

LIFE WITHOUT DIGNITY? THE SEARCH FOR AN INTEGRATIVE SENSE OF DIGNITY FOR NATURE, THE HUMAN CONDITION, AND THE NON-HUMAN CONDITION

Patryck de Araujo Ayala¹

Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso (UFMT) |

Jaqueline Sousa Correia Schwendler²

Centro Universitário Luterano de Palmas (CEULP) |

ABSTRACT

The existential threats to the integrity of life in all its forms, accelerated by the new Geological Era, the Anthropocene, and those arising from contemporaneity, raise the need for proposing a relationship of approximation between Law and Nature, as an indispensable condition to face such threats, from coherent solutions and with priority objectives. In this context, the main difficulty for transformation is identified as the need for recognizing (and considering) those who have no voice and demand protection for their value per se. Thus, this paper proposes to investigate to what extent one could also offer protection to non-human life through the content of dignity. In this way, based on the inductive method and bibliographic research, supported by theoretical and normative models on the subject, dignity is considered as a vehicle of humanity and not of personality, a premise on which the sense of integrative dignity is emphasized, in which everything with value should also have dignity.

Keywords: dignity of non-human life; human dignity; integrative dignity; intrinsic value.

1 Ph.D., Doctor, and Master in Law from Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), Doctoral internship at Universidade Clássica de Lisboa (UL), with a PDEE/Capes scholarship. Director of O Direito por um Planeta Verde Institute. Member of the Harmony with Nature Program (United Nations) as an independent expert. Head of the Jus-Clima Research Group. Associate Professor III in the undergraduate and master's courses in Law at Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso (UFMT). Mato Grosso State Attorney. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5641-8148> / email: pkayala@terra.com.br

2 Master in Law from UFMT. Bachelor of Law from Centro Universitário Luterano de Palmas (CEULP) of Universidade Luterana do Brasil (ULBRA). Lawyer and researcher at the Jus-Clima Research Group. Member of Núcleo de Estudo em Agroecologia of Tocantins. Member of the Associação Brasileira de Agroecologia (ABA). ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8492-8524> / email: jsousadireito@gmail.com

VIDA SEM DIGNIDADE? A BUSCA POR UM SENTIDO INTEGRATIVO EM DIGNIDADE PARA A NATUREZA, A CONDIÇÃO HUMANA E A CONDIÇÃO NÃO HUMANA

RESUMO

As ameaças existenciais à integridade da vida em todas as suas formas, aceleradas pela nova Época geológica, o Antropoceno, e advindas da contemporaneidade, suscitam a necessidade de se propor uma relação de aproximação entre o Direito e a Natureza, como condição indispensável ao enfrentamento de tais ameaças, a partir de soluções coerentes e com objetivos prioritários. Nesse contexto, identifica-se como a principal dificuldade para a transformação a necessidade de se reconhecer (e considerar) aqueles que não possuem voz e exigem proteção por seu valor per se. Assim, este artigo propõe investigar em que medida, por meio do conteúdo de dignidade, poder-se-ia, também, oferecer proteção para a vida não humana. Dessa forma, a partir do método indutivo e da pesquisa bibliográfica, com aporte em modelos teóricos e fundamentos normativos sobre o tema, considera-se a dignidade como veículo de humanidade e não de personalidade, premissa sobre a qual se acentua o sentido de dignidade integrativa, em que tudo o que tem valor deve também possuir dignidade.

Palavras-chave: *dignidade da vida não humana; dignidade humana; dignidade integrativa; valor intrínseco.*

INTRODUCTION

In the context of a geological era known as the Anthropocene, nature, and animals demand from the systems of law initiatives for consideration beyond theoretical models based on ethical approaches, or even based on an imperative of compassion that guides human duties. In this context, consideration is required through their inclusion as part of the same justice community.

In the current legal systems configuration of several nation-states, as well as public international law, the human condition takes priority for the purpose of justifying a content for dignity. This phenomenon arises not only from hegemonic theoretical models guiding the definition of a content for dignity, establishing a direct relationship with a moral and legal imperative emerging from post-war contexts but also from the need for a response to suppress states of systematic violations of the existential identity of the human condition.

Although at this time, several constitutional charters endorse the contents of dignity, either as a value or through the definition of the rights bound to it, with a visible reality in which dignity would be a common universal value, it could not be true that the definition of its content could also be common. Each justice community is free to accommodate the notion of dignity according to its particularities.

Given a scenario in which dignity approaches the condition of a – common – imperative to protect the human condition, this work intends to investigate, through the inductive method and bibliographic research, to what extent would it be possible to also offer protection to non-human life, starting from the premise that life, whatever its nature, *must always be protected*.

For the development of the problem, the text is organized into four sections using description strategies (first part), justification (second and third parts), and proposition (fourth part).

At first, it seeks to draw general connections on the subject to describe the subject of dignity in the systems of law. Such connections will be presented, first, to support the hegemonic argument that dignity would only make sense insofar as it protects men and, therefore, ensures the development of the human condition.

On the other hand, the second part is dedicated to the introduction of a possible change in the legal paradigm through international instruments,

normative and constitutional changes, and jurisprudence experiences, to justify that such a hegemonic model is subject to transformative initiatives. In a similar scenario, it is clear that the lives that matter to the Law are no longer restricted to human lives.

In the context of a geological era known as the Anthropocene, the third part shows why there was a paradigm shift in legal systems concerning other dimensions of life, nature, and non-human animals. It is argued that such a change can be justified, among other arguments, as a need for the arranged strategies to assign legal value to the condition of those who do not have a voice. To enable the transformation of legal models towards this direction, it is proposed that the intrinsic value cannot be ignored as a way to attribute meaning in dignity to the non-human community.

The last part justifies a sense of dignity that reaches and extends to all other forms of life and is guided by the following premises: a) The primacy of dignity must be guided by the notion that everything valuable is entitled to dignity; b) If all lives are valuable, they deserve respect and, consequently, must have dignity; c) The recognition that all forms of life have dignity can have its meaning justified by a notion of *integrative dignity*. According to this notion, the protected values – human lives, non-human lives, and nature itself – are presented as a unit, regardless of being interdependent.

1 THE NOTION OF DIGNITY IN LEGAL SYSTEMS

Two perspectives can be highlighted in the exegesis of the dignity theme, although they are not the only ones: the Christian tradition and the Kantian philosophy. It was mainly in the religious discourse, justified by the idea of mankind's superiority over other creatures given their likeness to God, that the legal content of human dignity found its first texture (SARMENTO, 2016, p. 51). It is in the holy book of Christians, the Bible, that the maxim of this hierarchy is found, placing man above other creatures. In Genesis, the first part of the Old Testament, there is a divine imposition of man regarding other lives on Earth, in which the human community is presented as the one who must have power over “[...] the fish of the sea, the birds in the sky, domestic animals, all the beasts and reptiles that crawl on the land” (GENESIS, 1969, 1:26).

This hierarchical perception of man underwent a paradigm shift when transposed to the context of philosophy, which, moving away from religion, allowed for new contours based on the priority given to the autonomy

of reason. In philosophy, the subject of autonomy acquired outlines from Galileo Galilei, René Descartes, and Francis Bacon, with the emergence of a theory based on *empirical-rational* procedures, as highlighted by Edgar Morin (2005, p. 24).

It is also in the Enlightenment that the thought of Immanuel Kant (1975) consolidated his moral philosophy of dignity, reverberating with greater intensity, especially through the affirmation of a legal content, as highlighted by Ingo Sarlet and Tiago Fensterseifer (2014, p. 70). In the foundation of his metaphysics of customs, Immanuel Kant (1975, p. 213-238) works with three components that allow us to understand his reasoning – reason, freedom, and autonomy. Thus, regardless of any pact, every individual endowed with rational capacity is *an end in itself*; that is, if you are rational, you are free, and if you are free, you have autonomy.

According to the Kantian notion, the autonomy of the will is the distinguishing element between humans and other beings, as “it is the foundation of human nature and all rational nature dignity” (KANT, 1975, p. 213). Man is, therefore, the leading core of the notion of dignity, as it has an intrinsic value.

The reality of massive destruction, systematic violation of human freedoms, and degradation of the human condition materialized in periods of war could be historically understood as a relevant engine to justify a reconstructive effort for a new legal order. In this new legal order, an angular position should be considered as a distinctive value to identify a sort of humanity that could no longer be broken or violated by nations and men themselves. It is in this context that we currently witness a global initiative to restructure the content for human rights, and it that also calls for the opening up of constitutional systems to values such as dignity (PIOVESAN, 2012, p. 41). In summary, after “mankind being subjected to unspeakable suffering” (BRASIL, 1945), the feeling towards the duty to protect the human person welcome several adepts in the depths of different peoples and nations. This way, protecting the human figure after the barbarism witnessed and fostered by mankind, as pondered by Ingo Sarlet (2005, p. 180), revitalized and universalized the primacy of Kantian philosophy.

Given the context, it is important to mention that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), among all the movements and normative instruments of the post-war period, was the one that consolidated on the international platform a model of protection for the human person, in which equality and dignity are values recognized and attributed to all

human beings, without distinction. At the same time that the international document defines a contemporary notion of human rights, it also embraces the dignity of the human being, placing it as a central value of the text, which, *a posteriori*, started to emerge as an inspiration for constitutional texts (PIOVESAN, 2003, p. 188).

Likewise, Cármen Lúcia Antunes Rocha (2009, p. 72) highlights the fact that the dignity of the human person has infiltrated contemporary constitutionalism, which, according to the author, became “[...] the beginning and end of the contemporarily produced Law”. Thus, by imposing itself as a reaction to the post-World War II period, human dignity has been enshrined as a value shared by different nations.

Although it was proven that an imperative for the protection and development of human dignity has been integrated into the context of global legality, in an expansive direction, it is convenient to assess what are the consequences that resulted from asserting that such an imperative is universal. If protecting and developing dignity is a universal imperative, there is the need to understand how far the content of dignity is reached.

1.1 Dignity: a universal yet anthropocentric value?

When dealing with the universality of the concept of dignity, Ingo Sarlet (2005, p. 180) explains that, even with a concept of universal dignity which presents itself as an expression of consensus between people and different places, it would be impossible to avoid adversity or even conflict. Therefore, the ambiguity and porosity of the legal concept of dignity are undeniable (ROCHA, 2009, p. 73).

In this sense, Aharon Barak (2015, p. 101-112; p. 137-143) contributes to the subject by stating that every society should have a position on the concept of human dignity and what it means to *be human*, even if dignity has universal aspects that influence any democracy. However, other aspects such as the history, culture, and human experience of each society are reflected. Thus, as reiterated by Aharon Barak, these are the factors that contribute to the identity of how dignity is conceived.

Ronald Dworkin (1998, p. 135) seems to share this same line of thought, for whom any civilized society has standards and convergences about what constitutes dignity which are changeable criteria according to the place and historical circumstances. Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1997, p. 18), in turn, ponders that the conflict around the subject of universality may have its reason for existing not only in the concept of human rights but

in the very notion of dignity, since, although both institutes reflect Western assumptions, all cultures foster notions of dignity.

In any case, regardless of the legal content protected under dignity by nation-states, the international platform has already consolidated the minimum protection regarding dignity, without which the matter loses its *raison d'être*: the protection of the human condition against acts threatening to their physical, psychological, social, and economic safety. In other words, it can be said that it is a value that invites the realization of human rights (SILVA, 1998, p. 94).

Thus, we could argue that the content of dignity may be different not only in its notion but also in the way in which it is recognized by the State (of Law). However, the influence of the Western notion on the content of dignity in law systems must be taken into consideration, since the UDHR establishes a bottom line for what needs to be respected regarding dignity, which is the protection of the human person against acts that violate their intrinsic value.

From this perspective, it is important to mention that, as highlighted by Erin Daly and James May (2015, p. 55-73), in the last 50 years dignity became entrenched in constitutional systems around the world, either as a fundamental value, an autonomous right, or a right associated with particular interests (e.g. work) or segments of the population (women, persons with disabilities, persons under the State custody, etc.). Furthermore, it is observed that more than 160 nations include dignity to some extent in their constitutional texts and a new constitution would hardly be implemented without it.

Thus, the implications concerning the content of dignity depend on how the subject is received and perceived by national Constitutions. In Aharon Barak's systematization (2015, p. 103-112; p. 137-143), the recognition of dignity can happen in two ways: a) dignity as a constitutional value, and b) dignity as a constitutional right.

As an illustration, we could register that the Colombian Constitutional Court concluded that the content of dignity was dual, presenting itself, as described by Aharon Barak, both as a value and a right. In the systematization carried out by the court, dignity was understood a) as either the autonomy or a possibility for human beings to decide on a life project, as well as to self-determine according to their wishes and desires; b) as implied in certain concrete material conditions of life, and c) as an intangible value of physical and moral integrity. In Erin Daly's understanding (2012, p. 49), when characterizing these three dimensions, the court corroborated the

maxim of “living as you wish, living well, and living without humiliation”.

These provisions demonstrate and well illustrate the conflicting understanding established around a claim to universal content for dignity. As described by Kantian philosophy, this minimum established in the international platform and Constitutions of different countries is bound to the human condition and the human being. Man is the protected object and center of the content of dignity in contemporary societies. Therefore, its anthropocentric content is evidenced.

As explained by José Rubens Morato Leite and Maria Leonor Ferreira (2004, p. 28-29), anthropocentrism is characterized by its unique and exclusive concern towards the well-being of men, a view that legitimizes its superiority over animals and nature itself. It is, therefore, men who can compose and deliberate the rules of John Rawls’ social contract (NUSSBAUM, 2013, p. 80). By this logic, all those who are free and rational have the necessary attributes to compose a community of justice and, therefore, have dignity.

Given these reasons, the content of dignity makes sense, first, in the protection of human life, because its importance has been developed by legal systems both as a value and a right, mainly to prevent and repair damage to the human condition.

Thus, in a scenario where dignity makes sense as an assurance for men, the question is whether this same content could also make sense in the protection of other forms of life. It is also relevant to ask how this sense could be achieved if the legal notion of dignity is still anthropocentric.

The search for understanding a notion of dignity compatible with the protection of all forms of life permeates the inspiring dream transcended by dignity. In other words, as explained by Daniel Sarmiento (2016, p. 340), that of a society in which everyone is perceived as noble. Thus, the next section aims to justify *the value of all forms of life* as an imperative *deserving of dignity*.

2 THE PARADIGM SHIFT IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: DIGNITY BEYOND HUMAN LIFE

As shown in the previous section, law systems somehow adopt or draw inspiration from a concept of *the least in dignity* to justify protection through rights. In this area, there is questioning on how dignity can make sense concerning the objective of protecting nature, and because of a second objective, the one of protecting other forms of life, while its protective

orientation in law systems is, *prima facie*, anthropocentric.

The World Charter for Nature (UN, 1982), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, expresses a yearning for respect towards all forms of life, suggesting that “every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord other organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action.” From this disposition, some important elements deserve consideration – life, respect, recognition, and the morality of actions.

More recently, the Earth Charter (UNESCO, 1992), signed in 2000 at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands, presupposed the need for care and respect for the community of life. Principle 1 establishes the recognition that all beings are interconnected, and each form of life has its value, regardless of its usefulness for human beings. Although the document does not have the legal *status* even of *soft law*, it represents the converging opinion of people and social organizations from all over the world, which collaborated in a plural way for its writing (BOSELTMANN; TAYLOR, 2018, p. 171-173).

Likewise, in 2010, the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth adopted in Cochabamba, Bolivia, assures that nature is a “living being, a single community, indivisible”, endorsing a sense of independent but coexisting values in which rights are “sourced by the same existence” and all beings are equally their holders (BOLÍVIA, 2010). The limitation of rights must occur, in this way, to the detriment of the rights of other beings, enabling the resolution of a possible conflict without damage to the integrity, balance, and health of mother earth.

Some integrative changes can also be described from a constitutional perspective. In 2002, Germany became the second member of the European Union to guarantee dignity beyond the human being, obliging, through its fundamental law (1949), the protection of the non-human condition, by including the excerpt *and animals*, to the clause dealing with the natural foundations of life. With that, the constitutional provision reinforced the content of art. 90 of the 1990 German Civil Code, which already assured that “animals are not things; they are protected by special laws” (GERMANY, 1990).

In a little more comprehensive way, we may also register the movement in Switzerland as an experience that managed to define a complex and differentiated protection for non-human life, as it enshrines a special provision in its Constitution. Besides having a constitutional provision through art. 80 – which refers to the well-being and offenses to the integrity

of live animals, the Swiss text enshrines the description of the *creature's dignity* in its art. 120³.

It is the manifestation of a unique biocentrism in the world, where the term *creature* refers to every living being (CAMENZIND, 2013, p. 279). According to Vanessa Gerritsen (2013, p. 7-8), although the constitutional command to protect dignity – and not life – was assertive, respecting animals as living beings endowed with intrinsic value is still a challenge restricted to very small success, if not fully ignored in Switzerland.

Likewise, art. 71 of the 2008 Constitution of Ecuador defined nature or *Pacha mama* as a holder of the “[...] right to existence, maintenance, and regeneration of its evolutionary cycles, functions, and processes” (ECUADOR, 2008). However, the recognition of rights to nature did not resolve the conflict, since numerous legislative inconsistencies treat it as an object (MARTINEZ; ACOSTA, 2017, p. 2930-2934). Thus, the practical application of the normative provision is still incipient, so that biocentric ethics is shy in the face of the jurisprudence of the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court. This trend was only recently revised in the so-called Los Cedros case through two decisions of its constitutional⁴ court, in which the second stands out. On this occasion, the court stated that, alongside human rights, the Ecuadorian Constitution, recognizes the rights of nature. These rights complement human rights, not to be confused with them, and protect ecosystems and natural processes themselves. (ECUADOR, 2021b).

In this same sense, there are expansive records of a transformation movement on the valuation of the non-human condition in the context of a community of justice. From 2010 to this date, countries such as Bolivia⁵, France⁶, India⁷, Spain⁸, Portugal⁹, and, more recently, Uganda¹⁰ have seen

3 In accordance with the constitutional text, the Civil Code of Switzerland determines, in its art. 641, that animals are not things.

4 The first decision was rendered in case No. 22-18-IN (ECUADOR, 2021a).

5 The Mother Earth Rights Act deems Mother Earth “sacred” and a dynamic living system (BOLIVIA, 2012).

6 The Civil Code of France, amended on February 16, 2015, provides in its article 515-14, that animals are living beings endowed with sensitivity (FRANCE, 2015).

7 Law no. 135-B, which enforced on May 23, 2014, made India the first Asian country to ban the sale and import of cosmetics tested on animals (INDIA, 2014).

8 In 2015, Spain made a number of amendments to their Penal Code. Since 2015, there has been an increase in penal frameworks for acts that undermine animal integrity. There is, for example, the criminalization of conduct that implies “sexual exploitation” of animals (ESPAÑA, 2015).

9 In Portugal, in 2016, there was a change in the legal status of animals. The Civil Code recognized the figure of the animal as “endowed with sensitivity and the object of legal relations” (PORTUGAL, 2016).

10 Uganda’s parliament recognized Nature’s fundamental rights to be, evolve, and regenerate in the new 2019 National Environment Act (UGANDA, 2019).

an expansion in the morality of legal systems to recognize that other values are also worthy of protection.

In 2017, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice, after the decision handed down by the constitutional court, recognizing the Atrato river as a “subject of rights to protection, conservation, maintenance and restoration under the responsibility of the State and ethnic communities”, received, appreciated, and granted the request for freedom in the face of *habeas corpus* AHC 4806-2017, filed by the bear Chucho. At the time, the justification for the decision to release the bear from the Barranquilla Zoo was supported by “universal morality, a global ecological public order, granting the respect they deserve [...]” (COLOMBIA, 2021), as reiterated by Judge Villabona.

Also in the wake of the protection of the non-human condition, in 2019, the Superior Court of Justice (STJ), when analyzing the case of guarding a wild animal, decided not to reintegrate the animal into its natural *habitat*. Due to animal welfare, the decision was based on an ecological perspective of the principle of human dignity (BRASIL, 2019) and so the Court, in following this understanding, abided to the new biocentric legal paradigm (SARLET and FENSTERSEIFER, 2019).

Also in 2019, the Bangladesh Supreme Court recognized the Turag River as a living entity, entitled to rights. The decision was based on the *public trust* doctrine and, therefore, took into consideration the government’s responsibility to protect the rivers. Thus, following the decision of the Whanganui River of New Zealand¹¹, in addition to declaring the Turag River the rights holder, the Court also designated the National River Protection Commission (NRPC) as its guardian.

That same year, the Yurok Tribal Council approved Resolution No. 19-40 and established rights for the Klamath River, namely the rights to “exist, flourish, and evolve naturally”. Thus, through a document emphasizing its condition as a written notification to the United States and the State of California, the river was given legitimacy in actions against entities violating its integrity.

In a general context, both documents and decisions demonstrate the existence of a legal movement, whose desire can be synthesized in an attempt to integrate nature and the non-human condition. Together with a “human moral duty to demonstrate love or compassion”, as dismissed by John Rawls in his theory of justice (RAWLS, 2016, p. 601-602), what is

¹¹ Through an agreement between the Whanganui River Aboriginal community and the New Zealand government, the Whanganui River was recognized as a subject of rights (NEW ZEALAND, 2017).

highlighted is the existence of other values that can no longer be protected only just and insofar as the human condition is protected.

Why do these documents portray a transformation towards a concern with other forms of life beyond the human condition? The answer to this change in legal meanings can be better understood from a scenario of limits described in the geological era called Anthropocene. The proposal, developed in the next section, is justified by the fact that modern legal relations can be also understood as places to engage in the struggle for recognition, as, in Axel Honneth's consideration, living with rights gives rise to the opportunity to live with self-respect (HONNETH, 2003, p. 183-196).

3 ANTHROPOCENE AS A TIME OF CONFLICT: THE JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGE AND RECOGNITION OF NON-HUMAN LIFE

Paul Crutzen (2002), Nobel Prize laureate in 1995, showed that human beings have altered the atmospheric, geological, hydrological, and biosphere systems of the Earth system. From this perspective, it is important to emphasize that the point of no return and the non-resilience of essential ecological processes characterized the succession from the Anthropocene to the Holocene, a period beginning approximately 10,000 years ago.

While in the Holocene stability and balance were the characteristics of a planet supposedly armed with infinite resources, in the Anthropocene it is recognized that there are planetary limits, and they cap decision-making and actions on the use and consumption of natural resources in a scenario of biodiversity loss, climate change, and disturbance of biogeochemical flows (STEFFEN *et al.*, 2015).

We must emphasize that this change in the planet's *status quo* has implications not only for the viability of the development of human life but all other dimensions of life. There is a weakening and threat to the integrity of life in all its dimensions. For this exact reason, there is the emergence of the urge for the reformulation of the values – including morals –, attributed to nature (AYALA, 2018, p. 148).

In this scenario, the Law takes on the responsibility of dealing with issues of environmental justice in which Biogee – Life and Earth – is regarded as a new subject whose “voice” is heard for the first time by those who previously suppressed it (SERRES, 2017, p. 60-65). However, beyond legal strategies, it is necessary that, in this new era, such initiatives

represent a reality of transformation that is not limited to the mere definition of theoretical models.

There must be space for transformative action so that we can not only transform our relationship with nature but also transpose a new ethical reference to the scope of the law (KOTZÉ, 2012). Therefore, there is the suggestion that the intrinsic value must also be extended to other forms of life. Far from its instrumental character, it must lead to owning values independent of human interests (BUGGE, 2013, p. 7).

If for a long time, the non-human condition and nature were excluded from a community of justice, the need for morally coherent recognition is evident in the Anthropocene, intending to *confront interspecies injustice*. However, in addition to its complexity, injustice is not resolved through the mere proliferation of protective norms or public consensus based on political majority decisions. Furthermore, there is still great resistance in recognizing nature and the non-human condition based on its value *per se*, whether because of the centrality attributed to man in law systems or because of the difficulty in justifying ecological approaches (SCHLOSBERG, 2009, p. 109-113).

For this reason, the lack of justice can be resolved through a “tripartite notion of justice”: a) recognition, b) participation, and c) distribution (BOSELNANN, 2015, p. 118). It is precisely from the lack of recognition that this work, even understanding the importance of the other components, will devote efforts to arguing, as it impedes the opportunity for participation, and also the feasibility of equitable distribution.

It is, thus, observed that recognition, in addition to not expressing mere identification (SARMENTO, 2016, p. 242), is associated with valuing and expressing respect towards the other. Therefore, according to Axel Honneth (2003, p. 159-160), its denial would be synthetically configured as disrespect. When working on the subject, the author develops three intersubjective spheres of recognition: a) love; b) right; c) solidarity.

Self-confidence, the basis for the subject’s autonomy, is created in the sphere of love. Axel Honneth (2003, p. 175) describes the recognition of love as *being oneself in another* in such a way that *being with oneself* within the other is reciprocal. The author lists violence as the most serious expression of disrespect, not limited to physical integrity, but extending to any violation that results in loss of autonomy.

Regarding the law, he starts from the assumption of decoupling between legal recognition and social esteem. Legal recognition does not depend on

the other's ability to inspire esteem or that their attributes elevate them to a positive social evaluation. It must happen because the individual can establish themselves in reciprocal relationships with autonomy, freedom, and equality.

The third and last sphere of recognition, solidarity, is fueled by social esteem. The individual is valued not only for being a simple holder of rights but for their particularities. From a social esteem perspective, value is measured by the degree of contribution to the reaction of pre-determined social goals (HONNETH, 2003, p. 200).

Can non-human lives achieve equal recognition? The Hegelian tradition, to which Axel Honneth is affiliated, presupposes that recognition is capable of establishing an ideal reciprocal relationship between subjects in which each sees the other as their equal; the very extension of – and not separate from – themselves.

While contextualizing the struggles for recognition, Nancy Fraser (2008, p. 86) ensures that the recognition policy is identified as an identity policy, which is matched by group struggles over nationality, ethnicity, race, and gender. In this sense, there is the question of how non-human lives could achieve recognition without it resulting from an *assertion of specificity*. (FRASER, 2008, p. 86).

This questioning is based on two important arguments. First, in the fact that, although other dimensions of life are perceived in contemporary society as differentiated problems of justice, they are so not because the degree of importance of their lives differs from the degree of importance of human life, but because they were excluded from consideration by the justice community. Second, an approach in which other dimensions of life are justified in a separate identity group is considered limited as, in addition to contributing to the establishment of distancing between the natural and the human world, it is harmful to the idea of integration.

The paradigm to be reached is one in which all forms of life bear important values, but how to justify the recognition of other dimensions of life (nature and non-human animals)? At first glance, the understanding that the lack of recognition gives birth to the violation, deprivation of rights, and degradation (HONNETH, 2003, p. 213) takes shape as a possible option. However, how to justify them if Axel Honneth (2003), chosen here for the recognition debate, relates disrespect to the psychological character? How to prove this reflex of disrespect on the image of nature and also other dimensions of life?

Nancy Fraser (2008, p. 68) adopts an essentially defensible systematization, given the issue under analysis. The author offers, excluding the subject's psychological state, three problems resulting from the lack of recognition: cultural domination, non-recognition, and disrespect. This path is also adopted by David Schlosberg (2001, p. 14), for whom nature and other forms of life are subject to the three dimensions of lack of recognition. The author continues by listing two possible paths given this situation. The first would be a recognition that, by prioritizing nature's physical integrity, presents itself in the form of respect for safety, development, autopoiesis, and capacity. The second, in turn, is limited to the extrinsic value of nature, that is, the recognition directed at the value of nature for human beings (SCHLOSBERG, 2001, p. 15).

The first path was chosen not only because it seemed more compatible with the demands of the Anthropocene but also because it is more open to the sense of integrity and, consequently, closer to an idea of dignity. Therefore, the search for a transformation for the problem posed is aimed at correcting the unfair results of the lack of recognition (FRASER, 1995, p. 82) and implying a restructuring of the framework of the structural gaps presented.

It appears that the search for recognition begins with the transformative result that non-human forms of life also have value. Perhaps in this way "a world sensitive to difference is possible, in which the adjustment to the majority or dominant cultural norms is no longer the price for equal respect" (FRASER, 2008, p. 83).

4 FOR AN INTEGRATIVE DIGNITY NOTION: THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN, NON-HUMAN, AND NATURE'S CONDITIONS

If so far it has been evident that the lack of recognition, in addition to causing injustice, attacks and degrades nature and non-human animals, what is intended in this space is, from content for dignity, to respond on how we can recognize the intrinsic value of life forms beyond human life. Back to the conclusion drawn in the first part of this work, if the content of dignity makes sense for the human condition, it too can reach new contours and exhort meaning in the interest of protecting other forms of life. From this perspective, it is clear that some paths are possible.

The first proceeds from contributions by Erin Daly and James May

(2017, p. 15-19), for whom human dignity content can be used to promote better environmental outcomes. However, the proposal offered by the authors does not provide an exact transformation towards a notion of integrative dignity to other forms of life as, on the contrary, the idea would still be to achieve better environmental protection based on the protection of the human condition.

Another – more propositional – path is offered by Ingo Sarlet and Tiago Fensterseifer (2017, p. 91-116), who defend the extension of the content of dignity with an increase in the ecological dimension under the justification of quality of life as a whole. However, like in the first path presented, the legal protection of the ecological dimension still has links, albeit mitigated, to the protection of the human person.

Both paths are welcomed in this opportunity. However, in an attempt to raise and contribute to the debate, the hope is that the content of dignity finds its *integrative* notion, in the direction of *justifying the protection of nature and the non-human condition*, regardless of whether there is any human interest to be protected.

In this sense, the paradigm shift, as demonstrated so far, requires changes in the content of dignity and confirms a premise by which legal initiatives *per se* are unable to achieve great feats in the context of the Anthropocene. Guided by the sense of justice, the search for recognition must be directed, adopting as a premise the recognition justified from the intrinsic value beyond human life

Within this context, Hans Christian Bugge (2013, p. 7-8) elucidates that when the intrinsic values of nature are threatened, there is, by definition, no human interest to be protected. The author then ponders whether they could be protected, nevertheless. The question is also whether such protection would be tangible through the content of dignity.

At this point, demonstrating that the content of dignity must make sense to the other dimensions of life is defensible, even justifiable, by the argument that the non-human community has an extrinsic value, which is not summed up in a value-focused only on itself but in a value for the achievement of material and spiritual well-being for mankind (BUGGE, 2013, p. 7-8). If this instrumental value is jeopardized, those who appreciate it and/or depend on it will presumably promote initiatives to contain this threat.

The problem posed is that situations of degradation of non-human lives are not always deemed relevant for human beings. On the contrary,

most of the time, men are the cause of the problem. On this plane of argument, the justification of the degree of importance of the non-human community to the human community can find its place in an approach to dignity for all forms of life but cannot be the central imperative.

Thus, the importance of emphasizing that the path to dignity must operate according to the maxim that all lives matter, as they are all valuable. Consequently, all lives deserve protective justifications regardless of the benefits they provide to each other.

Therefore, a notion of dignity capable of encompassing non-human forms of life also needs to be operationalized through some transformations that, together, can be systematized as follows: a) reducing the distance between the human and the natural world; b) understanding that the protection of nature is unattainable if the human condition continues to assert itself with superiority within a community of justice (BOYD, 2017, p. 33-34); c) deviating from any anthropocentric, classical, or broad rationality (MORATO LEITE; SILVEIRA, 2018, p. 101-111). In its place, life in all its dimensions must be perceived as the core of protection.

It is not a question of considering men outside the content of dignity but understanding that *other values are equally important*. Not only our laws but also our cultures bring about a fundamental reorientation necessary to transpose human beings from conquerors of nature to members of the planet's community of life (BOYD, 2017, p. 253-254).

Peter Singer (2010, p. 3) argues that the ethical principle on which human equality is based obliges us to have equal consideration for animals. On the same plane, Tom Regan (2004, p. 243-248) defends animals as *subjects-of-a-life*, an argument that makes them equal from a moral point of view and, therefore, custodians of the same respect and consideration, and their lives cannot be taken as a simple means, but rather as an end in themselves.

Such contributions in dignity can be complemented by overcoming what Michael Rosen (2015, p. 144) calls humanism and Platonism. The basic duty to respect the dignity of mankind, as opposed to the transcendental terms of Kant's moral philosophy, must occur without accepting the *humanism* that whatever is perceived as good is so for the benefit of the human being. Likewise, one must overcome the Platonism that imposes acting with respect and reverence only in the face of timeless value.

Thus, the duty to respect dignity lies past an understanding of personhood. It refers to the duty to respect the dignity of mankind as a *duty to*

ourselves (ROSEN, 2015, p. 144). However, says the author, we are incarnations of a transcendent value, in such a way that the humanity present in us demands that we act in a way that respects this value, even if respecting it does not benefit us or others. Ronald Dworkin (2014, p. 3-4) even speaks of indivisible dignity. To the author, well-being means looking for a good life for oneself and fulfilling it with dignity. However, doing it with dignity implies going beyond oneself, as this is the only way to respect the dignity of others and one's own.

Michael Rosen's thought (2015), added to the premises of Ronald Dworkin's (2014), evoking the following understanding: dignity must make sense as a vehicle of humanity and not of personality. Thus, where there is value, there is a duty of respect and, therefore, dignity.

This understanding opens the way to a proposition of *integrative dignity*, a place where all forms of life are relevant because they have value, demand respect, act with respect, and understand dignity. Thus, *integrative dignity* is understood as the care and respect for the community of life, a central premise of the Earth Charter, for which human life, coupled with the evolutionary process, cannot be understood separately from other forms of life (BOSELNANN; TAYLOR, 2018, p. 173).

Unlike the Cartesian logic, which tends to be operationalized by separation, an *integrative* notion of *dignity* raises ecological thinking in and out of the content of dignity, as it welcomes the understanding that men's, akin to the non-human condition, have ecological transcendental value (CAPRA; MATTEI, 2015, p. 204-205). Thus, if the non-human condition and nature are ecological beings, men must also be considered subject or ecological beings (GRANT; KOTZÉ; MORROW, 2013, p. 963), once dignity must configure what new thing the Charter of Earth provide: responsibility towards the great community of life (BOSELNANN, 2015, p. 223), from which the importance of the principles of ecological integrity and sustainability arise.

In short, the protection of the *integrative dignity* must take place not because it is rational and utilitarian, or even justified to the human being, but because it has a transcendental intrinsic, including ecological, value. We believe that it is also possible to allow, through the recognition of the intrinsic value of other forms of life (non-human condition and nature), the inclusion of these communities within the standards of justice, placing them, as argued by Martha Nussbaum (2013), as subjects of justice, even

though they are not autonomous rights holders¹².

In general terms, just as the UDHR put an end to the lack of legal recognition of the intrinsic value of the human being, it seeks, based on the imperative that all life has value, to put an end to the lack of recognition that, in the Anthropocene, hurts, attacks, and degrades non-human life (LATOURE, 2014, p. 23-25).

CONCLUSION

Guided by the objective of achieving a transformative result – that the content of dignity can also make sense in the protection of values other than the human condition, this work was developed in the direction of justifying such protection based on the recognition that nature and the non-human condition must have a value *per se*. In short, it defended that there is no longer any room for a content of dignity in which only the human person is the guiding center or final destination of protection.

Given this scenario, in order to justify recognition, respect, and protection for non-human lives, an argument was presented from the perspective that everything that has value must also be respected and, therefore, have dignity. Likewise, there was a demonstration of how the content of dignity can also make sense for the protection of non-human lives and nature itself. To this end, a suggestion was made that all lives exhort transcendental ecological value, from a meaning in dignity that is called *integrative dignity*.

If men are ecological beings and, therefore, part of nature and non-human animals, a notion of *integrative dignity* in which all lives are recognized, respected, and protected must and can have its place within a legal culture, whose primacy is the protection of all important values. This article also advocates that recognition through such an understanding leads to the integration of nature and the non-human condition within a *community of justice*, so that the participation or, in other words, the defense of the interests of the communities of life, is possible.

Finally, there is potential for the content of dignity to become a light for non-human lives which still suffer in the darkness of lack of recognition, respect, and, consequently, justice.

¹² Martha Nussbaum does not deal with the inclusion of nature within a community of justice, but many believe it is possible to extend her theory of justice. NUSSBAUM, Martha C. *Frontiers of Justice: disability, nationality and species belonging*. Translation by Susana de Castro. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2013. p. 309-402.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ALEMANHA. *Código Civil (BGB) de 1990*. Available from: <https://de-jure.org/gesetz/BGB/90a.html>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

ALEMANHA. *Lei Fundamental Alemã de 1949*. Tradução (inglês). Available from: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4e64d9a02.html>. Access on: May 25, 2021.

AYALA, P. A. Constitucionalismo global ambiental e os direitos da natureza. In: MORATO LEITE, J. R. (Ed.). *A Ecologização do Direito Ambiental vigente: rupturas necessárias*. Rio de Janeiro: Lumes Juris, 2018.

BANGLADESH. *High Court of Bangladesh*. The High Court has given orders to give some legal rights to all the rivers in Bangladesh. Dhaka Tribune, Jan. 30, 2019. Available from: <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/court/2019/01/30/turag-given-legal-person-status-to-save-it-from-encroachment>. Access on: May 28, 2021.

BARAK, A. *Human Dignity: the constitutional value and the constitutional right*. translated from the Hebrew by Daniel Kayros. United Kingdom: Cambridge University, 2015.

BOLÍVIA. *Ley de 15 octubre de 2012 – Ley marco de la madre tierra y desarrollo integral para vivir bien*. Available from: <https://bityli.com/ElfHF>. Access on: May 28, 2021.

BOLÍVIA. *Universal Declaration of Rights of Mother Earth*. Available from: <http://therightsofnature.org/universal-declaration/>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

BOSELDMANN, K. *O princípio da sustentabilidade: transformando direito e governança*. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2015.

BOSELDMANN, K.; TAYLOR, P. *The significance of the Earth charter in international law*. A thematic essay on the significance of the earth charter for global law. Available from: <http://www.earthcharterinaction.com/invent/images/uploads/ENG-Bosselmann.pdf>. Access on: Jun. 22, 2018.

BOYD, D. R. *The rights of nature: a legal revolution that could save the world*. Toronto: ECW Press, 2017.

BRASIL. *Decreto n. 19.841, de 22 de outubro de 1945*. Promulga a Carta das Nações Unidas, da qual faz parte integrante o anexo Estatuto

da Corte Internacional de Justiça, assinada em São Francisco, a 26 de junho de 1945, por ocasião da Conferência de Organização Internacional das Nações Unidas. Available from: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1930-1949/d19841.htm. Access on: May 26, 2021.

BRASIL. Superior Tribunal de Justiça. *Acórdão de decisão que deu parcial provimento ao recurso no intuito de anular os autos de infração emitidos pelo Ibama e restabelecer a guarda do animal silvestre apreendido*. Recurso Especial n. 1.797.175-SP. STJ, 2ª Turma. Relator: Ministro Og Fernandes. 21 de março de 2019. Available from: <https://stj.jusbrasil.com.br/jurisprudencia/692205375/recurso-especial-resp-1797175-sp-2018-0031230-0/inteiro-teor-692205385>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

BUGGE, H. C. Twelve fundamental challenges in environmental law: an introduction to the concept of rule of law for nature. In: VOIGHT, C. (Ed.) *Rule of law for nature: new dimensions and ideas in environmental law*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. p. 3-26.

CAMENZIND, S. Dignity of creature: beyond suffering and further. In: RÖCKLINSBERG, H.; SANDIN, P. (Eds.). *The ethics of consumption*. Wageningen: Academic Publishers, 2013. p. 279-283.

CAPRA, F.; MATTEI, U. *The ecology of law: toward a legal system in tune with nature and community*. Oakland: Berrett-Koehler, 2015.

COLOMBIA. *Resolución n. 002*. Consejo Comunitario Mayor de la Asociación Campesina Integral del Atrato COCOMACIA, 2013. Disponível em: <http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/recs/n12/n12a16.pdf>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

COLOMBIA. *Corte Suprema de Justicia*. Available from: <https://justiciaambientalcolombia.org/habeas-corpus-oso-chucho/>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

CRUTZEN, P. J. *Geology of mankind*. Nature, 415, jan. 2002. Available from: <http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v415/n6867/full/415023a.html>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

DALY, E. *Dignity rights: courts, constitutions, and the worth of the human person*. Philadelphia: University Pennsylvania Press, 2012.

DALY, E.; MAY, J. Environmental dignity rights. In: MALJEAN-DUBOIS, S. (Ed). *The effectiveness of Environmental Law*. Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017. p. 125-148.

DWORKIN, R. *El dominio de la vida: una discusión acerca del aborto, la eutanasia y la libertad individual*. Barcelona: Ariel, 1998.

DWORKIN, R. *A raposa e o porco-espinho: justiça e valor*. São Paulo: WMF, 2014.

ECUADOR. *Constitución De La República Del Ecuador 2008*. Available from: https://www.oas.org/juridico/pdfs/mesicic4_ecu_const.pdf. Access on: Dec. 10, 2021.

ECUADOR. *Corte Constitucional del Ecuador*. Caso n. 22-18-IN. Sentencia. 8 set. 2021a. Available from: http://esacc.corteconstitucional.gob.ec/storage/api/v1/10_DWL_FL/e2NhcNBlDGE6J3RyYW1pdGUnLCBldWlkOidiN2NkMjRmMS1hODMxLTQxMTEtODEzZiliZ-TQyOWQ0ZjQxYTMucGRmJ30=?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=-d68ec758-ce69-4ca0-97a1-9b63087ec4f7. Access on: Dec. 10, 2021.

ECUADOR. *Corte Constitucional del Ecuador*. Caso n. 1149-19-JP/20. Sentencia. Revisión de garantías. 10 nov. 2021b. Available from: http://esacc.corteconstitucional.gob.ec/storage/api/v1/10_DWL_FL/e2NhcNBlDGE6J3RyYW1pdGUnLCBldWlkOic2MmE3MmIxNy1hM-zE4LTQyZmMtYjJkOS1mYzYzNWE5ZTAwNGYucGRmJ30=. Access on: Dec. 10, 2021.

ESPAÑA. *Ley Orgánica 1/2015 – Ley que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, del Código Penal*. Available from: <https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/2015/03/30/1/con>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

FRANCE. LOI n. 2015-17 du 16 février 2015 – Relative à la modernisation et à la simplification du droit et des procédures dans les domaines de la justice et des affaires intérieures. Available from: <https://bityli.com/xxcoc>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

FRASER, N. From redistribution to recognition? Dilemmas of justice in a post-socialist' age. *New Left Review*, n. 212, p. 69-149, 1995.

FRASER, N. La justicia social en la era de la política de identidad: redistribución, reconocimiento y participación. *Revista de Trabajo*, v. 4, n. 6, p. 83-99, 2008.

GENESIS. Capítulo 1, versículo 26. *Bíblia Sagrada*. São Paulo: Sociedade Bíblica do Brasil, 1969.

GERRITSEN, V. Animal welfare in Switzerland-constitutional aim, social

commitment, and a major challenge. *Global Journal Animal Law*, v. 1, p. 1-15, jan. 2016.

GRANT, E.; KOTZÉ, L. J.; MORROW, K. Human rights and the environment: in search of a new relationship: synergies and common themes. *Oñati Socio-Legal Series*, v. 3, n. 5, p. 953-965, 2013. Available from: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221302>. Access on: Dec. 10, 2021.

HONNETH, A. *Luta por reconhecimento: a gramática moral dos conflitos*. São Paulo: 34, 2003.

ÍNDIA. *Lei n. 135-B de 2014* – Prohibition of import of cosmetics tested on animals. Available from: <https://www.petaindia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/final-ban-import.pdf>. Access on: May 21, 2021.

KANT, I. *Crítica da razão pura e outros textos filosóficos*. São Paulo: Abril, 1975.

KOTZÉ, L. J. *Reimagining global Environmental Law and governance in the anthropocene*. South Africa: Noordwes-Universiteit, Potchefstroom-kampus, 2012.

LATOUR, B. Para distinguir amigos e inimigos no tempo do Antropoceno. *Revista de Antropologia*, v. 57, n. 1, p. 11-31, 2014.

MARTÍNEZ, E.; ACOSTA, A. Los derechos de la naturaleza como puerta de entrada a otro mundo posible. *Revista Direito e Práxis*, v. 8, n. 4, p. 2927-2961, 2017.

MAY, J.; DALY, E. *Global Environmental Constitucionalism*. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

MORATO LEITE, J. R.; FERREIRA, M. L. P. C. Estado de Direito Ambiental: o antropocentrismo alargado e o direito da fauna. In: CURSCHMANN, J.; PAUL, W.; SANDEN, A. (Orgs). *Mitteilungen der deutsch-brasilianischen juristenvereinigung*. Regensburg: XXXIII Jahrestagung der DBJV, 2004.

MORATO LEITE, J. R.; SILVEIRA, P. G. A Ecologização do Estado de Direito: uma Ruptura ao Direito Ambiental e ao antropocentrismo vigentes. In: MORATO LEITE, J. R. *A ecologização do direito ambiental vigente: rupturas necessárias*. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2018. p. 101-143.

MORIN, E. Para além do Iluminismo. *Revista FAMECOS: Mídia, Cultura e Tecnologia*, v. 12, n. 26, p. 24-28, 2005.

NEW ZEALAND. *Innovative bill protects Whanganui River with legal personhood*. New Zealand Parliament, 28 mar. 2017. Available from: <https://bityli.com/r6RPP>. Access on: May 28, 2021.

NUSSBAUM, M. C. *Fronteiras da Justiça: deficiência, nacionalidade, pertencimento à espécie*. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2013.

ONU. *Carta Mundial para a Natureza – Resolução 37/7 das Nações Unidas de 28/10/1982*. Available from: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/39295>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

PIOVESAN, F. *Direitos humanos e justiça internacional*. 3. ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2012.

PIOVESAN, F. Direitos humanos e princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana. In: LEITE, G. S. (Org.). *Dos princípios constitucionais: considerações em torno das normas principiológicas da Constituição*. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2003. p. 141-154.

PORTUGAL. *Animais deixam de ser coisas em Portugal*. Pessoas-Animais-Natureza (PAN), Portugal, 2016. Available from: <https://www.pan.com.pt/animais-deixam-de-ser-coisas-em-portugal/>. Access on: May 25, 2021.

RAWLS, J. *Uma teoria da justiça*. 4. ed. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2016.

REGAN, T. *The case for Animal Rights*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

ROCHA, C. L. A. O princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana e a exclusão social. *Jurisprudência Catarinense*, Florianópolis, v. 35, n. 117, apr./jun. 2009.

ROSEN, M. *Dignidade: sua história e significado*. São Leopoldo: UNISINOS, 2015.

SANTOS, B. S. Por uma concepção multicultural de direitos humanos. *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais*, n. 48, p. 11-32 1997.

SARLET, I. W. As dimensões da dignidade da pessoa humana: construindo uma compreensão jurídico-constitucional necessária e possível. In: SARLET, I. W.; ALEIXO, P. S. M.; ZANINI, R. D. (Orgs.). *Dimensões da dignidade: ensaios de Filosofia do Direito e Direito Constitucional*. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2005. p. 13-43.

SARLET, I. W.; FENSTERSEIFER, T. *Direito Constitucional*. 5. ed. Ambiental. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2017.

SARLET, I. W.; FENSTERSEIFER, T. STJ, a dimensão ecológica da dignidade e direitos do animal não humano. *Revista Eletrônica Consultor Jurídico*, 2019. Available from: <https://bityli.com/7E6CU>. Access on: Jun. 03, 2019.

SARLET, I. W.; FENSTERSEIFER, T. Algumas notas sobre a dimensão ecológica da dignidade da pessoa humana e sobre a dignidade da vida em geral. *Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal*, v. 2, n. 3, p. 69-94, 2014.

SARMENTO, D. *Dignidade da pessoa humana: conteúdo, trajetórias e metodologia*. Belo Horizonte: Fórum, 2016.

SCHLOSBERG, D. *Defining environmental justice: theories, movements, and nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

SCHLOSBERG, D. *Three dimensions of environmental and ecological justice*. Presentation prepared for the European consortium for political research annual joint sessions, Grenoble, France, p. 1-5, 2001.

SERRES, M. *Tempo de crise*. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 2017.

SILVA, J. A. Dignidade da pessoa humana como valor supremo. *Revista de Direito Administrativo*, Rio de Janeiro, 212, p. 89-94, abr./jun. 1998.

SINGER, P. *Libertação animal*. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2010.

STEFFEN, W. *et al.* Planetary boundaries: guiding human development on a changing planet. *Science*, v. 347, n. 6223, 2015. Available from: <https://science.sciencemag.org/content/347/6223/1259855.full>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

SWITZERLAND. *Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, of 18 April 1999*. Available from: <https://bityli.com/f1O8E>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

UGANDA. *The National Environment ACT*, 2019. Available from: <https://bityli.com/0daFv>. Access on: May 25, 2021.

UNESCO. *A Carta da Terra – Acordo assinado durante a Conferência das Nações Unidas sobre Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento, em 1992*. Available from: <https://earthcharter.org/library/the-earth-charter-text/>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

YUROK TRIBE. *Yurok Tribal Council Resolution 19-40*. Establishing the Rights of the Klamath River. Available from: <https://bityli.com/tPFc9>. Access on: May 26, 2021.

Article received on: 06/22/2021.

Article accepted on: 12/16/2021.

How to cite this article (ABNT):

AYALA, P. A.; SCHWENDLER, J. S. C. Life without dignity? The search for an integrative sense of dignity for nature, the human condition, and the non-uman condition. *Veredas do Direito*, Belo Horizonte, v. 18, n. 42, p. 11-36, sep./dec. 2021. Available from: <http://www.domhelder.edu.br/revista/index.php/veredas/article/view/2184>. Access on: Month. day, year