen by the village head, who concurrently presided over the village tourism association (Pokdarwis), resulting in concentrated authority that enhanced site coordination but diminished transparency and accountability. An illuminating adaptation

occurred at Widarapayung, where the CV operator was composed solely of former Disparpora personnel who had overseen the site during the collaborative phase, effectively perpetuating their prior responsibilities under a modified legal framework that transitioned their employment from the public to the private sector, while their operational methodologies remained predominantly unchanged.

Table 1.

Comparative Characteristics of Management Modalities (2025)

Dimension	Military Cooperative	CV Third-Party Operator	Abandoned Sites
Primary locations	Teluk Penyu, Cemara Sewu, Serambil Sodong	Widarapayung, Jetis	Bunker sites, portions of Segara Anakan
Legal entity type	Koperasi TNI (Kodim/Korem)	Limited liability company (CV)	None (informal use)
Revenue destination	Military unit welfare funds	PNBP to central govt (variable)	None/minimal informal
Local government benefit	Zero	Zero	Zero
Infrastructure maintenance	Minimal (no budget 5 years)	Dependent on operator	None
Environmental oversight	None	None	None
Community employment	~15-20 per site (informal)	~8-12 per site (semi-formal)	Informal/subsistence
Reporting transparency	Internal military only	Limited external reporting	N/A
Legal compliance status	Questionable (commercial use violates Hankam designation)	Ambiguous (contracts exist but framework unclear)	Non-compliant
Visitor numbers (est.)	High (300-500 daily peak)	Moderate (100-200 daily)	Minimal (<50 daily)

Source: Field observations and interviews, August-September 2025

Field observations and assessments of environmental parameters indicated that governance impasse exacerbated coastal ecosystem deterioration via three mechanisms: the removal of regulatory monitoring, infrastructural failure, and distorted incentives for immediate resource extraction. A comparative analysis of sites under varying management regimes revealed systematic patterns: abandoned sites displayed significant erosion and mangrove loss, military cooperative sites experienced moderate degradation with minimal maintenance, whereas even the well-managed CV sites indicated deteriorating conditions compared to the baseline established during the collaborative

period. The collapsed bridge at Widarapayung not only caused access issues but also posed environmental risks, as tourists increasingly utilized informal beach access points that damaged coastal flora and destabilized dune systems. Numerous informants recognized the Segara Anakan lagoon system—a vital mangrove ecosystem undergoing significant siltation as reported by Ardli *et al.* (2022)—as a representation of the repercussions of governance failure, with neither military authorities (who oversee adjacent land) nor local government (which lacks jurisdiction) having defined responsibility or capability for ecosystem management. A Disparpora official expressed the deficiency in environmental governance: "We aim to engage in environmental preservation, which is our obligation, but we are unable to operate on military land, nor can we allocate funds for it" (Interview, May 2024). Community informants from Widarapayung Wetan reported escalating environmental pressures due to unregulated shrimp pond expansion in coastal wetlands, exacerbated by fragmented governance that undermined effective land use oversight: "Investors are entering, local farmers are converting land, and the TNI does not intervene as they also gain benefits, yet the environment is profoundly compromised" (community leader interview, August 2024). Water quality assessments at five coastal locations indicated heightened pollution indicators (turbidity, dissolved solids, coliform bacteria) beyond national criteria at all sites, with the most significant contamination observed at locations without formal management oversight. The environmental implications jeopardize both ecosystem integrity and the sustainability of tourism, as deteriorated coastal conditions diminish visitor happiness and imperil the ecological resources (beaches, mangroves, marine biodiversity) that are central to Cilacap's tourism appeal.

Specific path dependencies and goal dependencies functioned as binding constraints that kept actors in less-than-ideal governance configurations even though better alternatives were widely acknowledged, according to the analysis of interview and documentary data using the framework of evolutionary governance theory. Path dependencies—rigidities arising from historical institutional frameworks—were most prominently exhibited through the 2013 military land certification, which established a legal-administrative infrastructure that is exceedingly challenging to amend: modifying Hak Pakai designations necessitates intricate bureaucratic procedures involving various national ministries (Defense, Home Affairs, Agrarian Affairs) without explicit protocols for transitioning from Hankam to mixed-use or civilian applications. A Bappeda

informant stated: "Although there is consensus that management should revert to local government, the alteration of land certification is not straightforward." Approval from Jakarta is necessary, specifically from ministries with which we do not have direct interaction" (Interview, June 2024). Subsequent path dependencies arose from BPK's 2019 audit findings, which set a precedent influencing later audit interpretations, resulting in auditors' hesitance to endorse any arrangement resembling the proscribed revenue-sharing model, regardless of the superficial differences in legal structures utilized. Goal dependencies—rigidities stemming from commitments to new objectives—functioned through TNI AD's defense mission mandate, which explicitly forbids commercial tourism operations on Hankam land. This created a contradiction between the institutional mission and the actual land use patterns, which informants recognized but could not formally reconcile. A Kodim official expressed this tension: "Regulations stipulate that Hankam land should not be utilized for commercial purposes; however, in practice, cooperatives and CVs are functioning there." Local government officials articulated a sense of discomfort regarding goal dependency, as their accountability to central government development metrics and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets necessitates verifiable growth and revenue generation in the tourism sector. This creates pressure to demonstrate results, despite their limited authority over essential assets. These dependencies were binding rather than merely constraining, as they functioned through formal legal-administrative channels supported by enforcement mechanisms (audit sanctions, administrative penalties, potential criminal liability), setting them apart from informal norms or conventions that actors could more readily evade.

Analysis of the coordination efforts and failures of stakeholders revealed certain transaction cost barriers that, in spite of apparent benefits to both parties, hindered the establishment of cooperative solutions. From 2019 to 2024, local government officials indicated that they had a minimum of seven formal coordination meetings with TNI AD representatives to investigate opportunities for reinstating collaborative management; however, none resulted in actionable agreements. Interview data identified three forms of transaction costs impeding coordination: Information costs emerged from asymmetries concerning the genuine constraints and preferences of each party—local government officials initially suggested revenue-sharing models, oblivious to the fact that BPK precedent rendered such arrangements legally unfeasible for them, irrespective of military willingness, while military representatives proposed operational frameworks without

acknowledging that APBD regulations barred local government from financing infrastructure on non-government land, even in the presence of contractual agreements. A Disparpora official articulated exasperation: "We convene, we deliberate, yet when we attempt to formalize any agreements, unforeseen legal impediments arise that neither party anticipated" (Interview, May 2024). Negotiation expenses increased as any suggested agreement necessitated approval from various stakeholders beyond the immediate negotiating parties: local government proposals required budget endorsement from the Regional Parliament (DPRD) and acceptance from the BPK, while military arrangements demanded authorization from the Kodam (regional military command) and possibly clearance from the national Defense Ministry, resulting in intricate multi-principal bargaining that significantly heightened coordination challenges. The costs of enforcement were prohibitive as neither party had credible commitment mechanisms to guarantee adherence to negotiated agreements. Previous experiences from the 2014-2018 collaboration showed that superior authorities (in this case, BPK) could unilaterally nullify locally negotiated agreements without consultation, leading both parties to be rationally hesitant to invest in new collaborative frameworks susceptible to similar overrides. Game-theoretic study indicates that these transaction cost barriers converted what may seem like a straightforward prisoner's dilemma into a more intricate coordination game characterized by several equilibria and significant switching costs among them.

Analysis of implementation barriers showed that even this seemingly promising approach faced significant challenges, despite stakeholder discussions of potential solutions remarkably agreeing on the idea of creating a Regional Public Enterprise (BUMD) specifically for coastal tourism management. The BUMD model garnered support from various stakeholders as it theoretically mitigated multiple constraints concurrently: as a semi-private legal entity, a BUMD could engage in contracts with military authorities without violating BPK restrictions on inter-governmental revenue-sharing; as a regional government-owned entity, it could return economic benefits to local government via dividend payments and taxes while ensuring public accountability; and as a specialized tourism organization, it could cultivate professional management capabilities that neither Disparpora (mainly regulatory) nor TNI AD (primarily defense) possessed. A top Bappeda official expressed this rationale: "BUMD represents the most viable option, as it is semi-private and can collaborate with TNI, while remaining

regionally owned, ensuring that benefits revert to us" (Interview, June 2024). However, detailed examination of BUMD establishment requirements revealed formidable implementation barriers organized in three categories: legal-procedural barriers included complex legislative processes requiring Regional Regulation (Perda) approved by DPRD, substantial initial capital requirements (minimum 1 billion rupiah per regional regulation norms), and unclear legal standing for BUMD operations on Hankam land despite semi-private status; organizational capacity barriers encompassed Cilacap's lack of existing BUMD experience in tourism (creating startup costs and learning curves), difficulty recruiting qualified professional management willing to work in legally ambiguous environment, and challenges integrating community employment expectations with commercial efficiency requirements; and political economy barriers reflected resistance from current informal operators (military cooperatives and CV entities) who would lose economic rents under formalized BUMD management, potential opposition from DPRD members aligned with incumbent operators, and military authorities' ambivalence about arrangements that might increase external oversight of their land use. Interview data indicated that military representatives held a favorable view of BUMD in theory—"if a legal entity can manage this professionally and equitably distribute benefits, that could be effective" (Kodim official, July 2024)—but remained non-committal concerning specific contractual stipulations, especially regarding revenue allocations and operational jurisdiction.

5 DISCUSSION

The Cilacap case highlights a governance failure inadequately addressed in current coastal management literature: institutional incompatibility deadlock, wherein multiple legitimate institutional mandates produce friction imperatives that traditional coordination mechanisms are unable to resolve. Evolutionary Governance Theory elucidates how path dependencies and goal dependencies limit adaptive governance (Van Assche *et al.*, 2019; Beunen *et al.*, 2015). However, current applications have predominantly focused on regulatory legacies and bureaucratic inertia within fundamentally compatible institutional logics. For example, Birchall's (2019) examination of climate adaptation planning in Homer, Alaska, involved coordination among agencies adhering to civilian governance frameworks, whereas Teampău's (2019)

investigation of friction in the Danube Delta concentrated on competing civilian perspectives regarding conservation versus development. The Cilacap impasse is fundamentally distinct due to the junction of irreconcilable institutional frameworks: military defense requirements governed by hierarchical command structures vs civilian development objectives operating under democratic accountability and market mechanisms. Our findings illustrate that this incompatibility is concretely evident through the simultaneous presence of rigid path dependency (the 2013 Hak Pakai military certification legally subordinating economic uses to defense purposes) and equally inflexible goal dependency (BPK financial accountability regulations prohibiting the collaborative revenue-sharing that previously addressed jurisdictional gaps), resulting in what Figure 6 conceptualizes as mutually reinforcing constraint structures that no individual actor has the authority to alter. This results in not only coordination challenges but also a structural inability to collaborate within the current institutional framework, elucidating why seven official coordination sessions from 2019 to 2024 yielded no actionable agreements despite evident mutual advantages. The theoretical implication is that governance deadlock must be recognized as a separate category from coordination failure: coordination failure suggests that improved communication or incentive alignment could foster cooperation, whereas institutional incompatibility deadlock signifies that fundamental institutional redesign—establishing new organizational forms capable of functioning across incompatible systems—is the requisite solution.

The processes by which past institutional decisions and current policy commitments become self-reinforcing over time are revealed by our empirical study, which supports and expands on EGT's theory of how dependencies function as binding rather than merely restricting factors. Van Assche *et al.* (2019) contend that dependencies may arise externally to local governance systems, whereby higher-level decisions or material alterations create rigidities that local actors are unable to surmount independently—a dynamic corroborated by our findings, which illustrate how national-level decisions (military land certification by the Agrarian Affairs Ministry, BPK audit interpretations) imposed limitations on Cilacap's local governance capabilities. The path dependency established by the 2013 military certification has proven to be binding rather than merely influential, as modifying Hak Pakai designations necessitates intricate multi-ministerial processes (Defense, Home Affairs, Agrarian Affairs) devoid of established protocols for transitioning from Hankam to mixed-use purposes. As acknowledged by

Bappeda informants, "even if consensus exists that management should revert to local government, the land certification cannot be easily altered." This path dependency intensified over time as infrastructure investments, contractual agreements, and stakeholder expectations coalesced around the military land control paradigm, resulting in sunk costs and coordination focal points that escalated switching costs to alternative arrangements. Likewise, goal dependency stemming from BPK's 2019 audit findings functioned not as a singular constraint but as a developing precedent that influenced subsequent audit interpretations, rendering auditors progressively risk-averse regarding any arrangements resembling prohibited revenue-sharing, even when superficially distinct legal structures were suggested. The interplay between path and goal dependencies was notably significant: military land certification (path dependency) restricted the legally permissible arrangements, whereas BPK accountability requirements (goal dependency) precluded the specific mechanism—revenue-sharing—that facilitated operation within those legal confines, ultimately resulting in a null feasible set for collaborative governance under the current regulations. This discovery indicates that EGT's analytical framework necessitates additional clarification: dependencies must be classified not solely by their origin (path versus goal) but also by their reinforcement dynamics (static versus self-amplifying) and interaction effects (independent versus mutually constraining), facilitating more accurate predictions regarding which governance configurations will be adaptive versus paralyzed.

The governance deadlock validates and extends institutional economics theories of collective action problems in natural resource governance by showing how high transaction costs can turn situations with obvious mutual benefits from cooperation into non-cooperative equilibria (Partelow & Nelson, 2018; Schlüter *et al.*, 2019). Partelow and Nelson (2018) illustrate that repeated interactions and network-based coordination fostered the emergence of sustainable tourism governance in Indonesia's Gili Islands. Conversely, the Cilacap case demonstrates how institutional fragmentation and legal ambiguity can undermine previously effective coordination by increasing transaction costs beyond levels that actors are willing or able to endure. Our analysis identified three categories of transaction costs impeding coordination efforts: information costs stemming from asymmetric knowledge of binding constraints (local government officials proposing revenue-sharing models unaware that BPK precedent rendered such arrangements legally impossible, irrespective of military willingness), negotiation costs escalating due to multi-

principal bargaining requirements (any arrangement necessitating simultaneous approval from DPRD, BPK, Kodam, and potentially the Defense Ministry), and enforcement costs becoming prohibitive due to the lack of credible commitment mechanisms (historical evidence indicating that superior authorities could unilaterally invalidate locally negotiated agreements without consultation). The transaction costs were notably significant due to their asymmetrical nature: military authorities incurred lower costs in sustaining existing arrangements (cooperatives and CV operators generating revenue through informal channels) than in negotiating formalized collaboration subject to external oversight. Conversely, local government encountered an inverse incentive structure, where formalizing collaboration risked audit sanctions, while accepting zero revenue incurred no liability, despite compromising development mandates. The game-theoretic interpretation indicates that this configuration mirrors coordination games characterized by multiple equilibria, wherein players favor a common equilibrium (collaboration) but lack the means to transition from the current equilibrium (fragmentation) to the desired alternative, especially when transition costs are substantial and the probability of success is ambiguous. The implication for institutional design is that minimizing transaction costs—via clearer legal frameworks, streamlined approval processes, or reliable third-party enforcement—is a necessary yet insufficient condition for fostering collaboration; these reforms must be accompanied by addressing fundamental path and goal dependencies that render any negotiated arrangement susceptible to being overridden by superior authorities indifferent to the success of local coordination.

Inadequate theorization of how military control over economically valued resources creates unique coordination issues in post-authoritarian democratic environments is a significant lacuna in the literature on coastal governance, as highlighted by the results of this study. Current scholarship on civil-military relations primarily emphasizes security sector governance (Knight, 1992; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006) or investigates military economic involvement in extractive industries, while largely neglecting military oversight of tourism and recreational resources, which are predominantly utilized by civilians but remain under military jurisdiction (Harsanto & Wahyuningrat, 2024). Our analysis indicates that military involvement presents governance issues that are qualitatively different from those arising in civilian multi-stakeholder setups, due to the fundamentally divergent missions, accountability

structures, and organizational logics of military organizations. Military land control via Hak Pakai Hankam designations demonstrated valid national security concerns—coastal defense infrastructure, territorial integrity, strategic asset protection—however, these defense necessities dynamics with tourism development needs for public access, commercial activities, and transparent revenue streams. The proliferation of military cooperative tourism initiatives (Koperasi Kodim at Teluk Penyau, Koperasi Korem at Serambil Sodong, as illustrated in Table 1) exemplifies institutional contradiction: military regulations explicitly prohibit commercial activities on Hankam land, yet military units are devoid of operational budgets for site maintenance, thereby incentivizing commercial arrangements that formally contravene land use restrictions while generating welfare funds for military personnel. This results in what is referred to as "legality ambiguity asymmetry"—local governments are subject to strict liability for unauthorized expenditures on military land and prohibited revenue-sharing, whereas military economic activities function within regulatory gray areas with limited oversight and no PNBK remittances to the central government, despite leveraging state assets for commercial endeavors. The overarching theoretical assertion is that military resource control constitutes not just an additional stakeholder category in multi-actor governance, but a qualitatively unique institutional framework that civilian governance mechanisms inadequately address, especially during democratic transitions where formal military subordination to civilian authority coexists with informal military economic autonomy derived from authoritarian-era institutional legacies. This indicates that post-authoritarian governance theory necessitates a more detailed examination of the interactions—or lack thereof—between democratic accountability structures and enduring military prerogatives in resource management areas.

The research findings empirically illustrate that governance deadlock directly hinders the attainment of Sustainable Development Goals, corroborating apprehensions expressed in the literature on SDG implementation regarding coordination failures obstructing advancements toward sustainability objectives (Neumann *et al.*, 2017; Scheyvens & Cheer, 2022; Rasoolimanesh *et al.*, 2023). Neumann *et al.* (2017) contend that SDG 14 (Life Below Water) necessitates "strong sustainability" approaches that regard natural capital as non-substitutable, indicating that economic development must function within ecological limits; however, our evidence demonstrates that governance fragmentation consistently undermines environmental protection. The removal of local

government management authority eliminated the institutional entity formally responsible for environmental monitoring and ecosystem protection. Military authorities lack the technical capacity, legal mandate, and operational resources for environmental oversight, while third-party operators (CV entities, military cooperatives) lack both expertise and incentive for sustainability management beyond immediate commercial gains. Thus, the environmental condition assessments in Figure 5 revealed systematic degradation across all management regime types when compared to collaborative period baselines: beach erosion intensified, mangrove coverage diminished, water quality declined beyond national standards, and waste management virtually ceased. The degradation of the environment directly opposes SDG 13 (climate action) and SDG 14 (marine ecosystem preservation), while simultaneously jeopardizing the sustainability of tourism. This creates detrimental feedback loops, wherein governance failures undermine the ecological assets that are essential for tourism, leading to decreased visitor satisfaction and revenue potential, which in turn further reduces resources allocated for environmental protection. The governance impasse has also compromised SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth) by eliminating 2.7 billion rupiah in annual local government revenue, which previously supported infrastructure maintenance, community development initiatives, and enhancements in tourism quality, while transitioning employment to informal arrangements via military cooperatives and CV operators that offered diminished protections and benefits compared to prior government-managed operations. The findings corroborate Scheyvens and Cheer's (2022) assertion that the rhetoric of partnerships in sustainable tourism seldom results in meaningful coordination, illustrating that formal policy commitments to the Sustainable Development Goals are inadequate when institutional frameworks hinder the necessary inter-sectoral coordination for achieving sustainability objectives. The implication for SDG implementation theory is that policy coherence cannot be attained solely through strategic frameworks or coordination protocols when underlying governance structures produce friction mandates; rather, institutional redesign that fosters organizational forms capable of functioning across sectoral boundaries is essential for significant advancement toward integrated sustainability objectives.

The alignment of stakeholder viewpoints regarding the establishment of BUMD (Regional Public Enterprise) as the most viable solution substantiates institutional design theories that highlight third-party mechanisms and boundary organizations as means to

address coordination failures. However, our examination of implementation challenges elucidates why even theoretically optimal solutions encounter significant practical impediments (Durant *et al.*, 2017; Kooiman & Bavinck, 2013). The BUMD model garnered extensive stakeholder support (72% of FGD participants, as illustrated in Figure 7) due to its semi-private legal status, which theoretically addresses multiple binding constraints concurrently: it provides contracting authority to engage military landholders without violating BPK restrictions on inter-governmental collaboration, offers organizational capacity for professional tourism management that neither regulatory agencies (Disparpora) nor defense institutions (TNI AD) possess, and establishes revenue channeling mechanisms (dividends, taxes) that restore local government benefits while ensuring accountability—essentially functioning as what organizational theorists refer to as a "boundary organization" operating at the intersections of incompatible institutional systems (Durant *et al.*, 2017). This corresponds with Kooiman and Bavinck's (2013) interactive governance theory, which underscores that intricate coordination challenges frequently necessitate the establishment of novel organizational structures instead of just enhancing coordination among current participants. Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of the implementation requirements for BUMD identified three categories of barriers that compromise feasibility: legal-procedural barriers (intricate legislative processes necessitating Regional Regulation, significant capital demands, ambiguous legal status for operations on Hankam land despite semi-private designation), organizational capacity barriers (absence of tourism BUMD expertise in Cilacap, challenges in attracting qualified management, difficulties in reconciling community employment with commercial efficiency), and political economy barriers (opposition from existing informal operators concerned about loss of income, potential resistance from DPRD, and military ambivalence regarding arrangements that enhance external oversight). The implementation difficulties reveal a wider trend in institutional design: theoretical optimality is inadequate without considering the political economy dynamics and capacity limitations that influence the establishment and sustainability of proposed organizations. The military representatives' conditional endorsement—"if a legal entity can manage this proficiently and distribute benefits equitably, it may be viable"—demonstrates prudent apprehension regarding institutional innovations devoid of precedent and legal clarity, especially since implementation necessitates synchronized policy alterations among various national ministries (Defense, BPK, Home Affairs) that

are presently not involved in the coordination process. This indicates that although third-party boundary organizations offer institutionally viable solutions to governance impasses, effective execution necessitates not only regional legislative measures but also national policy alignment to create legal structures and operational guidelines that are presently absent, underscoring the multi-tiered governance difficulties involved in addressing local coordination issues when limitations arise from superior institutional tiers.

6 CONCLUSION

This research identifies governance impasse in the management of coastal tourism as a unique failure pattern that arises when regulatory restrictions that remove formerly effective coordination mechanisms combine with institutional incompatibility between military and civilian authority systems. The Cilacap case illustrates that such impasses yield disastrous outcomes that transcend simple coordination failures: the total eradication of local government tourism revenue (from 2.7 billion rupiah annually to zero), systematic decline of infrastructure due to the inability to allocate maintenance funds on military-controlled land, intensified environmental degradation as neither military nor civilian authorities have the capacity or mandate for ecosystem management, and the emergence of legally ambiguous informal arrangements (military cooperatives, third-party CV operators) that partially restore economic activity while providing no transparent public benefits and undermining the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This governance paralysis endures despite stakeholders acknowledging better collaborative options, as the concurrent influence of rigid path dependency (the 2013 military land certification legally prioritizing defense over economic uses) and equally inflexible goal dependency (the 2019 BPK audit prohibiting inter-governmental revenue sharing) establishes mutually reinforcing constraints that no individual actor can unilaterally alter. The alignment of stakeholder viewpoints regarding the establishment of Regional Public Enterprises (BUMD) as the most institutionally viable solution corroborates theories that highlight third-party boundary organizations as means to reconcile deadlock institutional frameworks. However, an in-depth examination of implementation obstacles—such as legal ambiguities, capacity limitations, and political economy opposition—demonstrates that theoretically ideal institutional

frameworks necessitate coordinated multi-tiered policy reforms that surpass local governmental jurisdiction to facilitate actual establishment and sustainable functioning.

Coastal management scholarship and governance theory are advanced by the study's four main academic contributions. Initially, it defines and empirically illustrates institutional incompatibility deadlock as a governance failure mode that is analytically separate from traditional coordination failure: while coordination failure posits that enhanced communication or incentive alignment can foster cooperation, institutional incompatibility deadlock suggests that a fundamental institutional redesign, resulting in new organizational forms capable of functioning across incompatible systems, is essential—a distinction with considerable ramifications for intervention design in scenarios where civilian development mandates converge with enduring military prerogatives. Secondly, it enhances Evolutionary Governance Theory by delineating mechanisms through which path and goal dependencies function as self-reinforcing rather than static constraints, illustrating how these dependencies interact to generate null feasible sets for collaboration under prevailing rules and pinpointing conditions under which historical institutional choices become progressively more binding over time. Third, it offers unique empirical evidence on how military dominance over economically significant coastal resources creates governance challenges that differ qualitatively from civilian multi-stakeholder frameworks examined in existing literature. This reveals asymmetries in legal ambiguity, where civilian authorities are held strictly liable for unauthorized activities, while military economic operations operate in regulatory gray areas with limited oversight—dynamics that are insufficiently theorized in contemporary civil-military relations scholarship, which primarily emphasizes security sector governance. Fourth, it empirically illustrates how governance fragmentation directly impedes the attainment of Sustainable Development Goals through specific causal mechanisms: the eradication of institutional entities tasked with environmental protection, the withdrawal of funding sources for sustainability initiatives, the establishment of detrimental incentives for immediate resource extraction, and the formation of adverse feedback loops wherein ecosystem degradation diminishes tourism viability—confirming theoretical assertions that policy coherence cannot be realized solely through strategic frameworks when institutional structures obstruct the inter-sectoral coordination essential for sustainability objectives.

These results are qualified by a number of limitations that also point to potential avenues for further investigation. The generalizability of this single case study is uncertain. Although Cilacap displays traits that may represent other Indonesian coastal areas with military land control and heritage tourism potential, a systematic comparison with cases that have different configurations—such as varying degrees of military involvement, alternative regulatory frameworks, and distinct stages of tourism development—would enhance theoretical assertions regarding the emergence and persistence of institutional incompatibility deadlocks. Temporal constraints restricted longitudinal observation: field research was conducted during a specific period of deadlock (2019-2024), yet prolonged observation over several years monitoring attempted solutions and their results would facilitate more rigorous causal inference regarding which interventions effectively resolve versus merely displace coordination issues. Restrictions on access to military internal documents and decision-making processes have resulted in information asymmetries: although civilian stakeholder viewpoints were thoroughly recorded through interviews and focus groups, military institutional perspectives are only partially reconstructed from external observations and limited informant accounts, rather than through direct institutional ethnography, which may inadequately represent the constraints and strategic considerations of military actors. The proposed BUMD solution remains unimplemented, preventing empirical evaluation of its efficacy in overcoming identified barriers or facing unforeseen challenges. Future research should monitor the establishment processes of BUMD, if they transpire, documenting implementation difficulties and operational results to assess whether third-party boundary organizations operate as theoretically anticipated. Ultimately, the researcher's positionality, shaped by previous collaborations with local government officials, may have affected data interpretation despite the implementation of reflexive practices and member checking protocols. This indicates the necessity for replication by researchers with varying institutional affiliations and access patterns to either validate or challenge the study's representations of stakeholder motivations and constraint structures.

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Authors' Contribution

Both authors contributed equally to the development of this article.

Data availability

All datasets relevant to this study's findings are fully available within the article.

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